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ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CREDIT RATIONING AND LOAN DEFAULT FOR
MF01
This chapter outlines the theoretical background to the importance of lenders developing suitable
technologies to reduce information asymmetries. Section 5.2 explains the objectives of the loan
default analysis using sample data obtained from MF01 over the period 1998 to 1999. The
economic model specification for the analysis is given in section 53 followed by the sampling
methodology and the definition ofthe dependent variable in section 5.4. Descriptive information
about the sample data is briefly discussed in section 5.5, while the remaining sections review the
results of the estimated models.
5.1 Theoretical Background
Lenders seldom have perfect information on the willingness of loan applicants to repay the loan
and may also have difficulty in establishing the true circums~ces leading to loan default. This
is because of the information asymmetries that exist between the two contracting parties. The
implication of such asymmetric information in credit markets is that the price (interest rate of
credit) may not act as a market-clearing mechanism. Furthermore, lenders may credit-ration loan
applicants, where this rationing may be in the form of additional collateral requirements or loan
size and loan term rationing. The extent of the rationing depends on the level of information held
by the two contracting parties and how effectively loan contracts can be monitored and enforced
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Herath, 1996; Barham et al., 1996).
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It is thus important that lenders are able to reduce information asymmetries by overcoming the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Where a lender is not able to distinguish
between potentially high-risk and low-risk loan applicants, there is a greater likelihood of
accepting a high-risk loan applicant and incorrectly rationing the low-risk loan applicant. This
leads to higher levels of default as more high-risk borrowers are accepted, forcing the lender to
increase interest rates to cover increased costs associated with increased loan default. This may
result in low-risk loan applicants opting out of the loan market, and it also increases the risk of
the remaining pool of loan applicants applying for credit. This may impact negatively on lender
profits (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Similarly, imperfect loan contract monitoring and enforcement may increase the likelihood of
moral hazard. This negatively affects lender income and may force the lender to increase levels
of monitoring or to require additional collateral to compensate for the greater loan default
(Herath, 1996; Navajas, 1999a). Additional monitoring increases lender costs, while there may
also be additional costs associated with evaluating collateral. This may encourage the lender to
increase interest rates to compensate for higher costs, or credit may be rationed. Both of these
effects have negative consequences for low-risk borrowers (Navajas, 1999a).
As outlined in Chapter 4, microfinance institutions have used different financial technologies to
mitigate information asymmetries, the two main technologies being group- and individual-based
lending. Where it is difficult and very costly to obtain information on individuals and the projects
that require finance, and to monitor the performance of borrowers, MFOs have used group-
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lending technologies. A standard loan contract is offered with a set term and a set interest rate
with individuals self-selecting into the program. To try and ensure that the group of borrowers is
able to repay the loan, care is taken by the lender in selecting to finance those activities that
generate sufficient incomes. Loan contracts are enforced by joint liability in which individuals
within the group monitor each other to ensure contractual obligations are met (Besley and Coate,
1995; Navajas, 1999a).
The disadvantage of this type of technology is that only one standard loan contract is offered to
potential borrowers. This may not necessarily meet the requirements of borrowers and may also
penalize low-risk borrowers who could have obtained a better loan contract had the lender been
able to screen individually for risk (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997). In addition, if there are many
'free-riders' in the group who opt not to pay, there may be wholesale default in the group. Also,
if the earnings within the group are positively correlated, as in agricultural lending, group loans
may not necessarily reduce default risk (Besley and Coate, 1995).
Financial technologies that grant individual loans require that lenders screen loan applicants
individually to assess loan repayment risk. Where the assimilation of information about the
individual loan applicant rests within the group for group loans, the MFO is required to collect
this information for individual loan applicants. Successful MFOs in Bolivia, such as Caja Los
Andes and Financiera Calpia employ loan officers to collect information from loan applicants
and perform some of the initial credit screening. The information is then processed and evaluated
by a credit committee according to certain prescribed guidelines (Navajas, 1999b). Hence the
knowledge about credit worthiness of loan applicants rests with the loan officers and members of
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the credit committee, and relies heavily on the localized knowledge that these individuals have
about their clientele.
Successful MFOs in Indonesia used the localized knowledge of tribal chiefs to screen loan
applicants, thus avoiding investment in technology and skills to screen loan applicants
themselves (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996). More advanced commercial lending institutions
have employed sophisticated scoring technologies to assimilate and process information about
loan applicants in order to provide loan officers with an indication of the potential risk of loan
default. This process has been facilitated by access to suitable information to use in these scoring
models (Schreiner, 1999; Hand and Henley, 1997). The type of credit assessment financial
technology used, depends largely on the ease of access to information, the availability of
collateral and the ability to enforce loan contracts.
To try and improve the ability of lenders to screen loan applicants, numerous studies have tried
to identify factors that influence loan default. Few studies have specifically focused on
identifying factors that influence loan default by small-scale agricultural borrowers, because
information was not readily available. Early research by Igben (1978), Sanderatne (1978),
Boakye-Dankwa (1979) and Okorie (1986) identified factors that influenced small-farmer loan
repayment, primarily in Nigeria. Few of these studies had access to original data, with
Sanderatne (1978) and Boakye-Dankwa (1979) relying on secondary survey data for their
analyses. Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega (1993), Vigano (1993) and Hunte (1993) used
more rigorous empirical models to estimate factors influencing loan repayment at the
Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican Republic, Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole
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of Burkina Fasso, and the Guyana Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank,
respectively.
Local research by Lugemwa and Darroch (1995) and Kuhn and Darroch (1998) explored the loan
repayment perfotmance by short-term and medium-term borrowers at two agricultural credit
banks in SA that received government subsidies. Later studies by Reinke (1998), Zeller (1998)
and Schreiner (1999) focused on loan repayment performance at MFOs providing mostly non-
agricultural credit to borrowers involved in small businesses. Although most of these studies do
not provide models that are useful for credit scoring purposes because of the small sample size
and the use of information that lenders do not readily collect or have available, they give some
insight into factors that may require more consideration by lenders in the credit granting process.
The model developed by Schreiner (1999) was a first attempt to develop a more rigorous
empirical scoring model based on a very large sample of 10 555 loans disbursed by a
microlender in Bolivia.
Due to the ready availability of data, numerous studies have investigated the loan repayment
performance of commercial farm clients (see Turvey, 1991; Miller and LaDue, 1991; Mortensen
et al., 1988). Early work by Orgler (1970), Altman (1980), Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) and
Reichert et al. (1983) focused on factors influencing loan repayment performance of commercial
bank loans. Boyes et al. (1989), Greene (1992), Jacobson and Roszbach (1998) and Roszbach
(1998) more recently analysed factors affecting consumer loan default. Since the early 1970s,
major credit risk companies such as FairIsaac and Experian have invested large resources in
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developing models to predict loan default risk. Little of this work has been published, as the key
information used is mostly proprietary.
A number of conceptual issues have been raised by the above studies of factors affecting loan
repayment performance. Firstly, loan default studies need to clearly distinguish the type of
borrower population for which factors affecting loan default are to be estimated. If the model
intends to predict loan default of all "through the door" loan applicants, then a model that
estimates this function based only on the accepted group of loan applicants will tend to give a
downwardly-biased estimate ofthe probability of loan default (Reichert et al., 1983; Boyes et al.,
1989; Greene, 1992). This implies that information about the rejected population must be
included by conditioning the default model to account for a type of selection bias that results
from only observing loan repayment for those borrowers that are accepted.
If the credit model intends to predict the loan default of existing borrowers, then it is of no
consequence if the model is not conditioned for excluding the rejected sample population
(Mortensen et aI., 1988; Boyes et al., 1989). Credit models very often tend to focus only on
predicting loan repayment performance over a single period debt contract. However, the credit
decision is a multi-period decision over which the loan generates a flow of funds until the
customer pays up the credit and decides not to take another loan, or defaults. During the life
cycle of the customer, several loans may be taken before the customer pays up the credit and
goes dormant. For a defaulting borrower, the time for which the loan is current is critical since
the collection costs are high. If a loan is current for a sufficient period of time, it may be
profitable to grant credit to a potentially defaulting customer (Eisenbeis, 1981).
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Several credit models have accounted for the revenue maximizing credit decision by, for
instance, adjusting the cut-off point in the classification tables of probability models for
maximizing revenue rather than minimizing loan default (Mortensen et al., 1988; Greene, 1992).
This action has been justified since the pay-offs for correct and incorrect classification of
borrowers are not equal. Roszbach (1998) modified the dependent variable in his credit model by
assuming that 'time to default' would give an indication of the profitability of the loan contract.
This assumption is rather limiting, since to obtain an accurate indication of the net revenue, the
net present value of the cash flows resulting from the debt contract over time must be estimated.
This requires accurate monthly cost data that are not always readily available.
It may not only be in a financial institution's interest to identify factors that affect loan
repayment, but also to establish whether the loan granting decision process is effective (Boyes et
al., 1989; Hunte, 1993). This requires that the effectiveness ofthe characteristics that are used in
the credit decision process must be validated against loan performance in order to establish
whether the characteristics can predict loan default. Hunte (1993) and Boyes et al. (1989)
developed credit models that tested the efficacy of the loan granting decision.
5.2 Objectives of the Analysis
Given the importance of the borrower screening process in the credit granting decision, the main
objective of this analysis is to identify factors affecting the loan repayment performance of loans
granted by two of the KZN MFOs discussed in Chapter 4, namely MFO1 and MF02. As noted,
MFO1 provides mainly consumption credit to low-income individuals that are formally
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employed, while MF02 provides medium- and long-term agricultural finance to emerging small-
scale farmers. Making the right credit decision has important consequences for lender viability
and borrower investment choices. This is particularly pertinent for MFO I which is operating in
an increasingly competitive SA microfmance environment that requires balancing the right
choices with a profit maximizing incentive. Given ready access to the data on consumption loan
performance for MFOI, the analysis will evaluate the efficacy of MFOI's loan granting
decisions. It will also condition the subsequent loan default model for MFO I for the sampling
bias that results from excluding the potential loan repayment performance of rejected loan
applicants. Given the lack of detailed cost information for MFOl, the loan default model could
not be extended to endogenously model the factors affecting loan performance, where the
performance variable is based on borrower profit and not only on loan default. Identifying the
factors that influence loan default can help MFO I staff to refine the credit granting process. The
results of this study may also assist staff to critically review the efficacy of the credit granting
process to ensure that their credit decisions are based on information that matters.
The above analysis extends previous research on factors affecting loan default III the
microfinance sector in several ways. Firstly, no previous work has been done in SA on
identifying factors that affect loan default at a microfinance institution granting consumer loans.
Secondly, no previous study in SA has been able to access information on rejected loans that can
be used to validate the efficacy of the credit granting decision. This analysis also uses
information provided by the credit bureau at the time of the loan assessment so that the role of
this information can be assessed in the credit evaluation process and as a predictor of loan
repayment performance. This is particularly important in the SA context where there the
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government is considering introducing a regulatory body to control credit bureaus and the
information that they can provide to lenders to facilitate the loan granting decision. No
international study on loan repayment performance at a microfinance institution has used this
type of information to assess its potential influence on loan default. Section 5.3 below will derive
the empirical models for the analysis of factors affecting the loan granting decision and loan
repayment performance of consumption loans granted by MFO1.
5.3 Economic Model Specification for MFOl
Before specifying the economic model it is important to understand the credit screening
technology used by MFO1. This lender operates in the mass credit market in SA and processes
approximately 800 loan applications per day. The financial technology used by MFOl restricts it
to granting loans to individuals who are employed in the formal sector of the economy. To
qualify for a loan, an applicant must be over 18 years of age, and produce a pay-slip and some
form of identification. An application form is completed and captured onto the banking system.
As MFO1 aims to disburse credit within one to two hours of the loan application being made, the
credit vetting process must necessarily be fast and accurate. Only branch managers at MFO 1
have the authority to approve or decline a loan.
The credit approval process relies on both the branch manager's local knowledge of individuals,
and the assessment of information based on four broadly defined aspects of credit worthiness as
determined by MF01's policies and procedures. The four aspects are stability, contactability,
affordability and previous credit history, and these aspects assess key areas of information that
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are required in order for the lending technology to operate. All loans are unsecured, with the only
form of collateral being reputational capital, which is effected by the listing of delinquent
borrowers by the credit bureau. Staff at MFO1 closely monitor the loan repayment performance
of borrowers and start a process oftelephonic follow-up (as soon as 5 days after an instalment is
in arrears) backed up by a series ofletters to encourage borrowers in arrears to repay.
With no collateral being taken, the credit assessment process is even more critical, since at this
point a wrong decision may result in lost income opportunities if a potentially low-risk loan
applicant is rationed out of the credit market. Conversely, if a potentially high-risk loan applicant
is accepted, there may be increased costs due to additional monitoring and eventual loan write-
off. Given that MFO1' s objective is to maximize profits, the balance between accepting the right
proportion of high- and low-risk loan applicants must be maintained.
Stability in relation to creditworthiness as defined by MFO 1 has two aspects, namely the stability
of income and the stability of residence for contactability purposes. Several proxy variables on
MFOl's loan application form measure stability, such as the length of residence at the current
residential address, time period of employment, age, and marital status. Given MFOl's financial
technology, a borrower must be contactable for credit control purposes. A loan applicant's
income must be stable, and the loan applicant must be able to repay the debt. Willingness to meet
credit obligations is measured by the applicant's previous credit history as obtained from the
credit bureau. Taking these factors, and any other knowledge of the loan applicant that the
branch manager may have, into account will determine whether a loan is granted or not, and if a
loan is granted, how much credit the loan applicant qualifies for. At the time of the study, the
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interest rate charged to borrowers was fixed, with no differentiation being made between high-
and low-risk borrowers. In addition, MFO1 offered one standard term consumer loan of 4
months. Hence the only differentiation between high-and low-risk loan applicants was based on
the loan amount.
The model of credit rationing and loan default for MFO 1 used in this study is based on the
theoretical frameworks derived by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Carter (1988), Hunte (1993) and
Barham et al. (1996), and the empirical modeling framework used by Boyes et al. (1989),
Greene (1992) and Jacobson and Roszbach (1998). The model assumptions are as follows:
1) Borrowers are heterogeneous, with different levels of credit risk, expected return a.nd
measurable probabilities of default. Lender MFO1 is thus assumed to ration loan
applicants according to the perceived risks and probabilities of default. Although
other terms and conditions of the loan contract such as interest rates and term should
be varied according to credit risk, MF01's financial technology at the time of the
study did not permit this. Low-risk borrowers were thus necessarily subsidizing high-
risk borrowers by virtue of paying the same interest rate.
2) Given borrower heterogeneity, MFOI will undertake a rigorous screening process to
differentiate its loan applicants into different credit risk classes. The only form of
rationing that is observed is loan size rationing which ranges from being completely
rationed (declined) to being partially rationed (the loan amount granted exceeds 0, but
cannot exceed the loan amount that is requested).
267
3) Although the interest rate is set and is equally applied to all loans, the effect of the
interest rate as a market clearing mechanism is reduced (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). However, the interest rate still has an adverse selection
effect since some low-risk borrowers may consider that the rate is above their
reservation price and may not consider applying for the credit. This leaves a
potentially riskier pool of loan applicants.
4) The expected pay-off to MF01 is given by:
E[Income] = (1- Po)(finance charges - cost of capital)
Po(Bad debt - recovery amount - penalty interest)
Fixed costs
(1 - Po)(Variable costs)
(PD)(Variable Costs)
where PD= the probability of loan default.
(5.1)
Equation (5.1) shows that as PDdecreases, the expected income of the lender increases
and the loan applicant is less likely to be credit rationed. The increase in expected income
results partly from the higher expected revenue and lower variable costs from assessing
and monitoring the loan applicant. As Po increases, the expected income decreases and
the variable costs increase due to the additional monitoring of the loan applicant. Where
Po is sufficiently large such that E[Income:lS 0, the loan applicant will be rationed fully
and credit will not be granted.
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The magnitude of PD required to induce partial or full rationing depends on the size of the
bad debt, the loan amount that is recovered, the potential income from penalty interest,
and the structure of the fixed and variable costs (Hunte, 1993; Greene, 1992). For
instance, if the recovery action is efficient, a higher level of bad debt can be carried,
while the penalty interest may also defray some of the costs of default. It will also depend
on the length of time for which the borrower is expected to remain current before
defaulting (Eisenbeis, 1981; Roszbach, 1998).
The credit rationing decision is necessarily complex and depends on an interlinked set of
costs, revenues and the expected default probability. However, a branch manager's
assessment of the default probability is the key element that influences the rationing
decision. Some risky borrowers may be accepted because the expected pay-off is greater
than the expected costs. Hence it is critical to explore whether the decision made by the
branch manager is effective in predicting PD. In addition, the decision to grant credit will
not necessarily only be based on the observable characteristics of loan applicants, but
may also depend on unobservable characteristics as a result of the localized knowledge of
the branch manager. The potential to earn revenue from a customer, if a potentially
defaulting customer is current for a sufficient period of time (Eisenbeis, 1981; Boyes et
al., 1989; Greene, 1992; Roszbach, 1998), is also relevant.
To assess the factors that affect the credit rationing decision and loan repayment performance,
the economic model for MFOl will consist of two equations:
c. =f3.v .. +&.
1 J JI I




Equation (5.2) represents the credit rationing function and equation (5.3) represents the loan
default function. The functions each have j parameter estimates (~, a) with j vectors of
explanatory variables (v, x) for i loan applicants in Equation (5.2), and i borrowers in Equation
(5.3). Variable C represents the latent, unobservable rationing ratio (number of loans accepted
relative to total loan applications). The greater is C, the less the loan applicant is rationed, with C
bound between 0 and 1.
Since MFO 1 does not record the amount of credit requested, all that can be observed ex post is
whether the sample applicant is granted credit, C = 1 (but the extent of the rationing is not
known) or fully rationed, C = 0 (declined). Amemiya (1981), Maddala (1983), McFadden (1987)
and Greene (2000) show that in this case the linear regression model can be extended to a
binomial response by introducing an intermediate unobserved (latent) variable c* such that:
where
C_( ') _{O if c' =0. -z c· -
1 1 1if c' > 0
(5.4)
The objective of this study is to predict the probability that a sample loan applicant will be
accepted, Pi as:
(5.5)
If F(51 v) is the cumulative distribution function of the disturbances, then the probability that a
sample loan applicant will be accepted is:
Prob[C j =11 vJ = Prob(z(c) > 01 vJ
= Prob[!Jv i +&j >0]
= F(!Jxilv j ]
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(5.6)
It is hypothesized that applicants who have more stable expected incomes, are contactable by
telephone, can afford the debt and who have relatively fewer defaults with other lenders are more
likely to be accepted by MFO I.
Variable D represents the latent unobserved propensity for an individual to default. The observed
default arises from the defined vector of attributes (x) and random behaviour of borrowers. Loan
default is assumed to occur in a single period that represents a specified duration of the customer
relationship with MFO I (Eisenbeis, 1981; Greene, 1992). The duration is based on the time
period that it takes for the majority of new borrowers to become delinquent (Kindred, 200 Ib).
This will be a fixed time period and, therefore, will not directly account for borrower
profitability based on the duration of being current, since a true analysis of this sort requires
detailed cost information that was not available for this study.
The greater is D, the higher is the propensity of the borrower to default. If D is relatively large
enough, the borrower defaults on the loan. All that is observed ex post is whether the borrower
defaults (Greene, 1992). Variable D can thus be represented by a latent unobservable variable d*
such that:
d' =a x· +w
1 1 I
where
D. = z(d') ={Oif d* = 0
I I 1if d' > 0
(5.7)
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The probability ofdefault is obtained by:
Prob[D; = 11 xJ = Prob[z(d;) > 0\ xJ
= Prob[a Xi + tiT; > 0]
= F(axdxJ
(5.8)
The vectors of attributes Vi and Xi (as captured by MF01 on the loan application form) are based
on the key aspects of MF01's credit assessment process, namely: borrower stability,
contactability, affordability, and credit history. Table 5.1 shows proxies for vectors Vi and Xi, and
their expected effects on the probability of MFO 1 applicants being granted credit.
5.3.1 Loan Applicant Stability
Proxy variables for stability include sample applicant age, length of residence at current address,
length of employment at current employer, home ownership type, and economic activity. Older
applicants tended to be married, were employed for longer, and had lower debt-to-income ratios.
Age thus gives a relatively good indication of sample applicant stability and responsibility
toward meeting debt commitments, as older applicants were more stable and less indebted than
younger sample applicants. Vigano (1993) used age as a proxy for loan applicant stability and
found that older borrowers had a better loan repayment record than younger borrowers. Boyes et
al. (1989) found that older applicants had a greater likelihood of being accepted, and less
likelihood of defaulting on their debt commitments. Greene (1992) and Aguilera-Alfred and
Gonzalez-Vega (1993) also found that older borrowers were less likely to default. Older sample
applicants are thus hypothesized to have a higher likelihood of being accepted and a lower
likelihood ofexperiencing loan repayment problems.
Table 5.1
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Definitions and Expected Signs for Variables used to Predict the Likelihood
of being Granted Credit and of Loan Default for MF01
Vectors of Explanatory Variables (Vi. x;) Expected sign for effect on Expected sign for
granting credit (C = 1) effect on loan default
(D=I)
Stabilitv
Age (years) + -
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) - +
Married (Married = 1, Other = 0) + -
Single (Single = 1, Other = 0) - +
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) + -
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) - +
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) - +
Rent (Yes = 1, No '= 0) - +
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) -/+ -/+
Home loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) + -
Bank account (Yes = 1, No = 0) + -
Length of residence at current address (months) + -
Employment sector (1 = Government, +/- +/-
0= Private sector)
Number of months worked at current employer + -
Contactabilitv
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) + -
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) + -
Affordabilitv
Gross monthly income (Rand) + -
Net monthly income (Rand) + -
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio + -
Previous Credit History
Average number ofloans with other lenders at time of + -
application
Total number ofloans that were 2 - 3 months in arrears - +
at time ofapplication
Total number of loans that were 4 - 9 months in arrears - +
at time ofapplication






Loan applicants that are married are regarded as more stable as they tend to be settled at their
place of residence. Given that married individuals have family responsibilities, they may also be
less prone to changing employment. Single applicants are more likely to change accommodation
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and employment making it more difficult for MFO1 to track these clients. Boyes et al. (1989)
found that married sample applicants had a greater likelihood of being accepted and were less
likely to default. Loan applicants who are married are thus more likely to be granted credit and
less likely to default, while single loan applicants are more likely to be credit rationed and more
likely to experience loan repayment problems.
Loan applicants who own their homes are more likely to be contactable and have a stable income
stream to maintain the home and potentially payoff the home loan should the property have a
bond. Loan applicants that live with their parents or live on the property of their employer may
not have sufficient income to afford to a home or to rent. Such individuals may also easily move
to different premises and thus may be less contactable by MFO1 staff. Less contactable
borrowers pose a greater credit risk, since contact by mail and telephone are important
components ofMFOI's lending technology. Similarly, loan applicants that rent accommodation
may also be more prone to moving as a result of changing employment, increasing the risk of
potential follow-up should the borrower default. Boyes et al. (1989) found that credit card loan
applicants who owned their homes had a higher likelihood of being granted credit and a lower
likelihood of defaulting on their loans, while applicants renting their accommodation had a
higher likelihood of defaulting on their credit card debt. Loan applicants owning their homes are
thus hypothesized to have a higher likelihood of being granted credit by MFO 1 staff and a lower
likelihood of loan default. Loan applicants that are living with their parents or on the employer's
property or renting the accommodation are less likely to be granted a loan. Those who are
granted a loan are more likely to experience loan repayment problems.
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Loan applicants who have a home loan will have been subject to the rigorous screening criteria
used by commercial banks that mostly deal with home mortgages. Individuals who have a home
loan are also more likely to have higher income levels to be able to pay the debt. It is thus
hypothesized that sample applicants who have a home loan are more likely to be granted credit
by MFOl staff and less likely to default. To open a bank account, applicants must have a certain
minimum level of income. The presence of a bank account may also allow MFO1 to deduct loan
repayments from the applicant's bank account by debit order, thus increasing the likelihood of
loan repayment. A loan applicant with a bank account may thus more likely be granted credit by
MFO1 staff and, given the potential for automatic loan payment deductions, be less likely to
default on the loan.
The length of time lived at the current residential address, and the length of time worked at
current employer, are also applicant stability proxies. These give some indication that contact by
telephone or post is more likely, and that the applicant is relatively settled in a job with a lower
likelihood of changing employment or possibly being retrenched. Boyes et al. (1989) found a
positive relationship between the likelihood of loan acceptance and length of residence at current
address and length of employment at current employer, and that borrowers who lived longer at
their current address were less likely to default. Length of residence is thus hypothesized to be
positively related to the probability of having a loan application accepted, and to be negatively
related to the probability of loan default. Similarly, sample applicants that were employed for
longer at their current employer may have a greater likelihood of being accepted and less
likelihood of experiencing loan repayment problems.
UMZl1litigZ
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Central to a credit contract is the promise to pay in future for cash received at the time that the
credit contract is entered into - credit contracts are thus inherently risky (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990;
Barry et al., 1995; Herath, 1996). To mitigate this risk, lenders must try to ensure that the loan
applicant can service the future debt commitments. It matters, therefore, how the applicant
derives the future income stream and whether the future income stream is stable or variable.
Vigano (1993) found that applicants involved in economic sectors with less potential variability
in income had a lower probability of default than those applicants involved in economic
activities with more variable incomes.
Boyes et al. (1989) reported a statistically significant relationship between economic activity and
the incidence of credit rationing - less skilled applicants earning lower incomes were rationed
more than skilled applicants employed in managerial positions. Turvey (1991) and Schreiner
(1999) also reported significant relationships between economic activity and incidence of client
loan default. In this study the expected signs of the estimated coefficients for economic sector
depend on what sectors the branch staff at MFO1 view as potentially more prone to income
shocks, and which sectors actually are more prone. Hence the analysis of this variable will be
exploratory in nature. Loan applicants deemed to be employed in sectors where the possibility of
retrenchment or "short-time" is higher, are more likely to be credit rationed, while borrowers that
are retrenched are less likely to repay their loans. Gender is also a potentially important
discriminator, and if the past findings that women have a better repayment record than men in
rural areas (Christen et aI., 1994; Schreiner, 1999) hold, then female loan applicants are more
likely to be granted credit and less likely to default on their loans.
,SS Q
276
5.3.2 Loan Applicant Contactability
Two options available to the lender to try and ensure that borrowers have an incentive to repay
debt over time are the use of collateral and the monitoring of the debt contract. Increasing the
collateral requirements helps to solve the incentive problem, since the risk of non-compliance is
shifted to the borrower (Barro 1976; Guttentag and Herring, 1984). Collateral is, however,
seldom able to eliminate the incentive problem completely since borrowers may not be able to
pledge collateral equal to the promised repayment amount. It is also costly to negotiate complete
debt contracts, while realizing the full value of the collateral may not always be possible (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985).
Hence where technology and cost allows, lenders also resort to monitoring the debt contract in
order to restrict the opportunistic behaviour of borrowers. Increased monitoring results in lower
opportunistic behaviour by borrowers, but comes at an increased cost (Navajas, 1999). Since
MFO1 does not take collateral and is thus compelled to monitor debt contracts, the monitoring
technology it uses must be cost-effective given the large number of borrowers that have to be
tracked daily. Individual visits are too costly and hence telephones are used to contact borrowers
that are in arrears. If borrowers are not contactable by telephone either at the work place or at
home, the pay offs to monitoring are reduced, and there is likely to be an increase in the
opportunistic behaviour of the borrowers. Potential borrowers that are contactable at work or at
home are thus less likely to be credit rationed and are also less likely to default.
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5.3.3 Loan Applicant Affordability
Barry et al., (1995) define repayment capacity as the ability of borrowers to meet the full debt
obligation from their surplus income. Okorie (1986), Boyes et al. (1989), Turvey (1991), and
Miller and LaDue (1991) show that borrowers with lower debt-to-income ratios have less
likelihood of defaulting on their debt commitments. Given the increased profile of borrower
indebtedness within the regulatory framework of MFOs in South Africa that culminated in the
formation of the NLR, it is particularly important that branch managers at MFO1 consider this
information in the loan granting decision. Higher monthly debt-to-net income ratios for sample
borrowers are thus likely to be positively associated with an increased probability of credit
rationing and an increased probability of loan default.
5.3.4 Previous Credit History of the Loan Applicant
The expected stability of future income streams and the availability of income are important
components in the credit assessment and loan default equations. A loan applicant may, however,
have a relatively secure income and have sufficient funds to cover the additional debt, but may
not be willing to meet the contractual obligations (Sanderatne, 1978). Willingness to meet
contractual debt obligations can be assessed from the applicant's previous credit history as
proxied by variables such as the number of delinquencies on other loan accounts and the number
of bad debt write-offs.
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Vigano (1993), Boyes et al. (1989) and Greene (1992) found that delinquencies on a loan
applicant's previous loan(s) are positively related to increased levels of both credit rationing and
loan default. Schreiner (1999) also reported that borrowers with more periods of arrears on
previous loans had a higher likelihood of experiencing loan repayment problems. Loan applicant
willingness to repay in the local study will be proxied by the number of previous loans with other
lenders at the time of the loan application, number of payment profiles with mild arrears, number
of payment profiles with major arrears, and number of bad debt write-offs. Branch managers at
MFO1 critically assess these variables and tend to weight them heavily when assessing loan
applications.
Loan applicants that had more previous loans with other lenders at the time of applying for a
loan with MFO1 are expected to have more credit experience and hence be familiar with the
potential implications of defaulting on a loan (e.g. being listed on a credit bureau). Loan
applicants with previous loans may also have more experience in managing their debt. The credit
bureau data is also likely to be more complete on these loan applicants, increasing the relevance
of the bureau score, which makes it easier for branch managers to assess the credit risk.
Schreiner (1999) found that borrowers with previous credit experience are less likely to default
on the loans. Loan applicants at MFO I with previous credit experience are thus less likely to be
credit rationed and are also less likely to default on their debt with MFO1.
The number of payment profiles with minor and major arrears show MFO 1 branch managers the
sample applicant's attitude toward credit obligations. Although income shocks may contribute to
poor loan repayment performance, persistent arrears with other lenders highlights the greater
279
potential risk of granting credit to the loan applicant where the arrears may be linked not only to
a poor attitude towards meeting contractual debt obligations, but also to higher indebtedness
levels. A higher number of loans with other lenders that are in minor or major arrears may thus
be positively related to increased levels of credit rationing and the increased likelihood of loan
default. Similarly, the number of previous bad debt write-offs indicates the extent to which
applicants have met their contractual debt obligations. Where this has happened in the past,
applicants are at increased risk of not meeting their debt obligations again. The number of bad
debt write-offs could thus be positively related to the increased likelihood of being credit
rationed and the increased likelihood of loan default.
5.3.5 Effect of Branch Staff Differences
Since MFOl has a decentralized credit granting system, the branch staff (and particularly the
branch manager) has considerable authority in approving loans. Given the different levels of
experience amongst branch managers and their different reactions to bonus incentive systems
and training, some branch managers may make more risky decisions than others. Schreiner
(1999) found that some branches grant loans to more risky borrowers than do other branches.
Two of the MFO1 branch managers (Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg) were relatively
experienced, while the Pretoria branch manager had worked for MFO1 for less than one year.
Hence it is expected that the Pretoria branch manager may be more conservative due to
inexperience than the other two branch managers and hence ration loan applicants more. The
quality of his credit decisions may also be relatively worse than those of the Pietermaritzburg
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and Ladysmith managers, and hence relatively more of the borrowers at the Pretoria branch are
more likely to default.
5.4 Testing the Efficacy of the Loan Applicant Screening Mechanism ofMFOl
To evaluate the efficacy of MFOl' s loan applicant screening mechanism, the sign and level of
statistical significance of the estimated Pj in equation (5.2) need to be compared to the sign and
level of significance of the estimated Uj in equation (5.3). A statistically significant parameter
estimate in equation (5.2) matched by a significant parameter estimate in equation (5.3) for the
same variable indicates that MFO I staff have correctly identified and used the information in
assessing the credit worthiness of the loan applicant as this information is important in predicting
the likelihood of loan repayment. A significant parameter estimate in equation (5.2) matched by
a non-significant parameter estimate for the same variable in equation (5.3) will indicate that,
while the information is regarded as useful in assessing the creditworthiness of the loan
applicant, the information is not significant in predicting the probability of loan default. A
statistically non-significant parameter estimate in equation (5.2) matched by a significant
parameter estimate for the same variable in equation (5.3) indicates that MFOl staff may have
ignored potentially useful information in the screening process since this information is
significant in predicting the likelihood of loan default but not significant in predicting the
likelihood of being granted credit (Boyes et al., 1989; Hunte 1993).
Given that equation (5.2) predicts the likelihood of a loan application being accepted and
equation (5.3) the likelihood of an accepted loan applicant defaulting, a significant positive
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parameter estimate in equation (5.2) matched by a significant negative parameter estimate for the
same variable in equation (5.3) indicates that the screening process was successful in identifying
creditworthy loan applicants. This implies that a higher value for Vji increases the likelihood of
the loan applicant being accepted, while a higher value for the same variable Xji decreases the
likelihood of loan default.
A significant positive parameter estimate in equation (5.2) matched by a significant positive
parameter estimate in equation (5.3) indicates that the screening mechanism was approving
riskier loan applicants, since a higher value for Vji increases the likelihood of being accepted
while a higher value for the same Xji increases the likelihood of default. A significant negative
parameter estimate in equation (5.2) matched by a significant positive parameter estimate for the
same variable in equation (5.3) indicates that MFOl staff are successful in identifying default-
prone borrowers correctly, and rationing them more strictly, since a higher value for Vji increases
the likelihood of being credit rationed while a higher value for the same Xji increases the
likelihood of loan default. Finally, a significant negative parameter estimate in equation (5.2)
matched by a significant negative parameter estimate for the same variable in equation (5.3)
indicates that the MFO 1 staff are incorrectly rationing credit too strictly to creditworthy
borrowers since a higher value for Vji increases the likelihood of being credit rationed while a
higher value for the same Xji decreases the likelihood of loan default. The diagnostic matrix in
Table 5.2 summarises the hypothesized efficacy of the screening mechanism.
Creditworthy borrowers are those in sector I and sector III in Table 5.2. Borrowers in sector III
have been incorrectly rationed too strictly. This is a Type I error and may result in lost revenues
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for MFOl. Non-credit worthy borrowers are in sector II and sector IV. Borrowers in sector 11
have been incorrectly granted credit. This is a Type II error and results in increased costs for
MFOl as a result of the increased potential default (Hunte, 1993).
Table 5.2 Diagnostics for Evaluating the Efficacy of the Loan Applicant Screening
Mechanism .
Hypotheses MFO1 Credit Action MFO1 Credit Action
Ex ante Ex IJOst Ex ante Ex post
No Rationing Repayment Rationing Repayment
Creditworthy +p -a -p -a
Sector I (No error) Sector III (Type I error)
Non-Creditworthy +p I +a -B +a
Sector IT (Type II error) Sector IV (No error)
Source: Hunte, 1993: 74.
Incorrectly granting credit to a high-risk customer may be more costly, depending on the time
taken to default and recovery rates and costs, and are the more serious of the two errors.
Incorrectly rationing of a low-risk loan applicant still allows MFO1 to invest the funds in an
alternative revenue-generating source such as an interest-bearing deposit account. Branch
managers must, therefore, try to correctly assess the loan default probabilities of loan applicants.
5.5 The Sample Selection Problem for the MFOl Loan Default Analysis
The loan applicant screening decision necessitates that branch managers at MFO1 try to predict
the probability of loan default for all applicants. The empirical model used to estimate the
probability of loan default must, therefore, apply to all "through the door" loan applicants, and
not just loan applicants that have passed the initial screening and who have been granted credit
(Reichert et al., 1983; Boyes et aI., 1989; Greene, 1992). However, the only information that
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exists on loan default probabilities comes from sample applicants who were granted credit. The
relevant issue is whether the default probabilities estimated using only information from
accepted sample applicants would be the same as the default probabilities estimated for the
sample applicant population as a whole. Consider equations (5.9) and (5.10):
c. =fJv· +&.
Credit Rationing equation: [ . I • I'
Cj =11ff cj > 0, else Cj =0
. D j =ax j +li1j ,
Default equatIOn: .•
Dj = 11ff d j > 0, else D i = 0
Where
Dj and x j are only observed if Cj =1,




Since repayment behaviour is only observed for those sample applicants who were granted
credit, Heckman (1979) shows that a type of incidental selection bias exists if the error terms in
equation (5.9) and equation (5.10) are correlated. If the credit rationing decision is
deterministically governed by sample applicant attributes, then the sample selection will not lead
to biased parameter estimates in equation (5.9).
Eisenbeis (1978) argues that the credit granting decision may not only relate to the immediate
loan but can be viewed as a multi-period decision that generates a flow of revenues over time
that may extend beyond the term of the immediate loan. Determinants that are difficult to
quantify, such as the branch manager's "gut feel", pressure to meet sales or loan recovery targets,
and profit maximization, are thus important in the credit granting decision and may add an
element of randomness that is captured in the error term of equation (5.10). Since the loan
granting decision is not deterministically governed by loan applicant attributes, the error terms in
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equation (5.9) and (5.10) may be correlated, in which case there is a type of incidental selection.
This results in biased parameter estimates in equation (5.9) if the default model is not
conditioned specifically for this incidental selection as shown in equation (5.12):
E[Dj IDj is observed] *1 *= E[d j c j >0]
=E[d; ICj > - f3 v j
=a x j +E[liTlCj > - f3 v j]
=axj + pal1)('i(01lT)
(5.12)
d;1 c; > 0 =E[d;1 c; > 0] + liT j
=axj + pa1lTAj (o,J +liTj
(5.13)
The derivation of this model can be followed in Greene (2000). The term p a 1lT Aj (0,J results
from the selection bias; p is the correlation between the error terms of equations (5.9) and (5.10),
and A, represents the inverse of Mill's ratio. If the error terms in equations (5.9) and (5.10) were
not correlated, the sample selection would be of no consequence, since the middle term in
equation (5.12) would equate to O.
However, given the correlation between the error terms, the consequence of ignoring the
incidental sample selection is inconsistent parameter estimates. This would lead to an
understatement of the true default probability if equation (5.9) were estimated without
accounting for the middle term in equation (5.13) (Greene, 2000). This can be viewed as a
problem of misspecification due to an omitted variable. An important underlying assumption of
the bias specification in equation (5.13) is that the error terms in equations (5.9) and (5.10)
follow a multivariate normal distribution (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2000).
Although some doubt has been cast on the assumption, few of the alternative approaches can
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accommodate the breadth of models that the assumption of normality can achieve. The
exploration of alternative approaches is still relatively new, with most of the empirical literature
still being dominated by Heckman's (1979) model (Greene, 2000). The next section describes
the sampling methodology used to collect data for the MFOI econometric model.
5.6 Data Sampling for the MFOl Econometric Model
To obtain information on the vectors of explanatory variables in equations (5.2) and (5.3), data
on both accepted and rejected loan applications was obtained from MFO I. The data consisted of
information captured on the loan application form, information obtained from the credit bureau
inquiry that is done at the time of loan application, and loan performance information for those
applicants that were granted a loan. The information captured on the application form and the
bureau data constitute the application data used to identify characteristics that are correlated with
events observed in the loan repayment performance data. In order to ensure that consistent data
on the sample loan applicants were provided by MFO I, a detailed manual was developed by the
author (see Appendix C) to specify each variable required for the analysis. This manual has since
been adopted by MFO I as guidelines to help staff in better defining information captured on its
database, and has made subsequent analyses of loan applicant data easier and more consistent.
Data captured on the loan application form were obtained electronic~lly for sample loan
applicants. The credit bureau data were more problematic to collect. Two of the leading credit
bureaus operating in SA were approached to provide data retrospectively on the sample loan
applicants. Only one bureau could provide the data in a useable format, and took considerable
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time to return the data that consisted of loan applicant personal details, loan applicant inquiry
history, payment-profile history (monthly repayment performance of loans with other lenders),
and default and judgment history. Loan applicant bureau characteristics used in the empirical
analysis were computed manually from the bureau data. This process was extremely time
consuming and took about five months from when the data were received.
5.6.1 Application and Performance Windows
The period of time over which the application information is collected is the application window.
This should ideally be a 12-month period to avoid the effects of seasonality that may be evident
in the loan application information (PlC Solutions, 2000). However, other factors that influence
the time period over which application data is observed are data availability, and the time needed
for borrower repayment behaviour to mature (become good or bad). Prior to this study the time
needed for an account to mature was not known. However, the MFO1 staff allowed a maximum
of nine months before a delinquent account was handed over to the internal collection agency.
Since handed-over accounts were never again considered for repeat business, this status was
considered as the write-off status.
The data extraction process began in August 1999 and hence the final date on which loan
performance was observed was set as 30 June 1999. Given the 9-month performance window,
the final month in which characteristics of loan applicants could be observed was September
1998. The first month in which applications could be observed was February 1998, which is a 9-
month application window. The shortened application window was due to MF01 switching to a
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new banking system, which would for the fIrst time make some of the information required for
the study available electronically. Given the volumes of data, it was important that as much data
as possible should be extracted electronically to simplify the data collection process. When the
study commenced, only four of MFOl's 12 branches had been converted to the new banking
system. Data from three branches, namely Ladysmith, Pretoria and Pietermaritzburg were used.
Figure 5.1, summarises the time frames chosen for the application and performance window.
September 1998
7-month application window 9-month performance window
Note: Each month in the application window has its own associated performance window
9-month performance window for February 1998 borrowers
....-- ....L- -,
Oh~erv::tti()nn::tte November 1998
Figure 5.1 Diagrammatic representation of Application and Performance window
Based on previous studies by Mortensen et al. (1988), Boyes et al. (1989), Turvey (1991) and
Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega (1993), loan performance for all sample borrowers would
initially be observed at a single outcome date, namely 30 June 1999. This implied that sample
borrowers that obtained their fIrst loan earlier in the application window would have a longer
performance period. Miller and LaDue (1991) and Greene (1992) specifIed a fIxed period such
that loan repayment performance for each sample borrower was observed over a 12-month
period. This is preferable to observing performance at a fIxed point in time as performance is
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observed over a consistent time period for each borrower (Kindred, 2001a). This approach, as
shown in Figure 5.1, was used in this study to create consistency across sample borrowers.
5.6.2 Sampling Methodology Issues for MFOl Data
Two methodological issues need to be accounted for when sampling data for models that
estimate loan repayment probabilities. The fIrst is that loan repayment behaviour is only
observed for loan applicants that were granted a loan. Where the credit granting process is not
deterministically governed by a set of loan applicant attributes, the absence of loan repayment
performance for the rejected loan applicants is non-random (Heckman, 1979; Zmijewski, 1984;
Boyes et a!., 1989). Parameter estimates of the model estimated with sample data only, for those
loan applicants that were granted credit, may be downwardly biased since successful loan
applicants, by nature of the prior selection, are less likely to default (Greene, 1992). For the
estimated default model to be applicable to the "through the door" loan applicant population, it is
important to condition the model on whether the loan applicant is accepted or rejected (Reichert
et al., 1983, Zmijewski, 1984, Miller and LaDue, 1991). If the intention is to estimate factors that
influence the loan repayment performance of existing clients (a behavioural type loan
performance model) then no sample selection problem exists. Since the objective of this study is
to estimate the loan default probability of fIrst-time loan applicants, the sample will include data
from both accepted and rejected loan applicants.
Secondly, loan default rates reported in previous studies by Boyes et al. (1989), Miller and
LaDue (1991), Greene (1992) and Schreiner (1999) were generally low (1% - 8% ofloans). To
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obtain a more balanced sample for model estimation purposes, defaulting clients were over-
sampled. This is a form of choice-based sampling, since the distinct population groups were
identified first, where the probability of an observation entering the sample depends on whether
the borrower is classified as good or bad. Choice-based sampling results in asymptotically biased
parameter estimates, particularly where probability type estimation techniques are used
(Zmijewski, 1984). To correct for this bias, Manski and Lermann (1977) derived the weighted
endogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) estimator. However, what the biased
sampling does, the weighting undoes with the estimated parameters often exhibiting relatively
large standard errors, which is what choice-based sampling attempts to avoid (Greene, 2000).
Lender MFO1 used a dynamic loan performance indicator where historic loan performance was
not stored in the database. For this reason, choice-based sampling was not used since the
performance groups were not clearly defined at the outset. The potential problem with this
approach is that the number of observed defaults could be very low, creating instability in
models using probability-type estimation techniques such as the probit or logit models. This
instability is evident in large estimated standard errors for parameter estimates.
The study population was clearly separated into two strata: those loan applicants that were
granted a loan and those that were rejected. These two strata were further stratified by branch -
Pretoria, Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg - to obtain accept and reject stratum per branch. To
exploit the stratification of the target population into distinct groups where the sampling units are
more homogeneous within each group, stratified random sampling was used to identifY sample
loan applicants (Barnett, 1992). Sampling each group independently by branch may result in
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sampling bias if the population proportions are not accounted for during the sampling process.
To mitigate this bias, the strata were sampled by proportional allocation that accounts for the
population proportions in the strata. This sampling process yields unbiased and efficient
estimators of the population mean (Barnett, 1992). Sampling units from each stratum were drawn
by a random sampling procedure.
Previous studies of consumer loan data have used large sample sizes to ensure that models are
more robust. Boyes et al. (1989) had a sample of 4 632 loan applicants, while Greene (1992)
used 13 444 observations, Schreiner (1999) had 39 956 cases, and Jacobson and Roszbach
(1998) evaluated 13 338 loans. Credit card scoring literature, as a rule of thumb, suggests that the
sample contains at least 1 500 good, 1 500 bad and 1 500 rejected customers. Each characteristic
used in the analysis contains at least 50 observations per dependent variable category to ensure
robustness of the characteristic (Kindred and Bailey, 2001).
To save costs and overcome limited resources to process the volumes of data, the researcher had
to keep the total sample below these recommended sizes. Discussions with the MFO1 staff set
the sample size at 800 loan applicants. Although this falls short of general accepted practices in
loan default analysis, the main purpose of this study was not to build a predictive scoring system
but rather to identify factors that influence the loan granting and loan default decision. The
outcome of the stratified random sampling by proportional allocation is shown in Table 5.3.
The study population had a total of 5 257 loan applicants, from which 800 would be sampled.
The sample size for each stratum was determined by proportional allocation so that the sample
il£2£UaAliJ
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proportion of accepted and rejected loan applications are the same as for the population. Some
sample accounts were not returned by MFO1 as they were identified as fraudulent applications.
This resulted in a relatively small reduction of 7 accounts in the sample from 800 to 793. The
biggest reduction in the sample came from accounts that were initially identified as rejects but
which were loan applicants that were neither rejected nor accepted. These loan applicants were
in a pending stage of the loan application where the branch manager required further
information, or a guarantor. These loan applicants were not included in any of the analyses, as
they had not reached a final decision stage in the loan application process.
Table 5.3 Population and Sample Distribution, 1998/1999
Branch Pretoria Ladysmith Pietermaritzburg Total
Accept 762 483 818 2063
Reject 1 709 484 1001 3 194
Total Study Population 2471 967 1 819 5257
Sample Size 800
Sample Accept 116 74 124 314
Sample Reject 260 74 152 486
Total 376 147 277 800
Accepts for which data was 115 74 122 311
received
Rejects for which data was 260 73 150 483
received
Total received 375 146 272 793
Total useable accepts 113 73 122 308
Total useable reiects 228 57 133 418
Total useable sampling units 341 130 255 726
Accepts not useable 2 1 0 3
Reiects not useable 31 17 17 65
The Pretoria branch with the highest loan applicant population was sampled the most. Ladysmith









Figure 5.2 Sample Distribution by MFOl Branch
Table 5.4 shows that as a result ofthe exclusions, the sample distribution shifted in favour ofthe
accepted loan applications (accepts). The Ladysmith branch had the biggest shift in sample
distribution toward the accepted loans category. the exclusions indicate the extent to which the
branch manager's ability to make a decision is slowed by factors such as a lack of information or
a lack ofexperience. Information problems may have been more prevalent at the rural Ladysmith
branch, while the lack of experience of the newly appointed branch manager at Pretoria could
have resulted in relatively high pending or waiting status of loans.
The relatively lower approval rate of 30.8% at the Pretoria branch further shows the manager's
lack of experience, as confirmed by staff at MFOl's head office. The Ladysmith and
Pietermaritzburg branches had relatively high approval rates of 49.1% and 44.69%, respectively.
This is evidence of more experienced branch managers, and perhaps a less risky pool of loan
applicants, even though loan applicants would potentially have to wait longer for loan approval.
Table 5.4 Distributions of Accepted and Rejected Loan Applicants, 1998/ 1999
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Branch Pretoria Ladysmith Pietermaritzburg Total
Accept 30.8% 49.1% 44.9% 39.2%
Reject 69.1% 50.1% 55.1% 60.8%
Total Study Population 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Sample as % of Population 15.2% 15.2% 15.2% 15.2%
Total useable accepts 33.1% 56.2% 47.8% 42.4%
Total useable rejects 66.9% 43.8% 52.2% 57.6%
Total useable sample 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Exclusions as a % ofsample 8.8% 12.3% 6.3% 8.6%
received
5.6.3 Definition of Loan Repayment Performance
Central to any analysis of the factors affecting loan repayment is the delinquency definition. Past
studies have used different delinquency definitions: Sanderatne (1978), Boakye-Dankwa (1979)
and Okori (1986) relied on loan recovery rates or proportion of balances in arrears as repayment
performance indicators. Boyes et al. (1989), Turvey (1991), Vigano (1993) and Jacobson and
Roszbach (1998) based loan performance on the financial institution's definition of 'good' and
'bad' clients, and are not explicit to how these are defined. Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) relied on
the subjective classification of borrowers by loan officers into different loan repayment
performance categories. Reinke (1998) defined loan repayment performance between borrowers
that are in good standing and borrowers that are not. Mortensen et al. (1988) defined a borrower
as non-current if any portion of the principal or interest due at the performance observation date
is in arrears. Lugemwa and Darroch (1995) classified a borrower as delinquent if the entire loan
was not repaid.
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Greene's (1992) analysis of the performance of credit card customers defined them as bad after
having skipped payment for six months in a 12-month period. Aguilera Alfred and Gonzalez-
Vega (1993) classified a borrower as good if the installment was paid within 30 days of the due
date, in arrears if the installment was paid 30 days after the installment due date, and in default if
the installments remained unpaid 30 days after the due date. Schreiner (1999) defmed a borrower
as delinquent if the borrower had a spell of arrears of at least 15 days. The above definitions of
'good' and 'bad' borrowers tend to be study-specific and depend on the way in which study
lenders structure and record loan repayment, and the objectives ofthe analysis.
Kindred (2001a) provides a guideline to loan performance definitions for empirical analysis of
loan repayment. A borrower should be considered 'bad' if the lender refused to grant further
credit at that delinquency level, or the lender would not have granted credit in the knowledge that
the borrower would have gone delinquent. Similarly, a customer should be considered 'good', if
based on the performance of the account, the lender would want to grant credit or continue to
grant credit to the customer. Furthermore, Miller and LaDue (1991) emphasised the need for an
objective repayment performance definition based on observable repayment performance.
The repayment performance defmition used in this study for MFO1 was based on the observed
repayment performance of sample borrowers. Several methodological issues arose in the
computation of the arrears indicator. Since MFOl provided short-term, 4-month consumption
loans that were on average repaid in less than four months, repayment performance could not
necessarily be based on the first loan, since customer behaviour patterns would not have
stabilized. Loan repayment performance thus had to be measured over a longer period of time
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and over several loans, with the 9-month performance window providing the guideline. The
existing loan ageing practice of MFO1 also stopped once the loan was handed over to the
internal collection agency. Hence, arrears monitoring was not possible from this point. Historic
loan repayment performance was also not stored in the database, which meant that loan
repayment performance would have to be recalculated.
Given that loans to MFO1 clients are repayable in monthly installments, the loan performance
calculation was based on a common consumer loans industry delinquency indicator known as the
contractual delinquency or CD (plC Solutions, 2000). The CD estimates the portion of the
installment that is in arrears while the loan is in term, and adds the number of months that the
loan is past the final payment date when the loan is out of term. Since MFO1 capitalized the
interest charged for the loan up-front, the CD was computed as follows:
CD = (Capital + interest in arrears)/monthly installment due (+ 1 for every month that the loan
remains unpaid when out of term). (5.14)
, &&
This indicator was calculated for each loan granted to the sample borrowers. Where sample
borrowers had concurrent loans, CD was calculated for each loan based on the payment
hierarchy rules used by MFOl that are shown in Figure 5.3.
Interest overdue on the oldest loan was settled first, followed by interest overdue on the most
recent loan. If there are sufficient funds left from the payment, the portion of capital and finance
charges in arrears on the oldest loan are settled, followed by capital and finance charges in
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arrears on the most recent loan. Finally, the current installments are settled if the payment made
by the borrower was large enough. As MF01 only had printed transaction lists of the customers'
loan history, each installment and payment had to be captured manually to compute CD. To
ensure that all the relevant information to compute CD was captured, a data capture form (see
Appendix D) was used. This information was transferred to an Excel spreadsheet for
computation of contractual delinquency for 308 borrowers (and over 1 000 loans), where each
loan was classified as being one ofCDO (0::::: CD < 1), CD1 (1 ::::: CD < 2), CD2 (2::::: CD < 3) and
CD3+ (3::::: CD < 00).
Pay current installment
of most recent loan
Pay current installment
of oldest loan
Pay capital and finance
charges in arrears on
oldest loan
Pay capital and finance
charges in arrears on
most recent loan
Payment
Pay interest on overdue for
the most recent loan
Pay interest on overdue for
the oldest loan
Figure 5.3 Payment hierarchy used by MFOl
Previous studies on factors affecting loan default were mostly at customer level, although much
mention is made of loan default. Borrowers in these studies only tended to have one loan or one
credit facility in the case of consumer loans (Boyes at al., 1989; Greene, 1992). Since one
customer can have many loans at MFO1, and the objective of this study is to analyse customer
rather than loan characteristics, a default indicator at customer level is derived from the
performance of individual loans. For this it was important to determine how many loans each
customer had on average in the 9-month performance window, as shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5
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Number of Loans in tbe 9-montb Performance Window for MF01,
1998/1999
Application Month Number of loans
1 2 3 4+
January 1998 18 17 15 0
February 1998 28 22 16 0
March 1998 35 27 22 0
April 1998 55 50 33 0
Mav 1998 33 24 21 0
June 1998 37 32 26 0
July 1998 42 35 27 0
August 1998 44 40 28 0
September 1998 16 15 7 0
Of the borrowers that were granted their first loan in January 1998, 18 had one loan in the 9-
month performance window, while 15 of the 18 had three loans. This trend emerges throughout
the application months. A combined loan repayment performance indicator per borrower was
thus based on the performance of, at most, the first three loans per customer. Satisfactory or
'good' borrowers were defined as clients for whom any of the first three loans did not age past
CDl. 'Bad' customers were defined as clients for whom any of the first three loans reached CD2
or greater.
Table 5.6 gives the distribution of good and bad borrowers for the three MFOl branches. Most of
the sample borrowers were current (75.9%), while 24.1% were in arrears. The Pietermaritzburg
branch had the lowest level of delinquency and the Pretoria branch the highest. Credit scoring
models will usually omit a class of borrower performance known as 'indeterminates' that are not
considered 'good' or 'bad' (Kindred, 2001a). These are normally customers with loan
performance like CD2. As the objective of this study is not to build a scoring model but to
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broadly identify factors that influence borrower repayment performance, the indeterminates were
not omitted from this study, but were rather included as 'bad' borrowers.
Table 5.6 Distribution of Good and Bad Sample Borrowers, 1998/1999
Total Good Borrowers Bad Borrowers
n n % n %
Ladysmith 73 53 72.6 20 27.4
Pretoria 113 78 69.0 35 31.0
Pietermaritzburg 122 103 84.4 19 15.6
Total 308 234 75.9 74 24.1
There was a statistically significant difference between the mean average 'bad' rate for the
Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg branches, and for the Pretoria and Pietermaritzburg branches at
the 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. The Ladysmith branch had the highest
acceptance rate but also a relatively high default rate (not as high as the Pretoria branch). The
Pietermaritzburg branch, although having a fairly high acceptance rate of 44%, had the lowest
default rate. The Pretoria branch with the lowest acceptance rate of 30% had the highest default
rate. The branch manager at Ladysmith had the most experience and, therefore, seemed willing
to accept some potential credit risks in order to try and achieve the required branch profit targets.
The Pretoria branch manager had the least credit granting experience (less than one year), and,
therefore, was more conservative in granting credit but not necessarily making the right credit
granting decisions given the high bad debt rate. Section 5.6.4 presents some key descriptive
characteristics of the sample data obtained from MFO1 and the empirical models of credit
rationing and loan repayment performance for MFO1 clients.
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5.6.4 Descriptive Characteristics of Factors Affecting MFOl Loan Granting Decisions
The decision by MFO1 loan officers to accept or reject a loan applicant is based on client
stability, contactability, affordability and credit history. Stability is represented by age, marital
status, length of residence at current address, length of employment at current employer, and
type of employer. Contactability is proxied by being able to make telephone contact at home or
at work or both. Affordability is reflected by the loan applicant's gross and, more importantly,
net income (as shown on the payslip - normally gross income less insurance, tax, and medical
aid deductions). Credit history is based on the information received from the credit bureau on the
loan applicant's loan repayment history with other lenders. The importance of these factors in
driving the credit granting decision and guiding the credit rationing behaviour of loan officers
will be considered in this section.
5.6.4.1 Descriptive Characteristics of Loan Applicants for the Ladysmith Branch
Table 5.7 shows that applicants that were accepted were, on average, older than rejected
applicants (37 years versus 34 years). This difference was statistically significant at the 5% level
of significance. On average, Ladysmith branch staff accepted more male loan applicants,
although the difference in means is not statistically significant. Male loan applicants tended to be
more credit active and higher income earners, which meant that the bureau data obtained for
these clients had more information to base the decision on. Regarding martial status, Table 5.7
shows that there was a statistically significant difference between single applicants that were
accepted and those that were rejected. Single sample applicants were considered less stable by
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Ladysmith branch staff as single applicants were generally younger, and less settled at their place
of employment (and were more difficult to contact) (the default category for marital status
included both divorced and widowed applicants)
Table 5.7 Comparison of Means for Accepted and Rejected Loan Applicants for the
Ladysmith Branch of MF01, 1998/ 1999
Note.. and denote statistically slgmficant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels ofslgmficance, respectIVely.
Characteristic Reject Accept t- value
n Mean n Mean
Age (years) 54 34.0 73 37.1 1.856
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) 56 0.57 73 0.60 0.356
Married (Married = 1,0 = Other) 55 0.38 73 0.51 1.407
Single (Single = 1,0 = Other) 55 0.60 73 0.40 -2.301
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.42 73 0.48 0.685
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.05 73 0.03 -0.781
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.29 73 0.23 -0.739
Rent (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.11 73 0.10 -0.243
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.09 70 0.13 0.588
Home Loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.07 73 0.14 1.150
Bank Account (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 1.73 73 1.88 1.968·
Length ofResidence at current address 55 181.18 73 171.93 -0.344
(months)
Employment Sector (1 = Government, 55 0.49 73 0.51 0.177
0= Private Sector)
Number of months worked at current 55 77.13 73 97.67 1.445
employer
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.91 73 0.84 -1.120
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 55 0.35 73 0.51 1.832·
Gross monthly income (Rand) 55 R2365 73 R2 788 1.66(·
Net monthly income (Rand) 55 R1548 73 R1964 2.853
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio 55 0.18 73 0.12 -2.12(··
Average number of loans with other lenders 54 2.43 73 1.90 -1.944 '"
at time ofapplication
Total number of loans that were 2 - 3 54 0.31 73 0.14 -2.161
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number ofloans that were 4 - 9 54 0.33 73 0.01 -4.569···
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number ofbad-debt write-offs at time 57 0.63 73 0.07 -4.736
of loan application
. * ** ***
..
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Loan applicants that owned their home or lived in a location were more readily accepted by
Ladysmith branch staff than applicants who lived on the premises of their employer, lived with
parents or rented their accommodation. While applicants that owned their homes are regarded as
more stable, it should also be noted that a large proportion of the Ladysmith low-income
population lives in locations (previously demarcated areas for black settlements). Although
applications living in locations do not own their property, they can be regarded as relatively
stable, as few households will move from their allocated plot in the location.
There may also be a degree of 'noise' that may have reduced the information provided by this
variable. For instance, some applicants that live in locations may have indicated that they own
their homes. Applicants living with their parents or renting accommodation may be regarded as
less stable as they are more likely to move and, therefore, may be perceived as less contactable.
There was no statistically significant difference between accepted and rejected Ladysmith
applicants in terms of home type. Although there was a statistically significant difference
between accept and reject rates, Ladysmith branch staff more readily accepted loan applicants
that had a home loan. Having a home loan implies a degree of creditworthiness, since the loan
applicant would have had to pass the stringent credit assessments of commercial banks that
usually granted home loans. On average, more accepted Ladysmith applicants had bank accounts
than rejected applicants. Although banking details do not usually form part of the MFO 1 branch
staff's credit assessment, applicants with bank accounts had, on average, a higher gross monthly
income than applicants without a bank account.
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Table 5.7 shows that rejected applicants at the Ladysmith branch had been at the current address
for a longer period than accepted loan applicants, but this difference (181 versus 172) was not
statistically significant. As this is a common credit-scoring variable, sample applicants often
overstate this period, which introduces inconsistencies into this information. The applicant's
employment sector may indicate the potential stability of future expected income streams that are
important for securing debt repayments. Ladysmith branch staff accepted more applicants
employed in the government sector. Their income streams may be more secure as the likelihood
of bankruptcy or dismissal may be relatively low compared to MFO 1 applicants employed in the
private sector. There was no statistically significant difference between the accepted and rejected
applicants at this branch in terms ofemployment sector.
A further indicator of employment stability is the length of time that applicants had worked for
their employer. On average, accepted Ladysmith applicants were employed for longer (98
months versus 77 months), but there was no statistically significant difference in employment
period between the two groups of applicants. Staff at MFO1 attached no physical collateral to
secure the credit granted, and hence relied on close monitoring of applicants during the loan
repayment cycle to try and ensure repayment. This monitoring was effected mostly through
immediate telephonic follow-up should the customer not repay the monthly installment on time.
Hence it was important when applying for loans that the applicants could provide a home and/or
a work telephone number. Table 5.7 shows that, on average, Ladysmith branch staff accepted
more loan applicants that had a home telephone number, with the difference being statistically
significant. Most of the Ladysmith applicants were either teachers in remote rural areas or
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factory workers. As it was difficult to contact these two groups at work, this source of contact
was less important for the branch staff.
Loan applicant ability to repay the loan is an important consideration in the assessment of
creditworthiness. A loan applicant may be willing to repay the debt, but unable to repay if
available income cannot cover the debt commitments. Accepted Ladysmith applicants had
statistically significantly higher average net and gross monthly incomes compared to rejected
applicants (RI 964 and R2 788 versus R2 365 and RI 548, respectively). The existing debt of the
sample applicants relative to available income is also a key factor in assessing the potential for
the applicants to incur more debt. Branch managers at MFOI do critically review existing debt
commitments, relative to net income, at the time of the loan application. A relatively high debt-
to-income ratio may increase the financial pressure on the sample applicant and reduce the
ability to repay. This study uses the ratio of retail debt commitments-to-net monthly income to
assess client debt loading. The ratio takes into account any debt commitments that are part of the
applicant's salary deductions, tax and insurance obligations, in the denominator. Additional debt
commitments that are not part of the salary deductions are accounted for in the numerator and
consist of retail debt commitments as indicated by the credit bureau. The retail debt-to-income
ratio was statistically significantly different for accepted and rejected Ladysmith applicants.
Accepted applicants had a mean debt-to-income ratio of 12%, while rejected applicants had a
mean ratio of 18%.
Rejected sample applicants, on average, have statistically significantly more previous loans with
other lenders. A priori, it is expected that the more loans a sample applicant has or has had with
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other lenders, the more established is the credit history, and the potentially more creditworthy is
the applicant. Ifthese loans are active, however, the incidence of credit rationing may be higher
because of higher debt commitments. In addition, sample applicants with more loans with other
lenders are more likely to have experienced loan repayment problems at some stage in time.
Payment profile information is probably the credit bureau information that is most scrutinized by
MFO1 staff. Discussions with branch managers at MFO 1 indicate that this information, together
with bad debt write-offs, carries the most weight in the decision on whether or not to grant credit.
Whether the payment profile and bad debt information at the credit bureau is consistent and
always correct is debatable. The author identified numerous inconsistencies in the payment
profile information when gathering the credit bureau information. These ranged from
questionable arrears definitions to inconsistent and incorrect information. Although most credit
grantors that provide information to the credit bureau used in this study belong to a collective
body, whose function is partly to control the quality of information that is submitted, there seems
to be very little uniformity in arrears definitions and consistency with which data is supplied to
the bureau. This is understandable, given that furniture and clothing retailers have different credit
models with different payment tolerance levels.
When this information is used to make credit granting decisions and to build bureau scorecards,
it is imperative that there be consistency in the data. Clothing retailers, for example, may regard
a payment of 60% - 70% of an installment as current, whereas MFO1 has no tolerance level and
staff will regard an installment as in arrears one day past its due date. These issues need to be
considered when using payment profile information. This study divides the payment profile
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information into two categories, namely profiles that have not had arrears worse than three
months in the six months leading up to the loan application with MF01, and profiles with arrears
of more than three months in the six months leading up to the application. Table 5.7 shows that,
on average, most Ladysmith applicants with minor (not worse than three months) and major
payment profile arrears (more than three months) were rejected by branch staff (0.31 and 0.33
versus 0.14 and 0.01, respectively). The differences in means were statistically significant at the
1% level of significance. Given the emphasis on payment profile information, it is imperative
that such data are displayed correctly and interpreted correctly. Here the responsibility lies with
both the providers of the information and credit bureau staff. Providers must submit 'clean'
information timeously to the credit bureau, and credit bureau staff should ensure that the data are
presented consistently to credit providers who need it. Most of the Ladysmith applicants that had
a default listing at the credit bureau were rejected. The difference in mean default listings
between the applicant groups was statistically significant, suggesting that this is a key factor that
branch managers consider when reviewing the credit application for approval. The period since
default did not seem to matter for the branch managers. This may be a questionable practice
since defaults that are older than 18-24 months may not be that relevant. If an individual defaults
on credit obligations, however, the likelihood that this will happen again may be very high.
5.6.4.2 Descriptive Characteristics of Loan Applicants for the Pretoria Branch
Table 5.8 shows that applicants that were accepted by Pretoria staff are, on average, older than
rejected sample applicants (36.4 years versus 35.7 years), but this difference was not statistically
significant (contrary to the age difference at the Ladysmith branch). The Pretoria branch staff
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rejected a higher proportion of female sample applicants who tended to have higher debt-to-
income ratios and relatively poor credit histories with other lenders. The difference in means was
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Similarly to Ladysmith staff, Pretoria staff
accepted more applicants that were married and fewer that were single, as married applicants
were considered more stable (older and more settled at their place of employment), although the
difference in means was not statistically significant. There was also no significant difference
between accepted and rejected Pretoria applicants according to home ownership type. Similar to
the Ladysmith staff choices, Pretoria staff tended to accept applicants who owned their homes
rather than those who rented accommodation, lived with their employer or lived with their
parents (were less contactable).
Although, on average, fewer Pretoria applicants had a home loan, more applicants had a bank
account compared to the Ladysmith applicants. Table 5.8 shows that the difference in means was
not statistically significant, which is consistent with a priori expectations, as branch staff do not
use this information in the screening process. Accepted Pretoria applicants had lived, on average,
longer at their current home address than rejected applicants (174 months versus 147 months).
This difference in length of stay was statistically significant at the 10% level of significance.
This result is different to that of Ladysmith where rejected applicants tended to have lived for
longer at their current home address.
There was no statistically significant difference between accepted and rejected applicants in
terms of employment sector at Pretoria, even though, similar to Ladysmith, Pretoria staff
accepted, on average, more applicants employed in the government sector. Both accepted and
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rejected Pretoria applicants had worked for a similar period of time at their employer when
applying for credit at MFOl (87.7 months versus 86.7 months) while there was a marked,
although not statistically significant, difference at the Ladysmith branch.
Table 5.8 Comparison of Means between Accepted and Rejected Loan Applicants for
the Pretoria Branch of MF01, 1998/ 1999
Note., and denote statIstIcally SIgnIficant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectIvely.
Characteristic Reject Accept t- value
n Mean n Mean
Age (years) 206 35.70 113 36.42 0.705
Gender (Male = 1,0 = Female) 228 0.53 113 0.64 1.948"
Married (Married = 1, 0 = Other) 228 0.49 113 0.52 0.612
Single (Single = 1,0 = Other) 228 0.43 113 0.38 -0.945
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) 228 0.47 113 0.51 0.687
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) 228 0.09 113 0.02 0.719
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) 228 0.29 113 0.32 0.551
Rent (Yes = 1, No = 0) 228 0.15 113 0.14 -0.184
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) 212 0.01 113 0.09 -0.052
Home Loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) 228 0.21 113 0.19 -0.432
Bank Account (Yes = 1, No = 0) 194 1.98 113 2.00 1.316
Length ofResidence at cur address 228 147.13 113 173.88 1.612"
(months)
Employment Sector (1 = Government, 216 1.48 113 1.52 0.778
o= Private Sector)
Number of months worked at current 216 86.71 113 87.73 0.119
employer
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 216 0.98 113 0.99 0.679
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 228 0.43 113 0.56 2.233"
Gross monthly income (Rand) 216 2713.61 113 3070.68 0.076
Net monthly income (Rand) 216 1 677.79 113 2045.88 0.011 ,..
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio 186 0.25 112 0.13 -2.834
Average no. of loans with other lenders at 203 2.66 107 2.27 -2.310··
time ofapplication
Total number ofloans that were 2 - 3 203 0.55 107 0.13 -5.146'"
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number of loans that were 4 - 9 203 0.43 107 0.02 -6.092
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number of bad-debt write-offs at time 228 0.63 113 0.18 -4.721
of loan application
. * ** ***
..
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Table 5.8 shows that, on average, both accepted and rejected applicants were readily contactable
at their place of employment, while fewer rejected applicants were contactable by telephone at
home than accepted applicants. The difference in means between accepted and rejected sample
applicants was statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Even though most Pretoria
applicants had access to a work telephone, it was important for Pretoria staff to be able to contact
borrowers at home since telephonic contact at work was not always reliable. Similar to
Ladysmith applicants, accepted Pretoria loan applicants had statistically significantly higher
average gross and net monthly incomes compared to rejected applicants (R3 071 and R2 045
versus R2 714 and RI 678, respectively). The average incomes were also higher than those of
Ladysmith applicants, indicating the higher earnings potential in the more urban and developed
cities of SA (particularly Pretoria and Johannesburg which are the industrial hubs of SA).
Table 5.8 shows that Pretoria branch staff also paid considerable attention to the loan applicant's
debt-to-income ratio. Rejected applicants had a mean debt-to-income ratio of 25% versus 13%
for accepted applicants, the difference in means being statistically significant at the 1% level of
significance. Compared to Ladysmith accepted applicants, the Pretoria accepted borrowers had
relatively higher mean debt-to-income ratios.
Pretoria applicants were, on average, more credit active than applicants at the Ladysmith branch.
Accepted applicants had a mean of 2.27 loans with other lenders at the time of application, while
rejected applicants had a mean of 2.66 loans (versus 1.90 and 2.43, respectively, for Ladysmith
applicants). Again, the incidence of credit rationing was higher because most of these loans were
active at the time of loan application. The difference was statistically significant. Similar to
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Ladysmith staff, Pretoria staff relied heavily on payment profile information provided by the
credit bureau in their assessment of credit worthiness. Rejected applicants had more payment
profiles with mild and serious arrears than did accepted applicants. Given the increased level of
credit activity by Pretoria applicants, they had a higher incidence of payment profile arrears than
Ladysmith applicants. On average, rejected Pretoria applicants also tended to have statistically
significantly more bad-debt write-offs than did accepted applicants.
5.6.4.3 Descriptive Characteristics of Loan Applicants for the Pietermaritzburg Branch
Similar to both Ladysmith and Pretoria, Table 5.9 shows that applicants that were accepted were,
on average, older than rejected applicants (36 years versus 34 years), but this difference was not
statistically significant. Contrary to the Pretoria and Ladysmith branches, Pietermaritzburg
branch staff, on average, accepted a statistically significantly higher proportion of female sample
applicants. These applicants tended to have better credit track records with other lenders and
lower levels of indebtedness relative to rejected female and male sample applicants. Regarding
marital status, Pietermaritzburg staff accepted, on average, more married applicants and fewer
single applicants, but the differences in means were not statistically significant.
Home ownership type was not a key factor in the credit-granting decision process for
Pietermaritzburg staff. On average, a greater proportion of accepted applicants owned their
home, than lived with their parents or on the employer's premises, rented or lived in the nearby
location. There is no clear trend as to what home ownership type was considered important by
branch staff. There was a statistically significant difference between accept and reject applicants
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in terms of whether or not they had home loans. Having a home loan implies a degree of
creditworthiness, since the loan applicants would have had to pass the stringent credit
assessments of the commercial banks.
Table 5.9 Comparison of Means between Accepted and Rejected Loan Applicants for
the Pietermaritzburg Branch of MF01, 1998/ 1999
Note., and denote statIstically SIgnIficant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels ofSignificance, respectively.
Characteristic Reject Accept t- value
n Mean N Mean
Age (years) 131 34.31 122 36.05 1.452
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) 133 0.71 122 0.59 -1.958"'"
Married (Married = 1, Other = 0) 133 0.42 122 0.48 1.001
Single (Single = 1, Other = 0) 133 0.56 122 0.47 -1.545
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) 133 0.16 122 0.22 1.293
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) 133 0.03 122 0.06 1.070
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) 133 0.29 122 0.25 -0.848
Rent (Yes = 1, No = 0) 133 0.22 122 0.18 -0.750
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) 132 0.29 122 0.29 -0.006
Home Loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) 133 0.06 122 0.12 1.752
Bank Account (Yes = 1, No = 0) 120 1.83 121 1.83 0.200
Length ofResidence at cur address 133 163.26 122 195.35 1.673·
(months)
Employment Sector (l = Government, 123 1.65 122 1.61 -0.577
0= Private Sector)
Number of months worked at current 120 77.03 122 88.61 1.094
employer
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 123 0.89 122 0.96 2.143
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 133 0.32 122 0.34 0.216
Gross monthly income (Rand) 124 2053.06 122 1958.51 -0.593
Net monthly income (Rand) 124 1461.84 122 1570.99 1.054
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio 112 0.15 122 0.11 -1.78(
Average no. of loans with other lenders at 122 1.75 114 1.54 -1.184
time of application
Total number ofloans that were 2 - 3 122 0.25 114 0.07 -3.436
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number of loans that were 4 - 9 122 0.29 114 0.03 -4.973"·
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number of bad-debt write-offs at time 133 0.45 122 0.09 -4.471
of loan application




Similar to the Pretoria branch, there was no statistically significant difference between accepted
and rejected sample applicants in relation to having a bank account. Accepted Pietermaritzburg
applicants, on average, lived longer at the current residential address than rejected applicants
(195 months versus 163 months), this difference being statistically significant at the 10% level.
The applicant's employment sector may indicate the potential stability of future income streams
that are important for securing debt repayments.
Unlike applicants at the Ladysmith and Pretoria branches, most Pietermaritzburg applicants
worked in the private sector (fewer applicants employed in the government sector were
accepted). Although accepted Pietermaritzburg applicants, on average, had worked for longer at
their current employer (89 months versus 77 months), this information was less important in the
credit granting decision. Very few Pietermaritzburg applicants had telephones in their homes and
so branch staff focused on contactability at work, unlike the Ladysmith and Pretoria staff. Most
accepted applicants did, on average, have a work telephone, while rejected applicants did not
(the difference was statistically significant). Unlike at the Ladysmith and Pretoria branches, there
was no statistically significant difference in average monthly gross and net income between
accepted and rejected applicants. Average monthly incomes of Pietermaritzburg applicants were
lower than those of Ladysmith and Pretoria applicants. This reflected the relatively lower salaries
and wages paid by the private sector jobs taken by these low-income individuals compared to
those in the government sector. Similar to Pretoria and Ladysmith, the Pietermaritzburg branch
staff focus on the debt-to-income ratio - accepted applicants had a statistically significantly lower
mean ratio than rejected applicants. Payment profile and bad-debt write-off information was also
just as important in credit screening for Pietermaritzburg branch staff as it was for Ladysmith
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and Pretoria staff. Applicants with more payment profiles in arrears and more bad-debt write-offs
were likely to be rejected. A summary of the characteristics whose means were statistically
significantly different between the rejected and accepted sample applicants in terms of the four
pillars in credit assessment at the three MF01 branches is given in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Summary of Statistically Significant Different Characteristics between
Accepted and Rejected MF01 Sample Applicants, 1998/ 1999
Branch Ladysmith Pretoria Pietermaritzburg
STABILITY Significance level
Age 10% ns ns
Gender ns 10% 10%
Married ns ns ns
Single 5% ns ns
Home ownership type ns ns ns
Use ofa Home Loan ns ns 10%
Use ofa Bank Account 15% ns ns
Length of residence at current address ns 10% 10%
Employment sector ns ns ns
Length of employment at current employer ns ns ns
CONTACTABILITY Significance level
Home telephone 5% 10% ns
Work telephone ns ns 5%
AFFORDABILITY Significance level
Net monthly income 1% 1% ns
Gross monthly income ns ns ns
Debt-to-net income ratio 1% 1% 10%
CREDIT HISTORY Significance level
Recent inquiries 5% 5% ns
Prior inquiries 1% 1% 1%
Number of loans with other lenders 1% 1% 1%
Payment profile arrears of 3 months or less 1% 1% 1%
STABILITY
Only the length of residence at the current address tends to be statistically significantly different
between accepted and rejected sample applicants consistently across most of the branches.
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Gender is highlighted for the Pretoria and Pietermaritzburg branches, while age was a
discriminator at the Ladysmith branch. Different branch managers tend to weight stability
indic',ltors differently, depending on the region where they operate.
CONTACTABILITY
Accepted sample applicants tend to have a home telephone contact number. It tends to be easier
to contact borrowers at home than at work. Although most sample applicants indicated that they
did have a work telephone, most could not be contacted directly. In a factory environment,
access to public telephones is limited to specific times, while messages left with the employer
may not be passed on to the employee.
AFFORDABILITY
The difference in net monthly (disposable) income between accepted and rejected applicants was
statistically significant at the Ladysmith and Pretoria branches. Managers are very aware of the
level of debt relative to income - the mean difference in this variable for accepted and rejected
loan applicants was statistically significant at all branches. It is also a legal requirement set out
by the MFRC that lenders must observe disposable income levels after accounting for all existing
commitments, to try and ensure that applicants do not borrow above their repayment capacities.
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PREVIOUS CREDIT mSTORY
This was the factor that had mean values that were most statistically significantly different
between the accepted and rejected groups at all three branches (except for recent enquiries at the
Pietermaritzburg branch). Sample applicants with a poor credit history were credit rationed, and
most were rejected.
5.6.5 Descriptive Characteristics of Factors Affecting Loan Repayment at MFOl
5.6.5.1 Factors Affecting Loan Repayment at the Ladysmith Branch
Table 5.11 shows that 'good' borrowers, on average, are older than 'bad' borrowers at the
Ladysmith branch (38 years versus 35 years), although the difference was not statistically
significant. This is consistent with the observation that branch staff tended to accept loan
applicants that are relatively older. There was no statistically significant difference in loan
repayment performance between male and female Ladysmith borrowers, even though, on
average, more male borrowers have problems repaying their debt than female borrowers. This
suggests that Ladysmith branch staff incorrectly grant too many credit applications from males.
Married borrowers had a marginally better loan repayment rate that borrowers that were not
married, while single borrowers performed marginally worse than borrowers that were not
single. However, loan repayment performance was not statistically significantly different
between married and single borrowers, implying that marital status may not be a very useful
predictor of potential loan default at this branch. Given that married applicants also had a
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relatively high acceptance rate at the Ladysmith branch, branch staff seem to make decisions that
are consistent with risk-reducing behaviour and correctly identify low-risk loan applicants. Type
of home ownership was not statistically significantly different between accepted and rejected
applicants, nor did it significantly differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' Ladysmith
Table 5.11 Comparison of Means between 'Good' and 'Bad' Borrowers for the
Ladysmith Branch of MF01, 1998/ 1999
Note., and ** denote statistically Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of Significance, respectively.
Characteristic Good Borrowers Bad Borrowers t-value
n Mean n Mean
Age (years) 53 38.04 20 34.51 1.346
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) 53 0.58 20 0.65 -0.501
Married (Married = 1, Other = 0) 53 0.53 20 0.45 0.590
Single (Single = 1, Other = 0) 53 0.36 20 0.50 -1.096
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.49 20 0.45 0.305
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.02 20 0.05 -0.719
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.21 20 0.30 -0.826
Rent (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.08 20 0.15 -0.957
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) 51 0.18 19 0.00 1.989
u
Home Loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.17 20 0.05 1.326
Bank Account (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 1.91 20 1.80 1.220
Length ofResidence at cur address 53 176.77 20 159.10 0.452
(months)
Employment Sector (l = Government, 53 1.40 20 1.75 -2.802
o= Private Sector)
Number of months worked at current 53 113.15 20 56.65 2.455
employer
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.83 20 0.85 -0.201
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 53 0.49 20 0.55 -0.447
Gross monthly income (Rand) 53 2942.43 20 2380.16 1.468
Net monthly income (Rartd) 53 2082.08 20 1 651.17 1.933
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio 53 0.11 20 0.12 -0.088
Average no. of loans with other lenders at 53 2.04 20 2.04 1.258
time ofapplication
Total number ofloans that were 2 - 3 53 0.11 20 0.20 -0.788
months in arrears at time of application
Total number ofloans that were 4 - 9 53 0.02 20 0.00 0.612
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number ofbad-debt write-offs at time 53 0.04 20 0.15 -1.704·
of loan application
. * ** *
..
316
borrowers. Thus this information has relatively little influence in predicting potential loan
repayment performance. Although borrowers living on locations performed better than those not
living there, the statistical significance is misleading since there are relatively few counts for this
variable. On average, more 'good' Ladysmith borrowers had a home loan and a bank account
than did 'bad' borrowers. Those who have a home loan are probably more creditworthy and able
to afford more debt due to their relatively higher income levels.
'Good' borrowers lived, on average, 178 months at their current address, while 'bad' borrowers
had an average of 159 months (difference was not statistically significant). Since the average
length of residence at the current address of accepted loan applicants was relatively higher, the
results again indicate that Ladysmith branch staff decisions are consistent with risk-reducing
behaviour in correctly identifying low-risk borrowers. Ladysmith borrowers working for the
government sector tended to have a poorer loan repayment track record than borrowers
employed in the private sector. Borrowers employed in the government sector tended to have
higher levels of debt and were also less contactable (most were teachers teaching at rural
schools). The results in Table 5.11 suggest that staff at the Ladysmith branch were ignoring
potentially useful information about predictors of loan default, since more loan applicants
employed in the government sector were granted credit.
'Good' borrowers had worked, on average, for longer at their employer at the time of application
than 'bad' borrowers (113 months versus 57 months). This statistically significant difference
implies that the credit granting decision based on this information is consistent with correctly
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identifYing low-risk loan applicants, although the information may not influence assessmg
creditworthiness. Having a home or a work telephone did not significantly separate high- and
low-risk borrowers. This may be due to the stringent credit rationing applied using this variable
which plays a key role in MFOl's financial technology. 'Good' borrowers had a significantly
higher mean net monthly income than did 'bad' borrowers. This characteristic thus seems to be
used correctly to identify low-risk borrowers. Net income levels influenced the loan approval
process, with applicants having relatively lower monthly net incomes being severely credit-
rationed. The mean gross monthly income for 'good' borrowers was also relatively higher, but
the difference was not statistically significant. Gross monthly income was not a key determinant
in the credit granting decision where branch managers focused more on disposable income in
estimating ability to repay future debt. There was no significant difference between the mean
debt-to-income ratios for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers. This does not imply that this variable does
not influence loan default, but rather that its effect has been reduced by the stringent credit
rationing criteria applied by branch staff using this criterion.
There was no statistically significant difference between the mean number ofprevious loans with
other lenders for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers, or between the numbers of payment profiles in
arrears. The main reason for this is the extent to which loan applicants that have arrears on their
payment profiles are credit rationed. Almost all loan applicants that had arrears on at least one of
their payment profiles were rejected. It is, therefore, not possible to draw conclusions about the
influence of this information in determining the probability of loan default. The difference in
mean total number of bad-debt write-offs for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers was statistically
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significant. Most of the borrowers with previous bad-debt write-offs were delinquent, consistent
with the branch managers accepting fewer applicants with bad-debt listings.
5.6.5.2 Factors Affecting the Loan Repayment at the Pretoria Branch
According to Table 5.12, 'good' borrowers at this branch were marginally older than 'bad'
borrowers, but the difference was not statistically significant. Similar to the Ladysmith branch,
this agrees with the observation that branch managers tend to accept relatively older loan
applicants. Although more male borrowers, on average, experienced loan repayment problems,
the difference in means was not statistically significant. Married borrowers performed slightly
better than the borrowers that were not married. Given that married applicants also had a
relatively higher acceptance rate, Pretoria branch staff seem to make decisions that are consistent
with risk-reducing behaviour and correctly identify low-risk loan applicants. Pretoria borrowers
that own their homes, or that rent, had better loan repayment performance. Only the difference in
means for Pretoria borrowers living with their parents was statistically significant. Borrowers
living with their parents may be less established in their employment and may also have to
contribute toward household expenses leaving less disposable income to service debt.
Relatively more 'good' borrowers had a home loan, although the difference in means between
the groups was not statistically different. 'Good' borrowers lived, on average, 173 months at
their current address, while 'bad' borrowers lived an average of 175 months there (difference in
means was not statistically significant). There is no apparent explanation why 'more stable'
borrowers would be more prone to loan repayment problems. Similar to the Ladysmith branch,
borrowers employed in the government sector, on average, experienced more loan repayment
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problems than borrowers in the private sector. Government employees had higher debt levels
given their relatively higher incomes, leaving less income to fund basic needs and any additional
new debt.
Table 5.12 Comparison of Means between 'Good' and 'Bad' Borrowers for the Pretoria
Branch of MF01, 1998/ 1999
Note., and denote statistically sIgmficant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels ofSIgnIficance, respectively.
Characteristic Good Borrowers Bad Borrowers t-value
n Mean N Mean
A1!;e (years) 78 36.98 35 35.15 1.040
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) 78 0.62 35 0.69 -0.714
Married (Married = 1, Other = 0) 78 0.53 35 0.51 0.111
Sin1!;le (Sin1!;le = 1, Other = 0) 78 0.36 35 0.43 -0.700
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.54 35 0.46 0.795
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.01 35 0.03 -0.583
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.27 35 0.43 -1.687'-
Rent (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.17 35 0.09 1.138
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.01 35 0.00 0.668
Home Loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.21 35 0.17 0.415
Bank Account (Yes = 1, No = 0) 76 2.00 35 2.00 -0.075
Length ofResidence at cur address 78 173.19 35 175.40 -1.106
(months)
Employment Sector (1 = Government, 78 1.49 35 1.60 1.239
0= Private Sector)
Number of months worked at current 78 93.56 35 74.71 1.501
employer
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 1.00 35 0.97 0.440
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 78 0.60 35 0.46 0.610
Gross monthly income (Rand) 78 3 157.13 35 2878.04 0.198
Net monthly income (Rand) 78 2063.09 35 2007.52 0.400
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio 77 0.14 35 0.13 0.101
Average no. of loans with other lenders at 74 2.31 33 2.18 0.400
time of application
Total number ofloans that were 2 - 3 74 0.15 33 0.09 0.705
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number ofloans that were 4 - 9 74 0.01 33 0.03 -0.588
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number of bad-debt write-offs at time 74 0.12 35 0.31 -2.040"
of loan application
. * ** ***
..
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The results suggest that Pretoria staffmay ignore potentially useful information about predictors
of loan default since, on average, more loan applicants employed in the government sector were
granted credit. 'Good' borrowers had worked, on average, for longer at their employer at the
time of application. Hence the credit granting decision based on this information is consistent
with correctly identifying low-risk loan applicants, although, similar to Ladysmith, this
information may not be considered important for assessing creditworthiness.
Having a home or a work telephone did not significantly separate high- and low-risk borrowers.
'Good' borrowers had, on average, a higher gross and net monthly income than delinquent
borrowers (R3 157 and R2 063 versus R2 878 and R2 007, respectively). Given that net and
gross monthly income are higher for accepted loan applicants, this information seems to be used
correctly to identify low-risk borrowers. Net income was a key predictor of loan approval, with
applicants having relatively lower monthly net incomes being severely credit-rationed. The
difference between the mean debt-to-income ratios was not statistically significant, suggesting
that this information cannot differentiate between high- and low-risk borrowers in the Pretoria
branch sample. Again, since this information influences the loan granting decision, those
applicants with high debt commitments are severely rationed, leaving those applicants with
acceptable debt-to-income ratios in the borrower pool. This results in very similar mean debt-to-
income ratios for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers.
Similar to the Ladysmith branch, there was no statistically significant difference in the mean
number of payment profiles in arrears between 'good' and 'bad' borrowers at Pretoria. The main
reason for this is the extent to which loan applicants that have arrears on their payment profile
321
were credit-rationed. Almost all Pretoria applicants that had arrears on at least one of their
payment profiles were rejected. It is, therefore, again not possible to draw any conclusions about
the influence of this information in determining the probability of loan default. The difference in
the mean total number of bad-debt write-offs for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers was statistically
significant, indicating that loan granting decisions based on bad-debt write-offs are consistent
with a strategy of minimizing loan default.
5.6.5.3 Factors Affecting the Loan Repayment at the Pietermaritzburg Branch
Table 5.13 shows that 'good' borrowers were marginally younger than 'bad' borrowers, but
again this difference was not statistically significant. Similar to the Ladysmith and Pretoria
branches, more male borrowers, on average, had loan repayment problems, but the difference in
means was not statistically significant. Married borrowers performed slightly better, and
borrowers that were single performed slightly worse, at the Pietermaritzburg branch. Given that
married applicants also had a relatively higher acceptance rate, Pietermaritzburg branch staff
seem to make decisions that are consistent with risk-reducing behaviour and correctly identify
low-risk loan applicants, even though the information on marital status does not separate low-
and high-risk borrowers.
On average, Pietermaritzburg borrowers that own or rent their homes, or that live with their
parents, tended to be 'bad', while those that live on the premises of their employer or in a
location tended to be 'good'. Only the difference in means between 'good' and 'bad' borrowers
renting their accommodation is statistically significant. Borrowers renting their accommodation
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may have less stable expected incomes, while the risk of not contacting them is higher since they
are more mobile.
Table 5.13 Comparison of Means between 'Good' and 'Bad' Borrowers for the
Pietermaritzburg Branch ofMF01, 1998/ 1999
Note., and denote statIstIcally sIgmficant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of sIgmficance, respectIvely.
Characteristics Good Borrowers Bad Borrowers t- value
n Mean n Mean
Age (years) 103 35.91 19 36.78 -0.349
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) 103 0.58 19 0.63 -0.396
Married (Married = 1, Other = 0) 103 0.49 19 0.47 0.093
Single (Single = 1, Other = 0) 103 0.49 19 0.37 0.935
Own Home (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.21 19 0.26 -0.475
Live with employer (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.07 19 0.00 1.167
Live with parents (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.24 19 0.26 -0.189
Rent (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.16 19 0.32 -1.677·
Location (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.32 19 0.16 1.427
Home Loan (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.12 19 0.16 -0.501
Bank Account (Yes = 1, No = 0) 102 1.82 19 1.89 -0.763
Length ofResidence at cur address 103 199.02 19 175.47 0.570
(months)
Employment Sector (1 = Government, 103 1.59 19 1.74 -1.187
0= Private Sector)
Number of months worked at current 103 85.71 19 104.32 -0.890
employer
Work telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.95 19 1.00 -0.976
Home telephone (Yes = 1, No = 0) 103 0.35 19 0.26 0.728
Gross monthly income (Rand) 103 2006.34 19 1699.19 0.985
Net monthly income (Rand) 103 I 617.56 19 1 318.50 1.345
Monthly debt-to-net income ratio 103 0.09 19 0.17 -2.329"
Average no. of loans with other lenders at 96 1.51 18 1.72 -0.655
time of application
Total number ofloans that were 2 - 3 96 0.07 18 0.06 0.233
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number ofloans that were 4 - 9 96 0.02 18 0.06 -0.840
months in arrears at time ofapplication
Total number ofbad-debt write-offs at time 103 0.06 19 0.26 -2.159
of loan application
. * ** ***
..
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'Good' borrowers lived, on average, 199 months at their current address, while 'bad' borrowers
lived an average of 175 months at their current address, but the difference in means was not
statistically significant. Given the difference in length of residence at the current address for
accepted and rejected applicants, the results again indicate that the Pietermaritzburg branch
manager's decisions are consistent with risk-reducing behaviour in correctly identifying low-risk
sample borrowers. As at the Ladysmith and Pretoria branches, borrowers employed in the
government sector, on average, experienced more loan repayment problems than borrowers
employed in the private sector. These government employees tended to have higher debt levels
given their relatively higher incomes, leaving less income to service basic needs and any
additional new debt. Unlike both Pretoria and Ladysmith staff, Pietermaritzburg staff correctly
identified government employees as being potentially more risky and hence credit-rationed them
more, although this information is not statistically significant in differentiating between high-
and low-risk borrowers. 'Good' Pietermaritzburg borrowers had worked, on average, for 77
months at their employer at the time of application compared to 89 months by 'bad' borrowers
(difference in means was not statistically significant).
Having a home or a work telephone did not statistically significantly separate high- and low-risk
borrowers. 'Good' borrowers had, on average, a higher gross and net monthly income than
delinquent borrowers (R2 006 and RI 617 versus RI 699 and RI 319, respectively). The
difference between the means is not statistically significant suggesting that, similar to Ladysmith
and Pretoria, this information does not separate 'good' and 'bad' borrowers. The ratios of
monthly debt commitments to net income suggest that 'good' borrowers, on average, have less
debt relative to income than do 'bad' borrowers. The difference in mean monthly debt-to-income
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ratios was statistically significantly different for the Pietermaritzburg borrowers, indicating that
debt commitments influence loan default and that the branch manager correctly uses this
information to identify low-risk loan applicants.
Similar to the Ladysmith and Pretoria branch results, there was not a statistically significant
difference in the mean number of payment profiles in arrears between 'good' and 'bad'
borrowers. The main reason for this is the extent to which loan applicants that have arrears on
their payment profile are credit-rationed. Most of the Pietermaritzburg applicants in arrears were
rejected. It is, therefore, again not possible to draw any conclusions about the influence of this
information in determining the probability of loan default. The mean difference in total number
of bad-debt write-offs for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers was statistically significant, indicating that
the loan granting decisions based on bad-debt write-offs are consistent with a strategy of trying
to minimize loan default at the Pietermaritzburg branch.
Table 5.14 summarises this section by reviewing those characteristics for which the mean values
were statistically significantly different between 'good' and 'bad' MFO1 borrowers. This gives
some insight into which variables may be useful predictors of loan repayment performance as
proxies for client stability, contactability, affordability and previous credit loan history.
STABILITY
Very few of the means of the stability indicators used by MFO1 were statistically significantly
different between 'good' and 'bad' clients. Employment sector and length of employment at the
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current employer were only significantly different between these groups at the Ladysmith
branch. These results may reflect a small sample problem, or sample applicants with poor
performance at other lenders and who were rationed out have led to a lack of variability in the
stability indicators across groups.
Table 5.14 Summary of the Significance Levels of Differences in the Means of the
Characteristics used to Assess MFOl Sample Borrower Loan Repayment
Performance, 1998/ 1999
Branch Ladysmith Pretoria Pietermaritzburg
STABILITY Significance level
Age ns ns ns
Gender ns ns ns
Married ns ns ns
Single ns ns ns
Home ownership type ns ns ns
Use ofa Home Loan ns ns ns
Use ofa Bank Account ns ns ns
Length of residence at current address ns ns ns
Employment sector 1% ns ns
Length of employment at current employer 1% ns ns
CONTACTABILITY Significance level
Home telephone ns ns ns
Work telephone ns ns ns
AFFORDABILITY Significance level
Net monthly income 5% ns ns
Gross monthly income ns ns ns
Debt-to-net income ratio ns ns ns
CREDIT HISTORY Significance level
Recent inquiries ns ns ns
Prior inquiries ns ns ns
Number of loans with other lenders ns ns ns
Payment profile arrears of 3 months or less ns ns ns
Payment profile arrears of 3 months or more ns ns ns
Previous judgements 10% ns ns
Previous bad debt write-offs 10% 5% 1%
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CONTACTABILITY
Mean telephone contact values at home or at work were not statistically significantly different
between 'good' and 'bad' MFOl borrowers.
AFFORDABILITY
The influence of affordability was difficult to assess since the rationing criteria applied to this
factor by MFO1 branch managers was so stringent.
PREVIOUS CREDIT mSTORY
The differences in the means for previous credit history between 'good' and 'bad' borrowers
were not statistically significant for the proxy showing bad debt listings at the credit bureau.
Again, the credit rationing criteria based on clients' previous credit history were very strict,
making it difficult measure the impact of this factor on loan repayment performance.
The empirical analyses that formally estimate models of credit rationing and loan default for
MFO1 are compared in the next section. This will help to show whether variables that are predict
credit-rationing well, can also predict subsequent loan repayment performance.
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5.7 Econometric Methods to Estimate the Economic Models
5.7.1 Single Equation Models
The statistical modeling technique used to estimate the probability function (F) depends on the





where <I> is the cumulative normal distribution function, and the linear probability model with
F(fJx) =fJx (5.17)
Linear discriminant analysis has also been used to estimate equation (5.4) (Reichert et al., 1983).
The linear probability model and linear discriminant analysis will not be used in this study to
estimate equation (5.4). The main problem with the linear probability model is that F(jJxl x) is
not constrained to lie between 0 and 1 as a probability should. Amemiya (1981) suggests that this
defect can be corrected by defining F = 1 if F(jJxl x) > 1 and F = 0 if F(jJxl x) < 0, but
concludes that this produces unrealistic kinks at the truncation points of the cumulative
distribution and recommends not using the linear probability model in the fmal stages of
modeling probabilities. In addition, heteroskedasticity in the error term as a result of model
specification make the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of ~ inefficient in a linear
probability model (Maddala, 1983).
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Linear discriminant analysis has been used in several studies to determine the characteristics that
are able to best classify borrowers as either 'good' or 'bad', or loan applicants as either accepted
or rejected (Eisenbeis, 1978; Reichert et al., 1983). Discriminant analysis, under assumptions of
multivariate normality, closely resembles both the linear probability model and the logistic
regression model, and so has often been used for comparative analysis purposes (Maddala, 1983;
Amemiya, 1981). The most important assumption underlying discriminant analysis is that the
variables describing members of the groups being evaluated are multivariate normally
distributed. This assumption is clearly violated, in particular, by models employing categorical
independent variables. However, the discriminant function is not necessarily less capable than
the logit model in its ability to classify cases even where the assumption of multivariate
normality is violated (Press and Wilson, 1978; Amemiya, 1981). Given the similarity between
the linear probability and logit models, and the relative robustness of the discriminant function
when its assumptions are violated, there may be a case for not discarding the discriminant
function as a classification tool. An important differentiating characteristic between the
discriminant function and the logit and probit models is the direction of causality between the
dependent and independent variables.
The discriminant model specifies a joint distribution of Yi (dependent variable) and Xi (vector of
independent variables), and not a conditional distribution of Yi given Xi. In a discriminant
analysis the group status is pre-determined and a new observation is classified into one of the
two groups based on measured characteristics. In qualitative response models such as the logit
and probit, the determination of Xi precedes that of Yi and, therefore, group status is conditional
on the determination of Xi. Thus the prediction of loan acceptance or loan default is not merely a
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problem of classification (Amemiya, 1981; Greene, 1992). As shown in section 5.3 and 5.4, the
econometric models in this study are based on latent continuous dependent variables describing
the credit rationing decision and the loan default outcomes.
The research issue is not one of merely classifying observations into pre-determined groups, but
to rather predict the likelihood that a sample loan applicant will either be accepted or rejected, or
repay or default on a loan, conditional on the characteristics of the loan applicant. Hence, given
Xi, what will Yi be, and not given Yi, what is Xi, as in discriminant analysis. Therefore, the logit
and probit are better suited to estimate the econometric models of credit rationing and loan
default for this study. Logit and probit models are more robust where the assumptions of
multivariate normality are not met, albeit only marginally (press and Wilson, 1978). Logistic
regression will be used to estimate the accept/reject and repay/default models at branch level.
Equation (5.18) gives the logit model as specified by Maddalla (1983) and Greene (2000):
e fJx
Probrv. = 11 x.] =---;c-
L '-, '1+efJx
which can be re - written as
P k
log-'-= Ro + "p.x .. +u·I-P P, LJ J IJ I
I J=1
(5.18)
The left hand side of equation (5.18) is the log odds ratio (or logit), which is a linear function of
the ~j explanatory variables. This property of the logit model makes it intuitively easy to interpret
and to use to estimate the single equation models. Note that Yi = 1 in equation (5.18) represents
the loan accept or default outcome, subject to information given about the Xi.
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5.7.2 Estimating the Default Equation with Sample Selection Bias to Test the Efficacy of
the Screening Process
The estimation of the economic model to test the efficacy of the loan screening mechanism at
MFO1 accounts for the sample selection bias, but requires the estimation of two equations.
Hunte (1993) used the tobit model to estimate parameters that affect the loan granting decision
and subsequent loan repayment performance. Although the dependent variables in the
specification used were continuous, the assumptions under which the tobit model was applied to
account for sample censoring are questionable. Hunte (1993) also did not specifically account for
the sample selection bias.
Both dependent variables in equations (5.9) and (5.10) are qualitative, which rules out the use of
the tobit model. Van de Yen and van Praag (1981) first proposed a bivariate probit model to
account for the sample selection bias in a two-equation model where both dependent variables
are qualitative and binary in nature. This model was also applied by Boyes et at. (1989), Greene
(1992) and Roszbach (1998) to analyse factors influencing loan repayment performance, where
the loan default equation had to be conditioned for the unobserved repayment performance of
rejected loan applicants. The specification of this model as derived in Greene (1992) is:
Ln (Xi' Vi' p) =LC=OOi In(1- <1>(jJ'vJ) + LC=O,D=OO; In <1>2 (-(a' Xi +t5 SJ, jJ'v j , - p))
+ LC=O,D=IO)n<1>2(a'x i +t5S j ,jJ'v j ,p) (5.19)
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5.8 Empirical Results of the Estimated Empirical Models
This section estimates the qualitative response models that identify factors that affect the
probability of credit rationing and of loan default for MFO1 sample clients. Separate logistic
regression models were estimated for the samples at each branch and on the combined data for
all three branches. The section also estimates factors that influence loan repayment performance
using the bivariate probit model in order to condition for the incidental sample selection. This
model is then used to evaluate the efficacy of the credit granting decision for MF01.
5.8.1 Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Previous research on credit rationing and loan default models has seldom focused on the
correlations between the independent variables (Reichert et al., 1983; Mortensen et al., 1988;
Boyes et al., 1989; Turvey, 1991; Miller and LaDue, 1991; Greene, 1992; Roszbach, 1998;
Schreiner, 1999). The primary focus of these studies was on the ability of the credit models to
correctly classify observations, rather than to focus on the statistical significance of individual
parameter estimates. In such situations, multicollinearity is of little consequence (Maddala,
1992). Although part of the objective of this study is to review the predictive power of the
statistical models, the main objective is to identify parameter estimates that significantly
influence the probability that a sample MFOl applicant will be credit-rationed, or that a sample
MFO1 borrower will default. It is thus important to consider the intercorrelations between
potential variables for the models, as multicollinearity masks the true contribution of each
collinear explanatory variable to the final model (Maddala, 1992; Greene, 2000). The bivariate
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correlation matrix is used initially in Table 5.15 to identify significant correlations between
potential independent variables to be included in the models.
Although the bivariate correlations are not a "fail-safe" method of identifying multicollinearity,
the statistical significance tests of the correlation coefficients do indicate a potential problem.
What the correlations do not show is whether this inter-correlation will be major problem in the
regression models (Maddala, 1992). The client stability indicators used by MF01 staff such as
gender, age, marital status, length or residence at current address and employer type, show
significant correlation coefficients. For instance, gender was significantly positively correlated
with being married and negatively correlated with being single. These links are expected as most
sample applicants are married and are government employees, do not have a home telephone and
have been less credit active. Age was also significantly correlated with many of the other
explanatory variables.
Having a home loan was also significantly correlated with age, marital status, banking details,
length of residence at current address, employer type and length of employment at current
employer. These correlations agree with a priori expectations that sample applicants with a home
loan tend to be older, married, government employees that have been employed for a relatively
longer period of time. Although the client stability and general demographic indicators of sample
applicants were highly correlated, initial comparisons of means suggest that most of these
variables are not important in the loan decision process. While their inclusion in the empirical
models may not be warranted, the exclusion of these variables could lead to potential bias in the
parameter estimates (Greene, 2000).
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Table 5.15 Correlation Matrix of MFOl Sample Applicant Characteristics, 1998/ 1999
Gender Age Married Single Home Bank Length at Employer Length at Home Work Net Salary Retail debt/ Total
Loan Details residence employer phone phone net salary previous
Loans
Gender 1.000 -0.006 0.177**" -0.104*** 0.002 0.017 -0.005 0.102*** 0.070 -0.128*** 0.031 0.154*** -0.120*** -0.106***
A2e -0.006 1.000 0.479*** -0.560*** 0.135*** 0.061 0.195*** -0.084** 0.617*** -0.015 -0.023 0.006 -0.110**" -0.140***
Married 0.177*** 0.479*** 1.000 -0.883*** 0.131*** 0.048 -0.022 -0.021 0.352*** 0.002 -0.056 0.094** -0.059 -0.125***
Sin21e -0.104*** -0.560** -0.883*** 1.000 -0.141 *** -0.080** 0.048 0.012 -0.394*** -0.049 0.036 -0.080** 0.062 0.108**"
Home Loan 0.002 0.135** 0.131*** -0.141*** 1.000 0.084** -0.144*** -0.171*** 0.177*** 0.095** 0.056 0.095** 0.034 0.093**
Bank Details 0.017 0.061 0.048 -0.080** 0.084** 1.000 0.034 -0.135*** 0.055 0.134*** 0.003 0.133*** 0.046 0.138***
Lernrthat res 0.005 0.195** -0.022 0.048 -0.144*** 0.034 1.000 0.001 0.133*** -0.009 0.010 -0.119**" 0.012 -0.014
Emvlover 0.102"** -0.084* -0.021 0.012 -0.171 *** -0.135**" 0.001 1.000 -0.146*** -0.103"** 0.144"** -0.132**" -0.104*** -0.131 ***
Length at 0.070 0.617*" 0.352"** -0.394**" 0.177**" 0.055 0.133*** -0.146*** 1.000 0.014 0.014 -0.023 -0.048 -0.043
emvlover
Homevhone -0.128*** -0.015 0.002 -0.049 0.095** 0.134*** -0.009 -0.103*** 0.014 1.000 -0.044 0.272**" 0.055 0.210**"
Work vhone 0.031 -0.023 -0.056 0.036 0.056 0.003 0.010 0.144**" 0.014 -0.044 1.000 -0.079** 0.064 0.083**
NetSalarv 0.154**" 0.006 0.094"" -0.080** 0.095** 0.133"** -0.119*** -0.132*** -0.023 0.272*** -0.079** 1.000 -0.166**" 0.128***
Retail debt! -0.120*** -0.110** -0.059 0.062 0.034 0.046 0.012 -0.104*** -0.048 0.055 0.064 -0.166*** 1.000 0.374***
net salarv
Total prey -0.106*** -0.140** -0.125*** 0.108*** 0.093** 0.138*** -0.014 -0.131 -0.043 0.210"** 0.083** 0.128*** 0.374*** 1.000
loans
Arrears 3 -0.079** -0.048 -0.037 0.037 0.002 0.018 -0.017 -0.064 0.019 0.040 0.046 0.012 0.149*** 0.328**"
months
Arrears 4 -0.018 -0.036 0.012 -0.015 -0.028 -0.008 -0.019 0.047 0.016 0.018 0.066 -0.025 0.116*** 0.221***
months
Bad debt -0.033 -0.047 -0.031 0.035 0.014 -0.008 -0.057 -0.017 -0.032 0.080** -0.013 -0.036 0.100** 0.083**
Note: ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.




Table 5.15 Correlation Matrix ofMFOl Sample Applicant Characteristics, 1998/1999 (continued)
Arrears 3 Arrears 4 months Bad debt
months
Gender -0.079** -0.018 -0.033
Age -0.048 -0.036 -0.047
Married -0.037 0.012 -0.031
Single 0.037 -0.015 0.035
Home Loan 0.002 -0.028 0.014
Bank Details 0.018 -0.008 -0.008
Length of res -0.017 -0.019 -0.057
Employer -0.064 0.047 -0.017
Length at emplover 0.019 0.016 -0.032
Home phone 0.040 0.018 0.080**
Work phone 0.046 0.066 -0.013
Net Salary 0.012 -0.025 -0.036
Retail debt/ net salary 0.149*** 0.116*** 0.100**
Total prey loans 0.328*** 0.221*** 0.083**
Arrears 3 months 1.000 0.008 -0.003
Arrears 4 months 0.008 1.000 0.220***
Bad debt -0.003 0.220*** 1.000





As expected, the income proxy variables were significantly positively correlated with the number
of previous loans with other lenders. Sample MFO1 applicants with higher incomes tended to be
more credit active and probably qualified for more credit than did lower income applicants.
Clients with a high debt-to-income ratio also had relatively more loans in arrears (significant
correlations between this ratio and the payment profile arrears variables). The total number of
previous loans with other lenders was significantly correlated with most of the other variables. It
was significantly negatively correlated with age, gender, marital status, and employer type,
suggesting that younger, female sample applicants are more credit active. Age was significantly
positively correlated with bank details, single loan applicants, telephone contact, the income
proxies and payment profile arrears. This suggests that applicants with relatively more previous
loans with other lenders were single, had contact details (requirement to access credit at other
lenders), had a bank account, earned relatively more income and, because of their credit activity,
had relatively more payment profiles that have been in arrears at some point.
The validity of including the total number of loans as a predictor can be questioned since it
represents many other factors in the credit dimension that are better explained by the variables
that it is correlated with. Payment profile arrears were strongly correlated with net income and
total previous loans. The more loans the sample applicant had with other lenders, the greater
were the arrears (this is expected since greater credit activity increase the likelihood of going into
arrears at some stage). Bad debt write-offs were also significantly correlated with payment
profiles that show serious arrears. This is expected since the likelihood that a loan showing
serious delinquency will be written off is very high. The payment profile information was not
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significantly correlated with the demographic and personal characteristics of the sample
applicants. This suggests that demographic characteristics have very little influence on loan
repayment performance, with the main factors being debt-to-income levels and, possibly,
previous arrears and bad debt write-offs. The next section discusses the expected relationships
between these characteristics and loan applicant credit rationing and loan repayment
performance.
The branch variables were also highly correlated with the remaining variables in the models,
indicating that branch managers' decisions are mostly based on information that has proxies for
stability, contactability, affordability, and credit history. The difference between the branch
managers is in the emphasis placed on the different proxies. It is thus very difficult to isolate the
effects of branch manager experience in statistical models. By estimating the individual credit
rationing and loan default models for each branch, the individual branch effects can be better
noted than in a combined model.
5.8.2 Independent Variables Included in the Empirical Models
Marital status, gender, bank details, home loan, and total number of previous loans with other
lenders were excluded from the analysis. Both marital status and gender were not key variables
in the credit-vetting procedure and there was no statistically significant difference between the
means of these variables for 'good' and 'bad' borrowers. Although past studies have found that
women have better loan repayment track records than men, this study found no statistically
significant difference between female and male borrowers.
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Inconsistencies in recording marital status also reduced the potential impact of this variable.
Banking details and having a home loan were also not key credit rationing decision variables for
MFO1 branch managers. Further exploratory analysis suggests that these indicators also have no
influence on loan repayment performance. The total number of loans with other lenders was
excluded from the analysis because the individual effects of these variables could not be isolated.
This is linked to the way in which the credit bureau returned the data. Credit activity is also
proxied sufficiently by the payment profile information since this variable counted the number of
loans with arrears.
Prior to estimating the statistical models, the effects of these variables were estimated by means
tests and additional regressions of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Hosmer
and Lemeshow, 1989). These exploratory analyses found that different groupings of economic
sector were important. Although the overall government! private sector employment variable did
not contribute significantly to the credit rationing and loan repayment decisions, branch
managers do focus on particular employment sectors that are vulnerable at the time of
application, and then ration loan applicants employed in those sectors more severely. The
individual branch analyses were also not intended to test the efficacy of the loan granting
decision because of sample size constraints. The bivariate probit model is extremely sensitive to
the counts of observations for each independent variable per dependent variable category
(Greene, 1997). These analyses were intended to highlight key factors affecting the credit
rationing decision and to identify factors that influence subsequent loan repayment performance.
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The default probabilities may hence have a slight downward bias. The estimated credit rationing
and loan default models for each branch are given in the following sections.
5.8.3 Logit Model Results for Branches
The following sections report estimated logit models for each of the branches and the bivariate
probit model for the combined sample. To test the estimated classification accuracy of the
models, the data are split into two subsets, one being used to estimate the parameters in the logit
model and the second being a holdout subset used to evaluate predictive accuracy (Reichert et
al., 1983). Given the relatively small sample sizes involved, 20% of the sample observations
were randomly selected to constitute the holdout sample.
5.8.3.1 Credit Rationing Model for the Ladysmith Branch
Borrower age (LSMAGED), home telephone (HOMPHD), debt-to-income ratio (LSMNETSR),
payment profiles with minor arrears (T0236M), payment profiles with major arrears (T0496M)
and total number of bad debt write-offs (TOBDWO) are used as proxies for stability,
contactability, affordability and credit history respectively. The expected signs and specifications
for these variables are shown in Table 5.16.
Table 5.16
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Definitions and Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates of Variables
Affecting the Ladysmith Branch Credit Rationing Decision, 1998/ 1999





LSMAGED = I if sample applicant age 2: 34 years +
= 0 ifsample applicant age < 34 years
Contactability
HOMPHD = 1 if sample applicant had a home phone +
= 0 ifsample applicant did not have a home phone
Monthly retail debt / Monthly net income
LSMNETSR = 1 ifdebt-to-net income ratio 2: 0.15 -
= 0 ifdebt-to-net income ratio < 0.15
Credit History
T0236M Total number of payment profiles that were 2-3 months in arrears at -
loan application
T0496M Total number of payment profiles that were 4 or more months in -
arrears at the time ofloan application
TOBDWO Total number ofbad debt write-offs at the time of loan applicant -
The binomiallogit parameters estimated for this model presented in Table 5.17 had a residual
deviance of 109.3, following a chi-squared distribution with 115 degrees of freedom (df), and
showed no significant lack of fit for the overall model. The likelihood ratio test of the null
hypothesis that the parameter estimates of the model equal zero (55.075) follows a chi-squared
distribution with 6 degrees of freedom and indicates that the variables in the model contribute
significantly to predicting PAccept (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Menard, 1995).
The Wald statistic can be used to determine the significance of the individual parameter
estimates. A disadvantage of this statistic is that for large parameter estimates the standard error
is inflated which may lead to false acceptance of the null hypothesis that ~ = 0 (Aldrich and
Nelson, 1984; Menard, 1995). Since the coefficients in Table 5.17 are relatively small, the Wald
statistic shows that the coefficients estimated for HOMPH, LSMNETSR, T0236M, LSMAGED,
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T0496M and TOBDWO are significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance,
respectively.
Table 5.17 Estimated Credit Rationing Model for the Ladysmith Branch, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
InWaccenJPreiect) Statistic Effects
Constant +0.6760 2.4513
LSMAGED +1.4038 7.1939'" 0.2493
HOMPH +0.8106 2.6683I:>'Yo 0.1866
LSMNETSR -0.7644 2.4080 -0.1819
T0236M -1.1771 5.0697" -0.2553
T0496M -3.0363 6.6725·... -0.3570
TOBDWO -1.7799 9.4615·... -0.1480
Residual deviance = 109.301 (115 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 55.075*** (6 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.491
Classification of Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 32 17 65.3%
Accept 11 62 84.9%
Overall Classification 77.1%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The variables, LSMAGED and LSMNETSR were re-specified as dichotomous dummy variables
to try and better identify the critical points at which the MFO1 Ladysmith branch manager
regards these variables as reaching levels that indicate credit risk. A condition index of 4.314
indicates very mild multicollinearity and hence no further remedial action was taken (Greene,
2000). The estimated model classifies 77% of the observations correctly - 84% of the accepted
and 65% ofrejected sample applicants.
E
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The signs of the estimated coefficients agree with a priori expectations. Sample applicants that
were older; contactable at home; had a debt-to-income ratio below 15%; had few payment
profiles with minor and major arrears, and with fewer bad debt write-offs, had a higher
likelihood of being accepted. Although sample borrower age was significantly correlated with
most of the stability and contactability measures in the study, individual analysis and comparison
of means showed that none of the other stability indicators affected the loan granting decision of
the Ladysmith branch manager. Since most of the other stability variables are excluded from the
analysis, LSMAGED suggests that older, more responsible borrowers were deemed less risky
and were thus less credit-rationed. The influence of contactability is confirmed with sample
applicants that were not contactable at home having a greater likelihood of being rationed.
Contacting borrowers by telephone is a key component of MFO I' s monitoring technology since
no physical collateral is taken to increase the incentive of the borrower to repay. Lack of
telephonic contact makes this technology ineffective, and increases the likelihood of the loan not
being repaid. Sample applicants having a higher debt-to-income ratio have a greater likelihood of
being credit-rationed, as they have less available disposable income to service the additional
debt. The Ladysmith branch manager thus seems to be very aware of debt levels of sample
applicants and tries not to over-commit potential borrowers.
Key rationing criteria for the Ladysmith branch manager also seem to be the manner in which
loan applicants have handled their debt obligations with other lenders as shown by the payment
profile information (T0236M and T0493M) and total bad debt write-offs. Applicants with any
arrears on their payment profiles and who had any bad debt write-offs in the 24 months prior to
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the loan application at MFIl were likely to be rejected. For instance, an applicant with one
payment profile showing major arrears has an 89% probability of being rejected. It is debatable
whether the strict credit rationing based on previous credit history is warranted given the
inconsistency of the payment profile information.
The marginal effects in Table 5.17 indicate the change in probability for a unit change in the
independent variable. For continuous independent variables the marginal effects are evaluated
using the group means. The greatest change in probability is observed for increases in
LSMAGED, T0236M and T0496M. If a sample applicant is older than 34 years, the probability
of being accepted increases by 24.9 percentage points. The probability of being accepted
decreases, on average, by 25.5 and 35.7 percentage points, respectively for applicants with minor
and major arrears. Increases in payment profile arrears have the greatest marginal impact on the
likelihood of applications being rejected.
Employing the same sample used to derive the parameter estimates to test the model's overall
classification accuracy may lead to biased and overly optimistic classification results (Reichert et
al., 1983). The logit model was, therefore, re-estimated using a 20% holdout sample to test for
predictive accuracy. The results in Table 5.18 for the residual deviance again show no significant
lack of fit. The null hypothesis that the slope parameters are zero can be rejected, given that the
likelihood ratio test is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5.18 Estimated Credit Rationing Model for the Ladysmith Branch - Excluding
Holdout Subset, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
InWaccenJPre·ect) Statistic Effects
Constant +1.1362 4.9401
LSMAGED +1.3010 4.8458·· 0.1013
HOMPH +0.4279 0.6086 0.2963
LSMNETSR -0.5400 0.9351 -0.1293
T0236M -1.2625 4.5362 -0.2653
T0496M -3.1629 6.9222 -0.3598
TOBDWO -1.9129 9.0971"· -0.1822
Residual deviance = 87.011 (98 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 50.435·... (6 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.523
Classification of Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 26 12 68.4%
Accept 7 60 89.5%
Overall Classification 81.9%
Classification of Holdout Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 3 8 27.2%
Accept 0 6 100.0%
Overall Classification 52.9%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The model has relatively good predictive power with an overall 81.9% correct classification of
observations. The signs of the parameter estimates agree with a priori expectations, although the
estimates for HOMPH and LSMNETSR are not statistically significant. The debt-to-income
ratio, LSMNETSR, is relatively highly correlated with the payment profile arrears and this may
mask the effect of this variable somewhat. The classification power of the estimated model was
good for accepted applicants but poor for rejected applicants, leading to an overall 53% correct
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classification. Although a classification cut-off of 0.5 was used, this should not markedly
influence the classification power, as the proportions of accepted and rejected sample applicants
are almost equal. This poor classification power may be a sample specific result.
5.8.3.2 Credit Rationing Model for the Pretoria Branch
Based on the comparison of means in Table 5.8, home telephone (HOMPHD), economic sector
(CONMOW), debt-to-income ratio (PTANETSR), payment profiles with minor arrears
(T0236M), payment profiles with major arrears (T0496M and total number of bad debt write-
offs are used as proxies for contactability, stability, affordability and credit history, respectively.
Loan applicants employed in the construction and motor manufacturing industries were deemed
to have more secure expected incomes by the MFO I Pretoria branch manager, as Gauteng is the
hub of industrial development in SA and has several large motor manufacturing plants located in
the Pretoria area. The CONMOW variable is thus hypothesized to have a positive relationship
with the probability of being accepted, and a negative relationship with the probability of loan
default. Expected signs for the proxies, and the variable specifications are shown in Table 5.19.
The binomial logit model for the Pretoria branch with a residual deviance of 253.828 in Table
5.20 shows no significant lack of fit. The null hypothesis that the parameter estimates of the
model are zero can be rejected given the highly significant likelihood ratio test of 126.04 and the
relatively high R2 (0.483). The Wald statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with I degree of
freedom, and shows that the parameter estimates for HOMPHD, CONMOW, T0236M,
T0496M and TOBDWO are statistically significant at the 1% level. The PTANETSR is
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statistically significant at the 15% level, which may be due to the relatively high correlation
between the debt-to-income ratio and having major arrears on payment profiles. A condition
index number of 4.012 indicates only mild collinearity between the independent variables and
hence no further remedial action was taken.
Table 5.19 Definitions and Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates of Variables
Affecting the Pretoria Branch Credit Rationing Decision, 1998/ 1999









HOMPHD = 1 if sample applicant had a home phone +
= 0 ifsample applicant did not have a home phone
Monthly retail debt I Monthly net income
PTANETSR = 1 ifdebt-to-net income ratio 0::: 0.18 -
= 0 if debt-to-net income ratio < 0.18
Credit History
T0236M Total number of payment profiles that were 2-3 months in arrears at -
loan application
T0496M Total number of payment profiles that were 4 or more months in -
arrears at the time ofloan application
TOBDWO Total number ofbad debt write-offs at the time ofloan applicant -
The signs of the estimated coefficients agree with a priori expectations. Applicants that were
more contactable at home, employed in the construction and motor manufacturing sectors, with
lower debt-to-income ratios, had fewer payment profiles showing minor or major arrears and
with fewer bad debt write-offs were more likely to be accepted at the Pretoria branch. Expected
stability of future income is key.
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Table 5.20 Estimated Credit Rationing Model for the Pretoria Branch, 1998/ 1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
LnWaccenJPreiect) Statistic Effects
Constant 0.2249 0.7158
HOMPHD 1.0463 10.7024*** 0.1778
CONMOW 2.4943 8.1745"*' 0.5510
PTANETSR -0.4027 1.548815% -0.0066
T0236M -1.4646 21.7136 -0.0819
T0496M -2.7342 13.5244-"'" -0.1243
TOBDWO -1.1559 19.8008*** -0.0787
Residual deviance = 253.828 (282 dt)
Likelihood ratio test = 126.046*** (6 dt)




Reject 150 33 81.9%
Accept 24 80 77.4%
Overall Classification 80.3%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The construction and motor manufacturing sectors are relatively well established in Gauteng,
implying reasonably stable expected future incomes for borrowers. Ability and willingness to
repay debt are also key decision criteria for the Pretoria branch manager. Sample applicants with
monthly retail debt commitments below 18% of their monthly net income had less likelihood of
being credit-rationed. This highlights the awareness amongst branch managers of the importance
of not over-committing sample loan applicants to debt. Both the Pretoria and Ladysmith branch
managers have credit-rationed sample applicants with debt commitments well below the 25%
level recommended in the Report on the Impact of Credit and Indebtedness of Clients (200 I).
Willingness to repay debt probably weighs most heavily in the credit decision of the Pretoria
branch manager. Sample applicants with debt at other credit institutions that had any arrears
:: j
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were likely to be fully credit-rationed. Similarly, sample applicants with bad debt write-offs are
less likely to be granted credit. This implies that the information provided by the credit bureau is
of critical importance. The result also highlights the use of reputational capital as a collateral
substitute. Sample applicants with less reputational capital (lower payment profile arrears and
bad debt write-offs) were less likely to be granted credit by MFO1 staff. It also highlights the
reliance that branch staff place on this information which can be detrimental to the credit
granting process where staff are inexperienced at interpreting this information (as in the case of
the newly appointed Pretoria branch manager). Credit may be rationed too strictly where this
reduces credit sales and puts pressure on the branch to remain financially viable.
The logit model was re-estimated using a random sample of 80% of the observations to test the
classification accuracy of the model and the stability of the parameter estimates. The residual
deviance in Table 5.21 shows no significant lack of fit, while the statistically significant
likelihood ratio test shows that the selected variables together contribute towards the explanatory
power of the model. The signs of the parameter estimates are the same as those in the full model,
and the coefficients are of a similar size. The estimated model performs relatively well - about
87% of rejected, and 77% of accepted applicants in the holdout subset were correctly classified.
The marginal effects of the estimated model indicate that the probability of being accepted rose
by about 20 and 52 percentage points, respectively, for sample applicants having a home phone
and employed in the construction and motor manufacturing industries. The marginal effects for
T0236M, T0496M and TOBDWO are the average over the range of the continuous variable.
The likelihood of being credit-rationed increases most for applicants that had one payment
348
profile with mild arrears or major arrears. The probability of being accepted with one payment
profile in minor arrears falls from 35% to 11%, while that showing major arrears decreases from
40% to 4%. Severe credit rationing occurs as result of a poor credit track record at other lenders.
Table 5.21 Estimated Credit Rationing Model for Pretoria - Excluding Holdout Subset,
1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
LnWaccentIPre"eet) Statistic Effects
Constant 0.113 0.142
HOMPHD 1.072 8.846"· 0.1984
CONMOW 2.332 6.825··· 0.5204
PTANETSR -0.214 0.347 -0.0387
T0236M -1.432 15.713··· -0.0875
T0496M -2.659 12.317··· -0.1328
TOBDWO -1.036 14.117··· -0.0821
Residual deviance = 200.831 (215 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 93.659**** (6 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.469
Classification of Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject III 27 80.4%
Accept 19 65 77.4%
Overall Classification 79.3%
Classification of Holdout Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 39 6 86.7%
Accept 5 17 77.3%
Overall Classification 83.6%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
5.8.3.3 Credit Rationing Models for the Pietermaritzburg Branch
Time worked at the current employer (LENGEMP), economic sector (CONSTRUC), having a
work telephone number (TELWORK), debt-to-income ratio (PMBNETSR), payment profiles
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with minor arrears (T0236M), payment profiles with major arrears (T0496M) and total number
of bad debt write-offs are used as proxies for stability, contactability, affordability and credit
history, respectively, given the results in Table 5.9. Pietermaritzburg applicants employed in the
construction industry were deemed to be greater credit risks as little new development was taking
place in and around the Pietermaritzburg area at the time of the study. Applicants employed in
the construction industry (CONSTRUC) are more likely to be credit-rationed and to experience
loan repayment difficulties (hypothesized sign of ECONPMB is positive). The expected signs for
these proxies, and the variable specifications are shown in Table 5.22.
Table 5.22 Definitions and Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates of Variables
Mfecting the Pietermaritzburg Branch Credit Rationing Decision, 1998/
1999





LENGEMP = 1 if> 48 months +
= 0 if< 48 months
CONSTRUC - 1 if sample applicant employed in construction industry -
= 0 otherwise
Contactabilitv
TELWORK - 1 ifloan applicant had work telephone +
= 0 if loan applicant did not have work telephone
Monthlv retail debt I Monthlv net income
PMBNETSR - 1 ifdebt-to-net income 2: 0.25 -
= 0 if debt-to-net income < 0.25
Credit History
T0236M Total mnnber of payment proftles that were 2-3 months in arrears at -
loan application
T0496M Total number of payment proftles that were 4 or more months in -
arrears at the time ofloan application
TOBDWO Total number of bad debt write-offs at the time of loan applicant -
The full sample model estimated in Table 5.23 shows no significant lack of fit, with a residual
deviance of 239.286 and 213 degrees of freedom. The chosen variables as a group explain the
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variability in the model (highly significant likelihood ratio test). The length of employment at
current employer and the debt-to-income ratio were re-specified as dichotomous variables to
better identify the critical points at which the Pietermaritzburg branch manager regards these
variables as indicators of high-risk clients, and to partly reduce the incidence ofmulticollinearity.
A condition index of 9.607 indicates mild collinearity, so no corrective action was taken
(Greene, 2000). The significant Wald statistics confirm the rejection of the null hypothesis that
the individual parameter estimates equal zero.
Table 5.23 Estimated Credit Rationing Model for the Pietermaritzburg Branch, 1998/
1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
Ln(pacceotlPreiect) Statistic Effects
Constant -0.2207 0.1145
LENGEMP 0.4959 2.297815% 0.1225
CONSTRUC -1.3048 2.093015% -0.2751
TELWORK 1.0639 2.8248* 0.2375
PMBNETSR -0.8502 4.3272 -0.1994
T0236M -1.5376 10.9659 -0.2349
T0496M -2.6043 15.4044 -0.2762
TOBDWO -1.1006 11.4196*** -0.2461
Residual deviance = 239.286 (213 dt)
Likelihood ratio test = 66.864**** (7 dt)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.348
Classification of Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 77 30 71.9%
Accept 22 92 80.7%
Overall Classification 76.5%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The coefficients for LENGEMP, CONSTRUC, TELWORK, PMBNETSR, T0236M, T0496M,
and TOBDWO are statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance,
iJ4lJn ;; ab 2£:0 £IJi Ail
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respectively. The model classifies 72% of the rejected and 81% of the accepted sample
applicants correctly. An overall 77% of sample applicants are classified correctly. The signs of
the parameter estimates agree with a priori expectations. Applicants that were employed for
longer at their current employer, were not employed in the construction industry, were
contactable by telephone at work, had a retail debt-to-income ratio over 25%, and had loans with
other lenders that are not in arrears were less likely to be credit-rationed. Stability and
contactability indicators tended to have less influence than affordability and creditworthiness in
the credit rationing decision. Sample applicants that were employed for more than 48 months at
the current employer were regarded as having relatively more stable expected future income
streams. Applicants employed in the construction industry in the Pietermaritzburg area were
regarded as relatively more risky due to the increased likelihood of retrenchment or erratic
employment given the relatively lower levels of investment in fixed infrastructure in the city at
the time of the study. Since sample applicants in this area are less contactable at homes, more
emphasis is placed on contact at work. This may also be part of the reason why applicants
working in the construction industry were credit-rationed more (their level of contactability at
work is poorer).
Similar to managers at the Ladysmith and Pretoria branches, much emphasis is placed on how
the applicant has managed credit at other lending institutions. Applicants that had loans in arrears
with other lending institutions were less likely to be accepted. The marginal effects show that
this is a key decision variable, with the average probability of being accepted falling by 23 and
27 percentage points, respectively, for applicants that had loans with minor or major arrears.
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The logit model was re-estimated using an 80% randomly selected sample to test the
classification power of the model, and robustness of the parameter estimates. The residual
deviance in Table 5.24 shows no significant lack of fit, while the statistically significant
likelihood ratio test indicates that the variables included contribute together in predicting the
likelihood that a sample applicant will be accepted. The model classifies 67% ofthe rejected and
81% of the accepted applicants correctly (overall 75% correct classification rate).
Table 5.24 Estimated Credit Rationing Model for the Pietermaritzburg Branch -
Excluding the Holdout Subset, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
Ln(PacceotIPreiect) Statistic Effects
Constant -0.325 0.214
LENGEMP 0.492 2.07815% 0.1222
CONSTRUC -0.865 0.850 -0.2013
TELWORK 1.028 _1.028 15% 0.2359
PMBNETSR -0.840 3.508**- -0.2003
T0236M -1.261 6.780*** -0.2222
T0496M -2.184 10.453*** -0.2724
TOBDWO -0.989 8.632 '* -0.2438
Residual deviance = 212.812 (180 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 47.620**** (7 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.298
Classification of Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 79 30 67.0%
Accept 18 79 81.4%
Overall Classification 74.5%
Classification of Holdout Observations
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Reject Accept
Reject 16 0 100.0%
Accept 4 13 76.5%
Overall Classification 87.9010
Note. *, ** and *** mdlcate slgmficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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The parameter estimates carry the same sign as those estimated using the full sample, while the
absolute size of the parameter estimates is not much different to those in the full model, except
for CONSTRUC. The estimated model in Table 5.24 has relatively good classification power,
with 100% of the rejected and 77% of the accepted sample applicants being classified correctly
(marginally less than the model estimated using the full sample).
5.8.3.4 Summary of Credit Rationing Models
The lender must be able to correctly predict loan default in order to promote business viability.
The probability of repayment is influenced by external factors such as the stability of future
expected income streams, and by borrower behaviour, which, in turn is influenced to some extent
by the incentives embedded in the loan contract to repay the loan (Navajas, 1999a). The financial
technology used by the lender must, therefore, be able to separate high- and low-risk borrowers
and to offer an appropriate contract that aligns the incentives of the borrower with those of the
lender. The type of financial technology used by the lender will partly determine what type of
client can be offered credit, and what are the important decision factors in predicting the
potential risk of the loan applicant. Lender MFO1 uses a financial technology that focuses on
granting credit to low-income individuals employed in the formal sector, who have no or very
little tangible collateral to secure the loan. Factors that reduce the default risk within the limits of
this financial technology are thus important determinants of the credit rationing decision.
The applicant's place of employment influences the stability of expected future income streams.
Branch managers, therefore, look at the economic sector in which the sample applicant is
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employed. Sectors may differ from region to region but the sector is something that all branch
managers consider in their rationing decision. Other stability indicators, like marital status,
gender and home ownership type, did not have as much influence on this decision. Since MFO I
cannot take collateral, staff cannot physically visit every borrower to ensure loan repayment, and
telephonic contact is critical. Again, the fmancial technology targets a specific type of clientele
to mitigate the risk of loan default and ensure that the contract can be monitored effectively to
align the incentives of the borrower to those of the lender. Consistent across all three branches,
all branch managers require that applicants be contactable by telephone at home or at work.
Another key criterion in the credit decision across all three branches was the loan applicant's
credit history, which shows his/her commitment to repaying debt. In essence the financial
technology used by MFO 1 substitutes reputational collateral for physical collateral. Sample
applicants with less reputational capital were more severely credit-rationed because the
technology depends on reputational capital to reduce the potential risk of default. However, the
interpretation of information received from the credit bureau remains critical. Different arrears
definitions and different credit policies lead to inconsistencies in the data reported by the bureau,
and branch staff must understand this as it impacts on their decision to grant credit. Staff training
in correctly using the bureau information is important if MFO1 wants to ensure more consistent
decisions across branch staff The next section reviews the factors that influence loan repayment
performance at the three branches of MFO 1.
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5.8.4 Empirical Logit Model Results for Loan Repayment
The models estimating factors that influence loan default for the individual branches were
exploratory - they are not scoring models, nor do they explicitly test the efficacy of the loan
granting decision. Rather, these models identify factors that influence loan default once sample
applicants have been screened and are considered creditworthy by MFO I staff. The estimated
default probabilities of the models may be downwardly biased as a result of not being
conditioned for the incidental sample selection. However, individual sample sizes for the
branches were relatively small with low proportions of observed defaults. This causes instability
in the bivariate probit model and, therefore, the bivariate probit model will only be estimated for
the full sample (Greene, 1997).
5.8.4.1 Loan Repayment Model for the Ladysmith Branch
Borrower age (LSMREAGE), economic sector (ECONLSM), relationship to closest relative or
friend, and ratio of monthly debt commitments to net monthly income (INDENSAC) were
included as proxies for stability, contactability and affordability. The variables' specifications
and expected parameter signs are shown in Table 5.25.
Table 5.25
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Definitions and Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates of Variables
Influencing Loan Applicant Default at the Ladysmith Branch, 1998/1999
Variable Name Description Expected sign for
effect on loan default
Prob(D = 1)
Stability
LSMREAGE = 1 ifsample borrower age> 26 years -
= 0 ifsamole borrower age < 26 years




RCRF12 = 1 if sample borrower's closest relative was friend or cousin, -
uncle, aunt
= 0 if sample borrower's closest relative was parent, wife, sister or
brother
Monthly retail debt I Monthly net income
INDENSAC Ratio ofmonthly instalment ofMFOlloanlnet salary +
The loan default model in Table 5.26 has a residual deviance of 63.624 with 68 degrees of
freedom, showing no significant lack of fit. The statistically significant likelihood ratio test
indicates that the variables as a group contribute to influencing the probability of loan default.
The Wald statistics are significant at the 10%, 5% and I% levels, respectively, indicating that the
individual parameter estimates are significantly different from zero. Loan default probability at
the Ladysmith branch was influenced by borrower age (LSMREAGE) and economic activity
(ECONLSM), the relationship of the borrower to the provider of a personal reference (RCRF12),
and the debt-to-income ratio (INDENSAC). The signs ofthe estimated parameter estimates agree
with a priori expectations. Sample borrowers under 26 years of age, employed in the textiles,
beverage and education sectors, whose personal reference was provided by a friend, uncle, aunt
or cousin, and who had a higher debt-to-income ratio were more likely to default.
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Table 5.26 Estimated Loan Default Model for the Ladysmith Branch, 1998/ 1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
In(PbadlPaccent) Statistic Effects
Constant 1.5434 1.7963
LSMREAGE -2.4536 8.6313 -0.5282
ECONLSM -1.3613 4.53411" -0.2478
RCRF12 -1.3601 4.1954" -0.2519
INDENSAC 5.7612 2.8425 0.0499
Residual deviance = 63.624 (68 dt)
Likelihood ratio test = 22.103**** (4 dt)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.378
Classification of Observations (Cut Point =0.5)
Observed Predicted Percent Correct
Good Bad
Good 49 4 92.4%
Bad 11 9 45.0%
Overall Classification 79.4%
Classification of Observations (Cut Point =0.3)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 43 10 81.1%
Bad 5 15 75.0%
Overall Classification 79.5%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Although the Ladysmith branch manager already credit-rationed younger sample applicants, it is
evident that rationing borrowers who are 34 years of age may be too strict and should perhaps be
adjusted to the 26-year cut-off point. This outcome is again conditional on the loan applicant
being accepted. Younger borrowers may have less stable incomes, be relatively inexperienced in
managing credit, and may take the contractual obligation to repay the loan less seriously (since
they have less experience of the consequences of defaulting on credit). They also have lower
incomes and hence may have less capacity to meet their debt obligations. The textiles industry in
SA has faced increased competition in recent years due to the lowering of import tariffs, and a
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number of textile factories have closed. This negatively affects the expected stability of future
income streams and increases the risk that sample borrowers employed in this sector will default.
Borrowers employed in the education sector usually taught at rural schools that were relatively
distant from the branch, reducing their contactability. Although many of these teachers gave the
telephone number of the regional education department, very few could be contacted directly at
the school where they worked. The reduced ability to monitor the sample applicants may have
reduced their incentives to repay, and hence increased the likelihood of loan default.
Providers of client references on the application form affect the borrower's contactability. If a
sample borrower is not contactable, or does not respond to telephonic follow-up calls, the credit
control staff at MFOl phone the reference provider. The study results indicate that where this
provider has no direct relationship with the sample borrower, the effectiveness of the reference
increases. Parents, brothers and sisters may have less incentive to relay messages to the
borrower, or may co-operate less with the credit control staff, than would friends or more distant
relatives. This finding should be interpreted with caution, as it may be very sample specific.
The debt-to-income ratio used in the loan default analysis for the Ladysmith branch differs
somewhat from to the debt-income ratio used in the credit-rationing model. Given that sample
applicants with relatively high retail debt-to-net income ratios were severely rationed, few
sample borrowers at the Ladysmith branch had high retail debt-to-net income ratios, reducing the
variability of this ratio and, hence, its potential role in explaining default. The ratio of the
monthly instalment of the MFOl loan granted to net income seemed to play a more influential
role. Sample borrowers that used a larger proportion of their monthly net income to repay the
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MFO1 loan were more likely to default. There are a number of competing needs for disposable
income, especially for low-income borrowers who may allocate proportionately more of their
income to paying for daily living expenses.
Where more of the income is taken up by debt, loan repayments are likely to suffer, since the
available income is first allocated to other, more important needs. While the branch manager
may be cautious in granting credit to already highly indebted loan applicants, it is important that
loans should not exceed the applicants' repayment capacity. The marginal effects show that age,
economic sector where employed, and provision of a reference had the greatest impact on the
probability of default. The estimated model classifies 92% of the accepted and 45% of the
rejected sample applicants correctly (overall 79% correct classification rate). There are a
relatively large number of Type II classification errors where defaulting borrowers are
incorrectly classified as current. The cut-point of 0.5 in the classification rule is normally used,
but there are potential problems, particularly ifthe sample sizes differ markedly, and the pay-offs
between falsely classifying a defaulting borrower as a current borrower, and a current borrower
as a defaulting borrower, are not the same (Greene, 2000). If there are a low proportion of
defaulters in the sample, then the prediction rule, based on a cut-point of 0.5 may have difficulty
in predicting a defaulter (Greene, 2000). This is evident in Table 5.27 for the classification table
on a cut-off point of 0.5. Discussions with management at MFOl identified that it is more costly
to incorrectly classify a potential defaulting borrower as a good borrower, than it is to incorrectly
classify a potentially current borrower as a defaulting borrower. There is, therefore, some merit
in adjusting the cut-off point to reflect the sample proportions of defaulters, in order to better
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classify defaulters. The disadvantage is that by adjusting the cut-off point to better classify
defaulters, the number of Type I errors will increase (Greene, 2000).
Table 5.27 Estimated Loan Default Model for the Ladysmith Branch - Excluding the
Holdout Subset, 1998/ 1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
In(PbaeYP200II) Statistic Effects
Constant 2.3862 3.3734
LSMREAGE -2.9883 9.3517 -0.6308
ECONLSM -1.6214 5.1978** -0.3257
RCRF12 -1.7514 5.5856** -0.3137
INDENSAC 5.7624 2.4712 0.8629
Residual deviance = 53.728 (62 dt)
Likelihood ratio test = 26.177*** (7 dt)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.464
Classification of Observations (Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 44 4 91.6%
Bad 10 9 47.3%
Overall Classification 79.1%
Classification of Observations (Cut-off point = 0.3)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 41 7 85.4%
Bad 4 15 78.9%
Overall Classification 88.8%
Classification of Holdout Observations Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 3 2 60.0%
Bad 1 0 0.0%
Overall Classification 50.0%
Classification of Holdout Observations (Cut-off point = 0.3)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 3 2 60.0%
Bad 1 0 0.0%
Overall Classification 50.0%
Note. *, ** and *** mdIcate sIgmficance at the10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Given that 25% ofthe sample borrowers defaulted at Ladysmith, the cut-off point was lowered to
0.3. The model then predicted 75% of defaulting and 81% of current borrowers correctly. The
resulting increase in Type I errors is thus relatively small. The model in Table 5.27 re-estimated
the loan default situation with an 80% random sample of borrowers, and shows no significant
lack of fit, with the parameter estimates being statistically significant. The signs of the estimated
parameter estimates agree with those of the full model. The absolute values of the parameter
estimates were also relatively close to those of the full model. Given the small size of the 20%
holdout sample (only 6 observations), it is difficult to draw conclusions about the classification
ability of the model. The model classifies 60% of the current borrowers and none of the
defaulters correctly.
5.8.4.2 Loan Repayment Model for the Pretoria Branch
Time spent at current employer (NEWLENGR), home ownership type (NEWHOME), economic
sector (PTAECON), telephone contact at home (TELPTR) and total bad debt write-offs
(TOBDWO) were used as proxies of stability, contactability and credit history given the analysis
of means in Table 5.12. The variables are specified with the expected parameter signs in Table
5.28. The statistically significant likelihood ratio test in Table 5.29 indicates that the variables
included in the model influence the probability of loan default. The parameter estimates are
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels of significance, and their signs agree with a
priori expectations.
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Table 5.28 Definitions and Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates of Variables
Influencing Loan Applicant Default at the Pretoria Branch, 1998/ 1999
Variable Name Description Expected sign for
effect on loan default
Prob(D = 1)
Stability
NEWLENGR = 1 if length ofemployment at current employer> 120 months -
= 0 if< 120 months
NEWHOME = 1 if sample borrower owns home -
= 0 otherwise
PTAECON = 1 if sample borrower employed in construction, motor -
manufacturing, entertainment, and non-core financial services sector
= 0 otherwise
Contactability
TELPTR = 1 ifsample borrower had home phone and contact phone +
= 0 otherwise
Credit History
TOBDWO Total number of bad debt write-offs at the time ofloan applicant +
Sample applicants that rented or owned a home, lived for more than 120 months at their current
residential address, not employed in the construction, motor manufacturing, security, financial
services, education and entertainment sectors, were contactable at home and had no bad debt
write-offs had less probability of defaulting. Applicants that owned their homes may have
relatively more stable incomes compared to sample applicants who live with their parents, on
their employer's property or in a location. Applicants who have lived for longer at their current
residential address may also be more stable with better contactability. The PTAECON variable
suggests that applicants employed in the construction, motor manufacturing entertainment,
education, security and financial services sector were more likely to default.
These results contrast with the initial credit-rationing criteria used by the Pretoria branch
manager where applications from the construction and motor manufacturing sectors were less
risky. There may, therefore, be a degree of error in incorrectly accepting high-risk sample
applicants. Sample borrowers working in the entertainment (mostly gambling industry) and
security sectors may be relatively more risky since they work shifts and are more difficult to
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contact. In addition, job security, and hence income stability tended to be lower in these sectors.
Borrowers who worked in the fmancial services industry were mostly cleaning and clerical staff
that were being retrenched due to the outsourcing some of these functions.
Table 5.29 Estimated Loan Default Model for the Pretoria Branch, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
In(PbadlP<Jood) Statistic Effects
Constant -0.2533 0.2908
NEWHOME -0.8290 2.8199 -0.1716
NEWLENGR -1.1292 3.2516" -0.1941
PTAECON 1.2155 6.5676...... 0.2530
TELPTR -0.9832 4.2607 -0.1935
TOBDWO 0.9234 3.4616 0.4617
Residual deviance = 116.494 (107 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 23.375**** (5 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.263
Classification of Observations (Cut-off Point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 70 8 89.7%
Bad 21 14 40.0%
Overall Classification 74.3%
Classification of Observations (Cut-off Point = 0.3)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 62 16 79.5%
Bad 14 21 60.0%
Overall Classification 73.5%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
It is difficult to explain why sample borrowers employed in the motor manufacturing and
construction sector were perceived as relatively more risky. These borrowers either work on a
construction site or in a factory environment where contactability can be a particular problem.
Few of the employers allow the borrowers to take calls while on shift, and according to credit
controllers, few employers in these sectors pass on a telephonic message to their employees. This
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reduces the effectiveness of the monitoring technology and thus may increase the potential for
moral hazard. The probability of loan default for a sample applicant employed in these sectors
increased by about 25 percentage points. Sample borrowers that were contactable were less
likely to default. Those that still had bad debt write-offs had a higher probability of defaulting.
This supports the already strict credit-rationing criteria based on previous loan defaults used by
the branch managers, and shows that once borrowers have defaulted on a loan, the likelihood that
it will happen again is very high. The marginal effect of this variable is the highest - the
probability of loan default for a sample borrower with one previous bad debt write-off increases
by 46 percentage points.
The estimated model in Table 5.29 correctly classifies nearly 90% of current, and 40% of the
defaulting borrowers (overall correct classification of 74%). Given that only 30% of the sample
borrowers defaulted, the classification based on a cut-off point of 0.5 is likely to perform
relatively poorly. With unequal costs of committing a Type I and a Type 11 error, reducing the
cut-off point to 0.3 better classifies the defaulters at the cost of incorrectly classifying non-
defaulters.
The estimated holdout subset model in Table 5.30 shows no significant lack of fit using 80% of
the cases, with the signs of the parameter estimates being the same as those in the full model.
The estimated classifies 88% of the current borrowers and 0% of the defaulters correctly (overall
47% correct classification). Reducing the cut-off point to better reflect the population
proportions and reduce the costly Type 11 error improves the overall classification to 64%, and
classifies 56% of the defaulters correctly.
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Table 5.30 Estimated Loan Default Model for the Pretoria Branch - Excluding Holdout
Subset, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
In(PbadlPgood) Statistic Effects
Constant -0.509 1.047
NEWHOME -0.995 3.213* -0.1883
NEWLENGR -0.774 1.313 -0.1241
PTAECON 1.244 5.469'- 0.2373
TELPTR -0.847 2.612* -0.1513
TOBDWO 1.080 4.103 0.3400
Residual deviance = 93.062 (90 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 19.082*** (5 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.262
Classification of Observations (Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 66 4 94.3%
Bad 19 7 26.9010
Overall Classification 76.0%
Classification of Observations (Cut-off point = 0.3)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 54 16 77.1%
Bad 10 16 61.5%
Overall Classification 72.9%
Classification of Holdout Observations (Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 8 1 88.8%
Bad 8 0 0.0%
Overall Classification 47.1%
Classification of Holdout Observations (Cut-off point = 0.3)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 6 2 75.0%
Bad 4 5 55.6%
Overall Classification 64.7%
Note· * ** d *** d ""fi h., an ill lcate Slgm cance at t e 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
366
5.8.4.3 Loan Repayment Model for the Pietermaritzburg Branch
Economic sector (ECONPMB), borrower debt-to-income ratio (PMBINC), total number of
recent inquiries (TOTRECINC), length of longest spell of arrears (LENGSPEL) and total bad
debt write-offs (TOBDWO) were included as proxies for stability, affordability and credit
history respectively, given the analysis of means in Table 5.13. The variables are specified with
their expected parameter signs Table 5.31.
Table 5.31 Definitions and Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates of Variables
Influencing Loan Applicant Default at the Pietermaritzburg Branch, 1998/
1999
Variable Name Description Expected sign for
effect on loan default
Prob(D = 1)
Stabilitv
ECONPMB = I if sample borrower was involved In construction, motor +
manufacturing, and textile manufacturing
= 0 otherwise
Monthly retail debt I Monthly net income
PMBINC = 1 ifdebt/net income ratio 2: 0.18 +
= 0 if debt/net income ratio < 0.18
Credit History
TOTRECINQ Total number ofrecent inquiries at credit bureau +
LENGSPEL Length of longest spell of arrears on any payment profile +
TOBDWO Total number ofbad debt write-offs at the time of loan applicant +
As only 15% of the accepted Pietermaritzburg sample applicants defaulted, this model was
relatively unstable. The residual deviance of 74.176 in Table 5.32 shows no significant lack of
fit, while the significant likelihood ratio test indicates that the variables as a group help to
explain some variability in the model. The signs of the parameter estimates agree with a priori
expectations. Sample applicants employed in the construction, motor manufacturing, textile
manufacturing and cleaning sectors, that had over 18% of their net monthly income committed to
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repaying retail debt, that had more recent inquiries, and that had more bad debt write-offs were
more likely to default.
Table 5.32 Estimated Loan Default Model for the Pietermaritzburg Branch, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
In(PbadlP200d) Statistic Effects
Constant -3.9988 25.3406
ECONPMB 1.8109 7.4863 0.1810
PMBINC 1.4144 5.0441" 0.1626
TOTRECINQ 1.1130 2.7023· 0.1602
LENGSPEL 1.2632 1.8025 0.1033
TOBDWO 0.9983 3.3507 0.1878
Residual deviance = 74.176 (107 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 21.529*** (5 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.263
Classification of Observations (Cut-off Point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 90 6 93.7%
Bad 13 4 23.5%
Overall Classification 83.1%
Classification of Observations (Cut-off Point = 0.15)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 71 25 74.0%
Bad 3 14 82.4%
Overall Classification 75.2%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The positive sign for the ECONPMB coefficient agrees with the credit-rationing criteria
employed by the Pietermaritzburg branch manager, and again suggests that workers in the
construction and motor manufacturing sectors are relatively greater credit risks. Sample
borrowers employed in the textile and cleaning sectors are also greater credit risks. The textile
industry was experiencing increasing competition from cheaper imports at the time of the study.
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Similar to the Ladysmith branch, employees in the textile industry were at greater risk of being
retrenched or put on to short time.
The cleaning sector referred to employers that were supplying office cleaning and sanitary
services to businesses in the Pietermaritzburg area. Sample borrowers in this sector were
possibly at greater risk of losing their employment, and being more difficult to contact. This
increased the risk of loan default due to less income stability and increased potential for moral
hazard. Borrowers with a higher retail debt-to-income ratio had more likelihood of defaulting,
with the probability of default increasing by 16 percentage points if the debt-to-income ratio
exceeds 18%. The sign of the coefficient for PMBINC is contrary to that in the credit rationing
equation, although the threshold of the ratio is lower. The result suggests that the
Pietermaritzburg branch manager is justified in rationing sample applicants with higher debt-to-
income ratios, as they are more likely to default.
Having less disposable income available makes these low-income borrowers more susceptible to
negative income shocks. The total number of recent inquiries shows the recent credit activity of
sample applicants. A higher number of recent inquiries means that there were more recent credit
applications, and also possibly the likelihood that many of these applications were declined
(potentially risky borrowers). This increased risk is confirmed by a greater likelihood of sample
borrowers with more recent inquiries defaulting on their loans with MFO1. Accepted sample
borrowers with more bad debt write-offs were more likely to default, which is consistent with the
credit-rationing criteria applied by the branch manager. Economic sector and total number of bad
debt write-offs caused the highest estimated marginal increase in the probability of default.
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The likelihood of loan default by a sample borrower who worked in the motor manufacturing,
textile and construction sectors increased by 18 percentage points. A similar increase was
observed for sample applicants that have bad debt write-offs. Given the small proportion of
defaulters in the sample, the 0.5 cut-off point for classification led to a relatively poor
classification of defaulters. The estimated model correctly predicts 93% of current borrowers,
and only 23% of the defaulters. The poor classification of defaulters is of concern, as the costs of
incorrectly classifying a defaulter as current were considered quite high by MFO1 management.
Reducing the cut-off point to more closely represent that sample proportion for the
Pietermaritzburg branch improves the model's ability to classify defaulters from 23% to 84%.
Re-estimating the model in Table 5.33 using 80% of the sample observations confirms that the
model is relatively unstable due to the relatively small proportion of defaulters. Although there is
no significant lack of fit, and the parameter signs are consistent, the absolute size of these
estimates, and of the significance levels, have changed (less robust model). The ability of this
model to correctly predict the 20% holdout sample is not very good. It classifies current
borrowers very well, but IS unable to classify borrowers that default.
s.a£Mi¥
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Table 5.33 Estimated Loan Default Model for the Pietermaritzburg Branch - Excluding
Holdout Subset, 1998/1999
Variable Name Parameter Estimate Wald Marginal
In(PbaJP~ood) Statistic Effects
Constant -4.147 18.357
ECONPMB 1.420 3.205'- 0.1522
PMBINC 1.905 5.74f** 0.2201
TOTRECINQ 0.769 0.821 0.1564
LENGSPEL 1.088 0.832 0.0844
TOBDWO 2.940 4.396"- 0.4379
Residual deviance = 49.266 (94 df)
Likelihood ratio test = 25.065**** (5 df)
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.432
Classification of Observations (Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 75 2 97.4%
Bad 10 3 23.1%
Overall Classification 86.7%
Classification of Observations (Cut-off point = 0.15)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 61 16 79.2%
Bad 3 10 76.9%
Overall Classification 78.9%
Classification of Holdout Observations (Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 18 1 94.7%
Bad 4 0 0.0%
Overall Classification 78.2%
Classification of Holdout Observations (Cut-off point = 0.15)
Predicted Percent Correct
Observed Good Bad
Good 13 6 68.4%
Bad 4 0 0.0%
Overall Classification 56.5%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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5.8.4.4 Summary of the Empirical Models
Several factors that influenced the credit rationing decision of the three branch managers were
not predictors of loan default, most notably the payment profile arrears. This is mainly due to the
strict credit rationing applied by branch managers to sample applicants who had payment profile
arrears. Employment stability as ptoxied by the economic sector where employed and length of
employment at current employer, entered the default equations, followed by available disposable
income (debt-to-income ratio), and reputational capital (reflected by total bad debt write-offs).
Boyes et al. (1989) Greene, (1992) and Schreiner (1999) found similar results in their models of
consumer loan default models. Kohl (2000) supports these results in his credit assessment
guidelines by identifying two key factors influencing default probability for low-income
borrowers as stability of income and affordability. Stability of income is determined by
economic conditions and may vary as these conditions change. This implies that MFO1 staff
must monitor local economic conditions to identify timeously which sectors are likely to be
affected by economic changes. Employment sector also indirectly influences borrower
contactability, since factory and construction workers were less likely to be contactable in their
work environment. If home contact cannot be readily established, which is highly likely for shift
workers, there is an increased likelihood of moral hazard, since MFO 1 staff cannot optimally
enforce the loan contract.
Low-income borrowers are already under financial pressure to meet their day-to-day living
expenses, and so may resort to financing their liquidity shortfalls with debt (Report on Impact of
qa
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Credit and Indebtedness of Clients, 200 I). Increased borrowings increase the likelihood that
borrowers may experience loan repayment problems during an income shock. Borrowers with
debt-to-income ratios over 18% are particularly vulnerable. Reputational capital was also a key
determinant of loan repayment. Sample borrowers with bad debt write-offs had a greater
likelihood of defaulting on the debt commitments with MFO1 across all branches. Reputational
capital can be effective if applied consistently across the credit industry. The next section
estimates the bivariate probit model in order to test the efficacy of the screening decisions taken
by MFO1 branch managers and to estimate parameters for the loan default model that condition
for the sample selection bias.
5.8.5 Efficacy of the Credit Screening Process and Estimation of Loan Default Equation
to Account for Incidental Sample Selection
Proxies for stability, contactability, affordability and credit history, and the expected signs of
their estimated coefficients are shown in Table 5.34. Proxies for stability include the loan
applicant's length of residence at the current address (G90MON), time spent at the current
employer (LENGEMP), and economic sector (ECONENT, ECONSTR). Having a home
telephone (HOMPHD) was a proxy for contactability, while the debt-to-income ratio
(DITRATNE) measured loan affordability. The loan applicant's previous credit history was
proxied by total number of payment profiles with minor arrears (T0236M) and total number of
previous bad debt write-offs (TOBDWO). More client stability indicators were included in the
bivariate probit model to try and make it as encompassing of the initial credit granting decision
as possible. Length of residence at current address, and length of employment at current
employer were included, while two categorical variables identifying different employment
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sectors were added to the model. There was, however, considerable multicollinearity between
length of employment at current employer and length of residence at current address, and for the
economic indicator variables.
Table 5.34 Variable Definitions and Expected Sign of Parameter Estimates of Branch
Credit Rationing Decision, 19981 1999
Variable Description Expected sign Expected sign
Name for effect on for effect oncredit loan default
rationiIig Prob(D = 1)
Prob(C = 1)
Stability
G90MON = 1 if length of residence at current address> 90 months + -
= 0 if length of residence at current address < 90 months
LENGEMP = 1 if> 48 months + -
= 0 if< 48 months
ECONENT = 1 if the loan applicant is employed in the +1- +1-
entertainment, security, and non-core fmancial services
sector,
= 0 otherwise
ECONSTR = 1 if the loan applicant is employed in the construction +/- +/-
or motor manufacturing sector
= 0 otherwise
Contactability
HOMPH = 1 if sample applicant had a home phone + -
= 0 if sample applicant did not have a home phone
Monthly retail debt 1Monthly net income
DITRATNE = 1 if debt! net income ratio 2: 0.18 - +
= 0 ifdebt! net income ratio < 0.18
Credit History
T0236M Total number of payment profiles that were 2-3 months - +
in arrears at loan application
TQBDWO Total number of bad debt write-offs at the time of loan - +
applicant
Maddala (1992) and Greene (2000) suggest that the collinearity between variables can be
reduced by using fewer orthogonal principal components that are constructed from the original
variables. The problem with this process is that if it is difficult to attach a clear interpretation to
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the principal components, the interpretation of the parameter estimates in the estimates equation
becomes ambiguous. Since only two variables make up each of the two principal components,
this may be less of a problem. The first principal component includes the two economic sector
groups ECONENT and ECONSTR as shown in Table 5.35. Only the first principal component
can be retained (Maddala, 1992), and it accounts for 55% of the variability in ECONENT and
ECONSTR. The principal component for the economic sector is named ECON. High values of
ECON show that sample applicants are employed in ECONSTR, while negative values will
indicate that applicants are employed in the ECONENT sector.
Table 5.35 Principal Component Analysis of Applicant Economic Sector, 1998/ 1999




ECONENT = 1 if the loan applicant is employed in the entertainment, security, and non-core
fmancial services sector
= 0 otherwise.
ECONSTR = 1 if the loan applicant is employed in the construction or motor manufacturing
sector
= 0 otherwise.
Principal Component Factors Principal Component 1 Principal Component 2
ECONENT -0.748 0.663
ECONSTR 0.748 0.663
For the length of employment and length of residence analysis in Table 5.36, the first principal
component accounts for 56% of the variability in G90MON and LENGEMP. Both eigenvector
coefficients are positive, suggesting that the first principal component measures the overall
stability of sample applicants as determined by length of residence at current address and length
of employment at current employer. This principal component is designated as STABIL in the
bivariate probit analysis.
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Table 5.36 Results of the Principal Component Analysis on Length of Residence and
Length of Employment, 1998/ 1999




G90MON = 1 if sample applicant has lived for longer than 90 months at current address
= 0 otherwise
LENGEMP = 1 if sample applicant is employed for longer than 48 months at employer
= 0 otherwise
Principal Component Factors Principal Component 1 Principal Component 2
G90MON 0.753 0.658
LENGEMP 0.753 -0.658
Two other variables had to be modified for the bivariate probit model due to the sensitivity of the
model to low number of observations for a given variable per dependent variable category. Few
observations for an independent variable result in convergence problems (Greene, 1997). First,
T0496M which measures the number of payment profiles with serious arrears that a sample
applicant had at the time of application, had to dropped from the model as too few accepted
sample applicants had such profiles (including this variable prevented the bivariate probit model
from converging). To account for the role of payment profile arrears, a variable accounting for
the total number of payment profiles with mild arrears that the sample applicant had in the 18
months prior to the application (TOT23), was substituted. This variable increased the number of
counts per dependent variable category in order to improve the ability of the model to converge.
Similarly, the variable accounting for total bad debt write-offs was re-specified to account for the
total number of bad debt write~ffs that sample applicants had in the 18 months prior to applying
for a loan at MFOl. The estimated bivarate-probit model reported in Table 5.37 has a residual
deviance of 480.20 that shows no significant lack of fit. The parameter estimates are statistically
significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5.37 Bivariate Probit Model of Loan Default, 1998/ 1999
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Estimate Estimate
Z(PaccentlPreiect) Z(PbadlP..ood)
Constant 0.4009 4.575 -0.0892 -0.133.
HOMPHD 0.3938 3.252...... -0.3204 _1.406 1:>':'.
ECON 0.0774 1.4601:>% 0.0776 0.7308
STABIL 0.1387 2.432 -0.1789 -2.504
DITRATNE -0.2995 -2.401 0.4053 2.271 ....
TOBDWO -0.9249 -11.252...... 0.9568 4.925......
TOT236M -0.6828 -6.529 0.3472 0.6223
p = -0.9006 -1.306
Residual Deviance = 480.20 (618 df)
Classification of AcceptlReiect Observations (Cut-off point = 0.5)
Predicted
Observed Reject Accept Percent Correct
Reject 192 147 56.6%
Accept 45 248 84.6%
Overall Classification 69.6%
Classification of GoodlBad Observations (Cut-off point =0.5)
Predicted
Observed Good Bad Percent Correct
Good 150 72 67.6%
Bad 28 43 60.6%
Overall Classification 65.9%
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The signs of the parameter estimates for the model predicting the likelihood of a sample
applicant being accepted agree with a priori expectations. Those applicants who had a home
phone, more stable expected incomes, fewer payment profiles with arrears and fewer bad debt
write-offs were more likely to be accepted. The model classifies 56.6% of the rejected and 84.6%
of accepted sample applicants correctly (overall classification rate of 69%).
The signs of the parameter estimates in the loan default equation suggest that those borrowers
who were contactable; more stable in that they have lived for longer at their current address and
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have worked for longer at their current employer, had lower debt~to-income ratios and bad debt
write-offs in the last 18 months, were less likely to default. The default equation classifies 67%
of the current and 60% of delinquent sample applicants correctly (overall correct classification
rate of 65.9%). Boyes et al. (1989) and Greene (1992) also found that sample applicant income
and previous credit history, as supplied by the credit bureau, were key determinants in the credit
rationing decision. Sample applicants with higher incomes and a 'cleaner' credit history were
more likely to be accepted. Boyes et al. (1989) also identified sample applicants who were stable
(lived longer at their current address) as having a significant influence on the credit rationing
decision. These findings support the results in this study, where sample applicants with lower
debt burdens and fewer arrears records at the credit bureau were more likely to be accepted.
The positive and statistically significant parameter estimate for HOMPHD in the rationing
equation, and the negative and significant parameter estimate for HOMPHD in the loan default
equation, indicate that the branch managers at MFO1 have used this information correctly to
identify low-risk sample applicants (quadrant I in Table 5.2). Applicant contactability thus seems
to be a key predictor of the extent of credit rationing and the likelihood of loan repayment
performance. Similarly, the negative and significant parameter estimate for DITRATNE in the
rationing equation, and the positive and significant parameter estimate for DITRATNE in the
loan default equation, indicate that branch managers have correctly used the debt-to-income ratio
information to identify potential high-risk loan applicants (quadrant IV of Table 5.2).
The positive coefficient estimate of ECON in the credit rationing equation together with the
positive coefficient estimate in the default equation suggests that branch managers have
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incorrectly accepted high-risk loan applicants. Those applicants employed in the motor
manufacturing and construction sector tended to be greater credit risks than anticipated by
branch managers. The non-significant parameter for EeON in the default equation suggests that
information on the economic sector in which the sample applicants work may not be useful in the
loan granting decision as it has little bearing on loan default. Boyes et al. (1989) also found that
economic sector was a relatively weak predictor of loan default.
Since the economIC sectors in which sample applicants were employed were relatively
disaggregated, this finding may be very sample specific. The stability of employment as proxied
by economic sector can clearly affect ability to repay a loan. A larger sample size would have
perhaps highlighted this better. The positive and statistically significant parameter estimate for
STABIL in the credit rationing equation, and negative and statistically significant parameter
estimate for STABIL in the loan default equation, suggest that branch managers have correctly
used applicant stability to identify potential low-risk borrowers. Those applicants who lived
longer at their current address and who have worked for longer at their current employer were
more likely to be accepted and less likely to default. More stable applicants may be easier to
monitor and may also have relatively more stable future incomes for servicing debt.
The negative and statistically significant parameter estimate for TOBDWO in the credit rationing
equation, and the positive and statistically significant parameter estimate in the loan default
equation, suggest that branch managers have correctly used this information to identify
potentially high-risk borrowers. Those applicants with previous bad debt write-offs were more
likely to be credit-rationed and were also more likely to default. Boyes et al. (1989) and Greene
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(1992) report similar results. The negative coefficient estimate for TOT23 in the credit rationing
equation, and the positive coefficient in the loan default equation, imply that branch managers
have correctly used payment profile information to identifY potential high-risk borrowers,
although the parameter estimate is not statistically significant in the loan default equation. Again,
it would be incorrect to conclude that such information is not a predictor of loan default.
Applicants with arrears were severely credit-rationed, leaving relatively few applicants with
arrears being accepted. This could have created too little variability in the data to show anything
meaningful in the loan default equation. If a larger sample of applicants in arrears had been
accepted, it may have been possible to quantifY the effect of arrears on predicting loan default.
The correlation between the error terms of the two equations (p) is negative, implying that the
unexplained tendencies to grant credit are negatively correlated with those of loan default.
Branch managers at MFO1 tend to be conservative and would rather over-ration applicants than
grant loans to potentially more risky, but also more profitable, applicants. This is also evident in
the signs of the parameter estimates. The information at the loan application stage is more likely
used to correctly ration high-risk sample applicants than to accept low-risk applicants.
This result differs from those of Boyes et al. (1989) and Greene (1992) who found that
unexplained tendencies to grant credit were positively correlated with predicting the probability
of loan default. Boyes et al. (1989) linked this to a lending policy that attempts to seek out
sample applicants that may be more risky, but also more profitable. Branch managers at MFOl
tended to be conservative and try to minimize potential loan default. A possible explanation for
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this is that MFO I may already have acceptance rates at which satisfactory profit is being made.
Any further increase in acceptance rates would increase the likelihood of earning lower profits.
One problem in using loan default models to predict default probabilities of "through the door"
loan applicants is that these probabilities are downward biased because the model has not been
specifically conditioned for selectivity bias. This bias results because default data are only
observed for accepted sample applicants where these have already been screened and deemed
creditworthy by the lender (Greene, 1992; Greene, 2000). The extent of such downward bias in
predicted probabilities is shown in Table 5.38. Parameter estimates for both the conditional and
unconditional probit models have similar signs, but the levels of statistical significance differ.
The effect of HOMPHD is much stronger in the conditional model, while that of ECON is much
weaker. The effects of stability, debt exposure and total bad debt write-offs are much stronger in
the conditional model than in the unconditional model, pointing to higher estimated probabilities
of default. The parameter estimate for TOT36M also has the expected positive sign. The
downward bias in the parameter estimates of the unconditional model is thus evident and can
lead to the underestimation of default probabilities, particularly in scoring models that apply to
the "though the door" loan applicants.
The average default probability for the sample applicant population is relatively lower at 28% for
the unconditional model than the 57% for the conditional model. The conditional model would
predict an average default probability of29% for defaulters while the unconditional model would
estimate 53%. Rejected sample applicants would have an average unconditional default
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probability of 32% and a conditional default probability of 64%. This level of downward bias
was also reported by Greene (2000). Where MFOs try to develop credit scoring models, it is
critical to account for the sample selectivity bias if the models are to correctly predict for the
entire "though the door" loan applicant population. Ifthis sample selectivity is not accounted for,
the MFO's may commit serious Type I errors (incorrectly accept high-risk borrowers).
Table 5.38 Conditional and Unconditional Loan Default Models, 1998/ 1999
Variables Unconditional Probit Model Conditional Probit Model
Z(PbadlP..ood) Z(PbadlPiJood)
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
estimate estimate
Constant -0.78955 -60410 -0.0892 -0.133.
HOMPHD -0.11922 -0.698 -0.3204 _1.40615%
ECON 0.21009 2.549"'''''' 0.0776 0.7308
STABIL -0.14105 -1.734'" -0.1789 -2.504"""
DITRATNE 0.35244 1.922'" 004053 2.271
TOT236M -0.14100 -0.688 0.3472 0.6223
TOBDWO 0.87815 2.632 0.9568 4.925
Average Default Probabilities
Total Applicant Population 28% 57%
Rejected Loan Applicants 32% 64%
Accepted Loan Applicants 24% 48%
Current Borrowers 22% 46%
Defaulting Borrowers 290.10 53%
Note: *, ** and *** mdIcate sIgmficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectIvely.
Other methods of so-called "reject inference" have been used to account for sample selectivity
bias. The most common method is to estimate the default model using the accept data only and
then to compute the default probabilities for the reject data using the estimated model. Once this
has been done, the loan default model is re-developed using the entire dataset (Hand, 2001). The
problem with this approach is evident from Table 5.38 in that default probabilities for the
rejected population are being estimated with downwardly biased parameters. The subject of
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reject inference is an area of intense debate in the credit industry but this issue is not explored
further in this study.
The classification rates for the conditional and unconditional probit models are given in Table
5.39 and Table 5.40 for a range of cut-off points (comparing the classification of probabilities
shows how different the conditional and unconditional models are). Given that the unconditional
probit model has much lower average probabilities, it classifies a lower proportion of the
defaulters correctly, while the conditional model almost seems to overcompensate.
Table 5.39 Differences in Classification Errors for Default Probabilities of the
Conditional Bivariate Probit Model, 1998/ 1999
Cut-offPoints 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55
Percentage Correct 'Goods' 0.5% 6.3% 9.5% 41.5% 51.8% 67.6% 77.0%
Percenta~e Correct 'Bads' 98.6% 93.0% 90.1% 77.5% 69.0% 60.6% 45.0%
Percentage Type I error 1.4% 9.9% 9.9% 22.5% 31.0% 39.4% 55.0%
Percentage Type 11 error 99.5% 90.5% 90.5% 59.0% 48.2% 32.4% 22.1%
Table 5.40 Differences in Classification Errors for Default Probabilities of the
Unconditional Bivariate Probit Model, 1998/ 1999
Cut-off Points 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55
Percentage Correct 'Goods' 71.2% 86.0% 90.5% 95.9% 98.2% 98.6% 99.5%
Percenta~e Correct 'Bads' 53.5% 32.4% 25.4% 21.1% 18.3% 8.5% 5.6%
Percentage Type I error 46.5% 67.6% 74.6% 78.9010 81.7% 91.5% 94.9%
Percentage Type 11 error 28.8% 14.0% 9.5% 4.1% 1.8% 1.4% 0.5%
The proportion of the more costly Type I error is much lower for the conditional model than for
the unconditional model. The issue that remains is what is the correct cut-off point to use for the
conditional model, since the intuitive cut-off point of 0.25 that represents the population
proportions has an unacceptably high level of type II errors. It seems as if the conditional model
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has been conditioned on the proportions of accepts and rejects in the sample which is closer to
50%. The estimated bivariate probit model shows that branch managers at MFO1 correctly use
the information obtained from the loan applicant to screen for potential loan default risk. Again,
key factors in the screening process are loan applicant income and previous credit history. The
negative correlation coefficient suggests that the branch managers are somewhat conservative in
their decision making process. This must always be weighed against expected profit, and it is
important that MFOl reviews the credit granting process, to ensure that the appropriate risk-
return acceptance rate is maintained. A key aspect highlighted by the model is the inherent
sample selection bias when estimating loan default models that ignore the information of rejected
loan applicants. The next chapter also analyses factors that influence loan default, but identifies




EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF LOAN DEFAULT MODELS FOR MF02
This chapter reports the results of the estimated loan default model using data obtained from
MF02 over the period 1993 to 1994. Lender MF02 is a finance institution providing short,
medium and long-term agricultural loans to small-scale and emerging farmers. The model
developed in this section is not conditional on the loan being accepted and hence should rather be
treated a loan review model. As the theoretical background of the loan default analyses has been
covered in Chapter five, the first section reviews the economic model for MF02, followed by the
data sampling methodology and descriptive statistics. The results of the econometric model are
reported in section 6.6.
6.1 Objectives of the Analysis
The objective of this analysis is to estimate a loan default model that identifies characteristics,
not only of borrowers that default, but also of borrowers that repay their loans with arrears. This
additional category of loan repayment can markedly affect a MFO's liquidity, since the MFO
depends on loan repayment to fund future loans. The information available from MF02 was
limited as no data was available on rejected loan applicants. The analysis, therefore, is restricted
to identifying factors that affect loan repayment performance of medium-term agricultural loans
made by MF02. It is accepted that the result ofthis analysis will be downwardly biased.
No previous study in SA has estimated factors that affect loan repayment performance of clients
using medium-term agricultural loans to finance equipment purchase at a development finance
i &
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institution. This research may assist MF02 and other MFOs who wish to provide this type of
credit to account for key factors that may affect the repayment of such loans. Although the
results may not be directly incorporated into a scoring model, they may highlight areas of
additional focus for loan officers evaluating loan applications for this type of finance. The
following section specifies the economic loan default model for MF02.
6.2 Economic Model Specification for MF02
Lender MF02 provides short-, medium- and long-term agricultural loans to emerging
commercial and small-scale farmers in KwaZulu-Natal, SA. The application process, particularly
for the medium- and long-term loans, is relatively long. A loan application is initiated by an
interview with the loan officer, to establish whether the loan applicant would qualify for a loan.
An application form is then completed, followed by a visit to the business premises of the loan
applicant. After all necessary documentation is completed, including fmancial statements, the
loan application is reviewed by a committee that normally consists of the manager for
agricultural credit at the branch, and the loan officer. Credit assessment criteria are determined
by MF02's credit policy, but also rely on the subjective evaluation of the loan officer. For the
purposes of this study, repayment performance of medium-term agricultural loans will be
assessed, as data on these loans was most readily available. The duration of medium-term
agricultural loans was between 3 and 10 years. The model assumptions are as follows:
1) The loan applicant pool is heterogeneous with different risk levels, expected returns from
their investment and probabilities of default.
386
2) Given borrower heterogeneity, MF02 staff must screen loan applicants into different risk
classes. Loan applicant screening is based on the information provided by the loan
applicant and the policies and procedures as determined by MF02's fmancial technology.
Unlike MFO1, loan officers at MF02 do not have any empirically derived diagnostic
tools (credit scoring models) that can be used in the credit assessment.
3) MF02 is a parastatal organization and hence its existence is not dependent on generating
profits. Although enough income may be generated to cover operational costs, MF02 is
largely reliant on government funds to continue operating. Consequently, the interest
rates that MFO charges are not market-related, but are lowered in line with its
development objectives. The screening effect of interest rates may be reduced but the
selection effect is still present (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Herath, 1996). Although low
interest rates will attract low-risk loan applicants, they will also lure a large number of
high-risk borrowers to apply for credit. It is thus critical to have an effective screening
technology to distinguish between high and low-risk borrowers.
4) Although the assets financed by MF02 are pledged as collateral, the realizable value of
this collateral is very low (due to poorly defmed property rights and low market values of
assets such as machinery and equipment) and, therefore, provides very little incentive for
borrowers to repay the loan and thus has a negligible effect on the expected return of
MF02.
5) Information on rejected loan applications for MF02 was difficult to come by, and so is,
not included in the model. As the empirical default model does not condition for the
absence of loan repayment performance of rejected loan applicants, the model cannot be
used to predict potential default probabilities of all "through the door" loan applications.
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At most, the results can be used to infer loan repayment performance of borrowers who
have been deemed credit worthy (Miller and LaDue, 1991).
6) As the model can only be used to evaluate the loan repayment performance of borrowers
with loans, the MF02's expected return function can only be influenced by any potential
risk-reducing measures that are adopted during the term of the loan. Such measures
include increasing the levels of monitoring where borrowers are deemed to have become
more risky during the term of the loan contract.
7) The model is assumed to be a single period model where the period spans over the entire
duration of the loan (Eisenbeis, 1981).
The empirical default model is the same as that for MFOl derived in equation (5.7) and (5.8) and
is thus not repeated here. The vector of attributes Xi (as captured by MF02 during the loan
application process) is based on loan, business and personal variables as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Definitions and Expected Signs for Variables used to Predict the Likelihood
of Loan Default for MF02
Vector of Explanatory Variables Expected sign for effect
on loan default (D = 1)
Loan characteristics
Loan principal amount -
Borrower's direct own equity contribution -
Business characteristics
Economic activity of the borrower (1 = if borrower funded a +
chicken or conract ploughing and cartage business venture, and 0
if borrower funded a maize milling or timer/sugarcane contracting
harvestin~ and transport business)
Present annual income relative to annual debt obligations -
Personal characteristics
Previous loan historY with MFO1 (1= Yes, 0 = No) -
Gender of borrower (1 = Male, 0 = Female) +
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A proxy variable for asset collateral relative to loan size was not included in the analysis because
the MF02 file information on asset values was not reliable (staff constraints meant that asset
value data were often not validated by visits to clients). Information on the monitoring activities
ofMF02, number of years the borrower had been in the business, borrower education and family
size were often missing from borrower case files, the possible impact of these variables on loan
performance could not be evaluated.
Lenders can reduce the risk of client default by spending more resources on loan evaluation and
supervision, which increases loan administration costs. Wealthier rural loan applicants with
larger asset bases can reduce lender information collection costs by being able to readily pledge
(verifiable) collateral. This could result in the concentration of loan portfolios amongst wealthy
clients with larger loan sizes (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984). Lender behaviour could also be influenced
by the applicant's resource allocation, risk management and product choices (Barry et a!., 1995).
Consequently, more funds are likely to be available for investments having a better risk-return
combination.
Sample borrowers with larger loans had larger asset bases, were diversified, had investments
with higher net returns and dealt in well-established markets for their products. Wealthier
borrowers may be better able to withstand negative income shocks by drawing on own assets and
diverting less loan funds to personal consumption (Barham et al., 1996). Loan size (LSIZE) as a
proxy for larger, wealthier, surplus producing clients, is thus hypothesised to be negatively
related to loan default.
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A borrower's direct own equity contribution relative to total loan size (OWNLN) shows that the
borrower has a stake in the proposed investment and reflects a risk-sharing agreement in which
some of the risk of project outcome is borne by the borrower as an incentive to repay. This will
not provide a first-hest outcome, since as long as only part of the risk is borne by the borrower,
he/she will equate his/her marginal cost of effort with his/her share and not with the total
marginal product of the investment (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993: 21 - 55; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). In addition, a higher own equity contribution may reduce loan approval time since the
lender may have less stringent information requirements. The variable OWNLN should,
therefore, be negatively related to loan default.
Data on the sector financed was included to account for the relative riskiness of different
business ventures. Contract harvesting and the carting of timber and sugarcane had well-
established markets in KZN, with borrowers being able to deliver to the major processors of
these products. In addition, maize milling is a service in demand in the rural areas where maize is
predominantly grown for consumption purposes. The more regular cash flows implied by these
factors would improve the potential repayment ability of these borrowers. Loans for the purchase
of tractors and implements, although offering attractive potential returns, were deemed more
risky by MF02 lending staff because borrowers often failed to maintain the equipment used for
contracting services.
Experience also shows that contractors involved in land preparation such as ploughing had
liquidity problems as they seldom had enough work throughout the year (Ross, 1996). Chicken
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production enterprises, which involve relatively low capital outlay, faced intense competition,
while increased feed costs and Newcastle disease had led to large losses and the consequent poor
performance of such enterprises at the time of the study. The CONTRACT variable should,
therefore, be positively related with loan default.
Gross annual income relative to annual debt obligations, LIQUID, indicates the borrower's
ability to meet debt commitments (Barry et a!., 1995). Investment projects yielding greater
expected net returns are likely to be positively associated with loan repayment since the borrower
has more income to meet both his consumption requirements and debt obligations (Okorie,
1986). However, additional liquidity provided by the loan may flow toward the most attractive
use available from the perspective of the borrower. Too much emphasis on the additional funds
provided by the loan could be misleading since the borrower might divert funds (fungibility) to
some other use more important at the time (von Pischke and Adams, 1980). Vigano (1993) found
no relationship between specific project profitability and loan repayment, owing to the
fungibility of money. Hence, gross present annual income, which accounted for all sources of
borrower income excluding income derived from the new investment, was used to estimate
LIQUID. This emphasised total borrower liquidity and not merely liquidity generated by
additional income from the project. The higher is LIQUID, the greater is the ability to repay
timeously.
The previous use ofMF02 loans by the borrower (PREVLN) is used as a proxy for the extent of
the lender-borrower relationship. The lender is likely to have more reliable information on
established borrowers, while the borrower has a better knowledge of the lending procedures and
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late payment penalties imposed by the MF02 (where the MF02 does not refinance clients who
default on previous loans).
Finally, clients having an established track record with MF02 are more likely to repay loans than
are new borrowers. The GENDER variable is also a potentially important discriminator, and if
the past findings amongst rural borrowers that women have a better repayment record than men
(Christen et aI., 1994) holds, GENDER is likely to be positively related to loan default. The
following section discusses data source and sampling methodology.
6.3 Data Sampling for the MF02 Econometric Model
Two branches of MF02 - Port Shepstone and Pietennaritzburg, were selected for the analysis as
they could provide the most comprehensive infonnation required for the study. Given the
relatively small population of medium-tenn agricultural loans, all observations were included in
the study sample to maximise the degrees of freedom required for multiple category response
models. A data sheet was compiled to record infonnation extracted from the borrower case files
(see Appendix E). Following Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega (1993), repayment
perfonnance was monitored over time to avoid distortions in delinquency measurement as a
result of different loan maturities and portfolio growth rates. Primary data from individual
borrower dossiers were obtained for all medium-tenn agricultural loans disbursed in 1993 and
1994 (1993/94 data was used as MF02 has moved away from financing relatively small
agribusiness ventures), giving a total population of 59 dossiers.
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To account for any possible cash-flow variations arising from the nature of the agricultural
activities, the loan repayment categories were defined such that flexibility within a repayment
category was accounted for. The repayment status of these loans as at a selected cut-off date of
31 March 1996 was classified into three categories: (1) current or without repayment problems
(all instalments due paid within 30 days of the cut-off date), (2) paid with arrears (all instalments
due paid within 30 to 90 days of the cut-off date), and (3) in default (any instalments due still
unpaid in excess of90 days after the cut-off date). Given this classification, 29 per cent of the 59
loans were current, 17 per cent were in arrears and 54 per cent were in default. The relatively
high default rate may have substantial implications for the financial viability of the agricultural
divisions at these two branches. The next section reviews some characteristics of the sample
borrowers.
6.4 Characteristics of MF02 Sample Borrowers at the Port Shepstone and
Pietermatitzburg branches
6.4.1 General Characteristics ofPort Shepstone and Pietermaritzburg Sample Borrowers
Borrowers were classified in four categories shown in Table 6.2, namely individuals applying for
credit (male and female), borrower groups and joint ventures (companies or partnerships). Of the
59 borrowers, 78 per cent were male and 17 per cent female while groups and joint ventures
accounted for the small balance. The small percentage of women in the sample receive only 13
per cent of the total volume disbursed, while male borrowers receive the largest share. Average
loan sizes reflect a similar trend, except for joint ventures which have the largest average loans.
Table 6.2 Loan Size of MF02 Medium-term Loans by Type of Borrower, 1996
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Borrower Number of Loans Volume Disbursed Average Loan Size
Type
n % (Rand) (Rand)
Male 46 78 1 107179 24069
Female 10 17 189647 18964
Group 1 2 13928 13 928
Company/ 2 3 97246 48623
Partnership
TOTAL 59 100 1408000 23864
Smaller loan sizes for women may be attributed to their smaller businesses, lower levels of
collateral and less access to human and material resources as found by Yaron (1992). Table 6.3
shows that women have smaller businesses (lower estimated annual average gross incomes)
relative to men and joint ventures. Average annual present income is also considerably smaller
for women, indicating an overall lower level of liquidity, possibly due to most of the women
being employed in jobs earning a fixed salary, or having small trading businesses.
Table 6.3 Occupations and Incomes of MF02 Sample Medium-term Loan Borrowers,
1996
Type of Present Occupation Average Average Gross
Borrower (n = 57) Annual Annual Income
Present from Operations
Income
Agribusiness Fixed Trader (Rand) (Rand)
(%) Salary (%)
(%)
Male 53 29 18 50511 91 152
Female 11 44 44 40008 76005
Group 100 0 0 - 86520
Company/ 100 0 0 167400 319690
Partnership
TOTAL 47 30 21 52226 104126
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,The joint ventures tended to have the largest loans because they were relatively large businesses
with considerable liquidity (large average annual gross income and annual average present
income). The two joint ventures were involved in contract cane and timber harvesting and
transport. Most of the male borrowers (53 per cent) were involved in agribusiness activities -
contract ploughing and transport in the rural areas. Twenty nine per cent of male clients were
employed full-time earning a fixed salary, while 18 per cent had trading businesses, usually
shops. The size of their businesses was relatively large, and they had higher liquidity than the
female borrowers.
Table 6.4 shows that most of the medium-term loans (63 per cent) disbursed were for the
purchase of tractors, trailers and ploughs for contract transport and ploughing in the communal
areas of KZN, with tractors or a tractor-plough combination being the most common assets
financed.
Table 6.4 Investment Activities Financed with MF02 Medium-term Agricultural
Loans, 1996
Investment Type Number of Volume of Average Loan Size
Loans Disbursement
N % (Rand) % (Rand)
Livestock 13 22 192 125 14 14778
production
Timber/ Sugarcane 6 10 202038 15 33673
contractors
Maize milling 3 5 31461 2 10487
Contract Ploughing 36 63 946206 69 26283
and Cartage
TOTAL 58 100 1 371 830 100 23652
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The average loan size of R26 283 indicates that most of the equipment purchased tended be
second-hand, potentially reducing its reliability and ultimately affecting contractor productivity.
Twenty-two per cent of the loans were for livestock production, mostly for the purchase of
broiler equipment, feed and day old chickens, with only one loan being for the purchase of cattle.
These loans accounted for only 14 percent of the total volume disbursed. Timber and sugar cane
harvest and transport activities had relatively large average loan sizes due to the purchase of
relatively more expensive necessary equipment, such as lorries. Loans to purchase of hammer
mills for maize milling accounted for the lowest number of loan disbursals. Most of the medium-
term loans (73 per cent) were thus for the purchase of equipment for contracting activities. This
is expected given that part of the mechanisation policy of the SA government's FSP, of which
the RH was the major implementor in KZN, promoted the support of contracting activities in
rural areas to facilitate crop production.
Table 6.5 shows that 50 per cent of the women were involved in either livestock production or
contract ploughing and harvesting. Sixty-nine per cent of the men had contract ploughing and
cartage businesses, with 16 per cent being involved in livestock production (mainly broiler
production). The high number of men involved in contract ploughing and cartage can partially be
explained by MF02 having financed tractor equipment purchases for many retrenched miners in
the Port Shepstone area who had returned to settle with their families. The only group loan in the
sample was for broiler production. The joint ventures (partnerships and companies) were
involved in timber and sugarcane contracting. The characteristics of the medium-term loans and
some features of the two MF02 branches are described in section 6.4.2 below.
Table 6.5
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Investment Activities by MF02 Medium-term Loan Borrower Type, 1996
Investment Male Female Group Partnership
Activities /ComDany
n % n % n % n %
Livestock production 7 16 5 50 1 100 - -
Timber/ sugarcane 5 11 - - - - 2 100
contracting
Maize milling 2 4 1 10 - - - -
Contract ploughing 31 69 4 40 - - - -
and Cartage
TOTAL 45 100 10 100 2 100 1 100
6.4.2 Loan and Lender Characteristics ofPort Shepstone and Pietermaritzburg Branches
Table 6.6 shows the number and volume of loans disbursed for the Port Shepstone and
Pietermaritzburg branches of MF02. Sixty one per cent by number and 56 per cent by volume
were disbursed by the Port Shepstone branch, and only 39 per cent by number and 44 per cent by
volume by the Pietermaritzburg branch. The high percentage of loans in the Port Shepstone area
is due to the FSP being implemented in this region which resulted in MF02 giving particular
focus in terms of loan disbursal to this area. While the Port Shepstone Branch had more
disbursals, the Pietermaritzburg branch, on average, disbursed larger loans.
Table 6.6 Number, Amount and Average MF02 Medium-term Loan Size, 1996
Regions No. ofLoans Volume Disbursed Average
Loan Size
n % Rand % (Rand)
Port Shepstone 36 61 794776 56 22077
Pietermaritzburg 23 39 613225 44 26661
TOTAL 59 100 1408000 100 23864
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In Table 6.7 loans to contractors clearly accounted for most of the disbursals by number and
volume for the Port Shepstone branch. Loans for livestock (predominantly broiler) production
and timber and sugarcane contracting accounted for 42 per cent of the volume, and loans for
contracting ventures for 58 percent disbursed for the Pietermaritzburg branch. Timber and cane
cartage on a large scale was more prevalent in the Pietermaritzburg area with relatively large
loans being disbursed to timber and sugarcane contractors.
Table 6.7 Activities Financed by the two MF02 branches, 1996
,2Q &
Activities Financed Port Shepstone Pietermaritzburg
number of % by volume number of % by volume
loans of loans loans of loans
disbursed disbursed
Livestock 8 9 5 20
production
Timber/ Sugarcane 2 9 4 22
contractors
Maize Milling 3 4 0 0
Contract Ploughing 22 78 14 58
and Cartage
TOTAL 35 100 23 100
Table 6.8 shows that most of the loans for the Port Shepstone branch were five year loans for
equipment purchase (mainly tractors and ploughs for contract ploughing and cartage) with 40 per
cent of the loans ranging from R35 000 to R45 000. Crosby (1995) noted that loans of about
R50000 would place great financial stress on contractors even with concessional interest rates in
rural areas where work was highly seasonal and erratic. The livestock production (day-old chick,
feed and equipment purchase) and maize milling loans of the Port Shepstone branch were
relatively small, most being one to three year loans. Fifty per cent of the equipment purchase
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loans at the Pietennaritzburg branch were relatively smaller, ranging from R15 000 to R25 000
with loan tenns of five years.
Table 6.8 Loan Terms and Loan Sizes by MF02 Branch, 1996
Note: PSH = Port Shepstooe, PMB - Pletennantzburg
Loan Term Investment Activities
(years) Livestock Timber/ Maize Contract
Production Sugarcane Milling Ploughing
Contracting -- and Cartage
% % % % % % % %
PSlfl PMBb PSH PMB PSH PMB PSH PMB
0=8 0=5 0=2 0=4 0=3 0=22 0= 14
1-3 100 20 50 25 100 - 19 21
3-5 - 20 - 75 - - 9 29
5-6 - - 50 - - - 72 43
6-7 - 60 - - - - - 7
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 - 100 100
Loan Size Range
<RIO 000 63 - 50 25 33 - 14 7
RIO 000 R14 999 25 40 - 25 64 - 5 7
R15 000 - R24 999 12 40 - - - - 14 50
R25 000 - R24 999 - - - 25 - - 27 22
R35 000 - R45 000 - - - - - - 40 -
> R45 000 - 20 50 25 - - - 14
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 - 100 100
a h -
More emphasis seems to be given to timber and sugarcane transport and harvest contractors, and
broiler production, at the Pietennaritzburg branch. Pietermaritzburg also had some large loans
over R45 000 for livestock, timber/ sugarcane and plough contracting. According to Table 6.9,
the average loan approval times and grace periods allowed by the two branches varied, with the
Port Shepstone branch having shorter average loan approval times and grace periods before the
first instalment was required.
Table 6.9 Loan Approval Times and Grace Periods for Investment Activities by
MF02 Branch, 1996
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Investment Port Shepstone I Pietermaritzburg
Activities I
Average Loan Approval Times
n Average number of n Average number of
days days
Livestock 8 26 4 55
production
Timber/ Sugarcane 2 28 4 44
contracting
Contract milling 3 24 0 0
Contract Ploughing 22 35 14 75
and Cartage
TOTAL 35 32 22 65
Average Grace Period
Livestock 8 88 4 104
production
Timber/ Sugarcane 2 43 3 54
contracting
Contract milling 3 73 0 0
Contract Ploughing 21 78 14 87
and Cartage
TOTAL 34 78 21 86
Loan approval times are, on average, one month longer for the Pietermaritzburg branch.
Pietermaritzburg has disbursed, on average, larger loans than Port Shepstone, with four loans
above R45 000, which do require more information resulting in longer loan approval times.
However, this requirement may not be the only reason for longer loan approval time at
Pietermaritzburg. Loan approval times for tractor, trailer or plough purchases differed
considerably between the two branches even though 50 per cent of these loans had much lower
loan size ranges than the Port Sheptsone branch. Delays at local tractor dealerships, long
travelling distances for borrowers, and administrative procedures may have also lengthened loan
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approval times. While assessing borrower repayment capacity is important, timely disbursal of
loans is crucial for plough and cartage contractors, as long waiting periods may jeopardise their
income-generating capability. The next section briefly describes loan default status for the
sample borrowers.
6.4.3 Loan Default Status ofPort Shepstone and Pietermaritzburg Sample Borrowers
Only 29 per cent of the 59 borrowers were classified as current, 17 per cent were in arrears, and
most (54%) were in default. The high default rates seem unacceptably high and may impose
considerable financial stress of the agricultural lending programmes at these two branches. In
Table 6.10, 54 per cent of borrowers accounting for 46 per cent of the value of the loans
disbursed were in full default. This is a substantial portion of medium-term loan portfolios for
the two branches, and negatively affects their fmancial viability and reductions in subsidy
dependence. Female borrowers and group loans accounted for the highest number and
percentage value of loans in default. Fifty percent of male borrowers, accounting for 40 per cent
of the value of loans disbursed, were in default. In contrast, 70 per cent of the number of loans
accounting for 86 per cent of the amount disbursed to women were in default. Hunte (1993)
found similar results for repayment performance at GAlBANK in Guyana. Although the result
may be sample specific, this runs contrary to the hypothesis that female borrowers are likely to
have lower default levels.
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Table 6.10 Repayment Status of MF02 Sample Medium-term Loans by Type of
Borrower, 1996
Borrower Total Current Repaid with Default
Type Volume Arrears
Disbursed
(Rand) (Rand) % (Rand) % (Rand) %
Male 1107179 303983 27 370396 33 432800 40
Female 189647 15372 8 10768 6 163507 86
Group 13928 - - - - 13928 100
Partnership/ 97246 61750 63 - - 35496 37
Company
TOTAL 1408000 381105 27 381164 27 645731 46
Total n % n % n %
Number
Disbursed
Male 46 14 30 9 20 23 50
Female 10 2 20 1 10 7 70
Group 1 - - - - 1 100
Partnership/ 2 1 50 - - 1 50
Company
TOTAL 59 17 29 10 17 32 54
Repayment status by investment activity in Table 6.11 indicates that 69 per cent of the number of
loans, accounting for 59 per cent of the value of loans disbursed for livestock production were in
default. Fifty-six per cent of the number of loans, accounting for 49 per cent of the value of loans
disbursed to borrowers with contract harvesting and ploughing activities, were in default. Broiler
production and contract ploughing and cartage thus together accounted for most of the defaulting
loans both in number and by value of loans disbursed. Maize milling and timber and sugarcane
contract harvesting and carting accounted for the greatest number and value of loans being
current. Twenty-two per cent of the number of loans, or 30 per cent of the value of loans
disbursed to contract ploughing and cartage, were in arrears. One loan for timber and contracting
activities accounted for 42 per cent of the value of the loans disbursed to timber and sugarcane
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contracting activities. It appears, therefore, that relatively few borrowers with large loans aimed
at contracting activities constituted the arrears category.
Table 6.11 Repayment Status of MF02 Sample Medium-term Loans by Investment
Activity,1996
Investment Total Current Repaid with Default
Activity Volume Arrears
Disbursed
(Rand) (Rand) % (Rand) % (Rand) %
Livestock 192125 68809 36 10 768 6 112548 59
Production
Timber/ 202038 85738 42 84400 42 31900 16
Sugarcane
Contracting
Maize Milling 31461 31461 100
Contract Plough 946206 195097 21 285996 30 465 119 49
and Cartage
TOTAL 1 371 830 381 105 28 381 164 28 609561 44
Total n % n % n %
Number
Disbursed
Livestock 13 3 23 1 8 9 69
Production
Timber/ 6 3 50 1 2 33
Sugarcane
Contracting
Maize Milling 3 3 100 17
Contract Plough 36 8 22 8 22 20 56
and Cartage
TOTAL 58 17 29 10 17 31 54
According to Table 6.12 male borrowers who were current on loan repayments had a higher own
equity contribution relative to loan size than male borrowers who were in arrears and in default.
This also held for female borrowers. No equity contribution was required by the defaulting joint
liability group, while only a small equity contribution was required from one joint venture group.
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This is probably because these joint ventures (partnerships and companies) had substantial asset
bases that could be used as collateral in the place of own equity.
Table 6.12 Repayment Status by MF02 Borrower's Own Equity Contribution Relative
to Medium-term Loan Size, 1996
Borrower Type Average Relative Own Equity Contributions (%)
Current Arrears Default
n % n % n %
Male 14 21 9 14 23 16
Female 2 19 1 20 7 14
Group - - - - 1 0
Partnership/ 1 5 - - 1 0
Company
TOTAL 17 20 10 15 32 14
Although MF02 had rules on relative own equity contribution requirements, these were not
always strictly adhered to, depending on the merits of the individual loan application. The
general trend in Table 6.12 is that borrowers with higher own equity contributions tend to be
current rather than in default or in arrears. A higher own equity contribution provides a greater
incentive for borrowers to exert effort to try and ensure investment success, resulting in
improved ability to repay the loan.
Borrowers' liquidity as proxied by present annual income at the time of the loan application
(which includes all sources of borrower income) is, on average, higher for borrowers who are
current than for borrowers who are in default. Table 6.13 shows that borrowers in arrears are an
exception since average annual present income was higher than for borrowers who were current.
A few borrowers in arrears were granted relatively large loans. Given that loan size is a function
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of repayment capacity and liquidity, the large average annual present income for borrowers in
arrears is expected.
Table 6.13 Repayment Status by MF02 Sample Borrower Liquidity Levels, 1996




(Rand) n (Rand) n (Rand) n (Rand)
Male 2489025 14 57621 9 98093 23 34760
Female 369080 2 27180 1 124000 6 31 786
Group* 1 0-- - - - -
Partnership'/ 334800 1 334800 - - 1 0
Company
TOTAL 3 192905 17 70344 10 100 684 31 31941
Female borrowers, on average, have lower annual present incomes than men. Many of the
women had fixed employment and other business activities so their, experience in, and
appropriate supervision of, contracting businesses may have been lacking. The joint ventures
have the largest average annual present incomes as expected. Overall, borrowers with better
liquidity had better repayment ability, except for those borrowers in arrears.
Some 58 percent of all medium-term loans disbursed by the Port Shepstone branch, were in
default, 17 percent in arrears and 25 per cent current. Table 6.14 indicates that these amounted to
54, 19 and 27 per cent of the value of the loans, respectively. The situation for Pietermaritzburg
was more favourable, with 48 per cent of all medium-term loans disbursed, accounting for 35 per
cent by value, being in default.
405
Table 6.14 Repayment Status of MF02 Sample Medium-term Loan Borrowers by
Branch, 1996
Region Total Current Repaid with Default
Volume Arrears
Disbursed
(Rand) (Rand) % (Rand) % (Rand) %
Port Shepstone 794776 213 480 27 148812 19 432484 54
Pietermaritzburg 613 224 167625 27 232352 38 213 247 35
TOTAL 1408000 381 105 27 381 164 27 645731 46
Total No. N % n % N %
Disbursed
Port Shepstone 36 9 25 6 17 21 58
Pietermaritzburg 23 8 35 4 17 11 48
TOTAL 59 17 29 10 17 32 54
Average Loan Size Rand Rand Rand
Port Shepstone 23720 24802 20594
Pietermaritzburg 20953 58088 19386
TOTAL 22417 381 16 201 79
About 35 per cent of the Pietermaritzburg medium-term loans, accounting for 27 per cent by
value, were current, and only 17 per cent, accounting for 38 per cent by value, were in arrears. It
appears, therefore, that the large loans disbursed by the Pietermaritzburg branch for broiler
production, timber and sugarcane contracting and contract ploughing and cartage were in
distress. While the trend appears to be that borrowers with larger average loans tend to be
current, some borrowers with particularly large loans for sugarcane and timber contracting, and
broiler production in the Pietermaritzburg area have repayment problems.
Borrowers with repayment problems thus tend to be those that have invested in livestock
production (mainly broiler production) and contract ploughing and cartage activities that have
lower liquidity and made lower own equity contributions. Contrary to expectations, women in
this sample have the poorer repayment records. This is possibly due to the lower levels of
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liquidity and the smaller size of the business ventures which are more prone to negative income
shocks. Borrowers with larger loans tend, on average, to have better repayment records (loan size
is a proxy for asset base, income and level of diversification). The next sections will present the
econometric model used to estimate factors influencing loan default ofMF02 sample borrowers.
6.5 Econometric Methods to Estimate the Economic Model for MF02
Since the single equation models have been presented in section 5.7, these will not be repeated
here. However, the dependent variable for the MF02 loan default model is extended to three
discrete categories. For situations where the data are individual specific involving more than two
discrete categories in the dependent variable, the unordered multinomial logistic regression
model first developed by Theil (1969) can be used. The maximum likelihood estimation of
regression models with multiple dependent variables is discussed by Greene (2000) and Maddala
(1983). Given that Pj (j = 1,..,3) are the probabilities of each one of the three repayment
categories occurring, the multinomiallogit model can be expressed as:
(6.1)
for j = 2,3; i = 1,...,n; and k = 1,...,K
where PI is the probability ofloans being current, P2 ofloans being in arrears and P3 of loans in
default. The Xki are vectors of explanatory variables, f3kj are estimated parameters, n is the
number of observations and k the number of explanatory variables. From equation (6.1) the log
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odds ratios In(P2 / PI), In(P3 / PI) and In(P3 / P2) can be computed, where In(P3 / P2) is In(P3 / PI)
- In(p2 / PI).
The probabilities of the three category response model must sum to one, which requires a
normalisation procedure such that one category serves as the base category to which all other
categories are compared. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) and Greene (1990) show that, as a result of
the normalisation procedure, the sign of the parameter estimates is in the same direction as the
change in the log odds ratio for an increase in Xi, but not necessarily when estimating the change
in probabilities. Hence, parameter estimates should be interpreted with caution.
In addition, the parameter estimates become unstable, and probabilities under-classified where
dependent variable categories are small relative to the other categories, limiting the classification
power of the model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Greene, 1990). This, and the fact that the
number of parameters proliferates as the number of discrete dependent categories increases,
requires relatively large numbers of observations per category for the model to give stable
parameter estimates and have good predictive power (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Hosmer and
Lemeshow, 1989). The small number of observations for category two in the sample data may
thus lead to unstable parameter estimates and poor classification results for this category. The
following section presents the results of the estimated logit models.
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6.6 Logit Model Results
Two types logistic regression models estimated included the binomial and the unordered
multinomial response models. While the logistic regression model is fairly robust one critical
assumption of the model, similar to linear regression analysis, is that no linear relationships exist
amongst the independent variables (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). This may lead to large variances
and co-variances making precise parameter estimation difficult, leading to an increase in Type II
(false acceptance of null-hypothesis) errors. Several methods may be used to detect
multicollinearity, with bivariate correlation coefficient and condition indices being used in this
study (Gujarati, 1995). Prior to reviewing the correlation matrix, the variable abbreviations and
descriptions as used in the statistical models are given below.
Loan Characteristics
LSIZE = Loan principal amount (Rands).
OWNLN = borrower's direct equity contribution relative to loan size.
Business Characteristics
CONTRACT = 1 if the borrower funded a chicken production or contract ploughing and cartage
business venture, and 0 if the borrower funded a maize milling or timber/sugar-cane contract
harvesting and transport business.
LIQUID = present annual income relative to annual debt obligations.
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Personal Characteristics
PREVLN = 1 ifthe borrower has had previous loans with the RFI, and 0 if a first time borrower.
GENDER = 1 for male borrowers, and 0 for female borrowers.
The bivariate correlations of the independent variables used in the models are given in Table
6.15 below. Some multicollinearity exists between LSIZE, OWNLN and LIQUID, with bivariate
correlation coefficients being greater than 0,25 and statistically significant at the five per cent
level. The variables LIQUID and PREVLN are also positively correlated, with a correlation
coefficient of 0.4041. While bivariate correlations indicate the presence ofmulticollinearity, they
are considered unreliable, particularly in models with more than two explanatory variables
(Gujarati, 1995). An alternative test for multicollinearity, as suggested by Gujarati (1995) and
Greene (1990), is to use a condition index as shown in Table 6.16.
Table 6.15 Bivariate Correlation Coefficients of the Independent Variables in the MF02
Medium-term Loan Default Model
Variable LSlZE OWNLN CONTRACT LIQUID PREVLN GENDER
LSIZE 1.0000 -0.2821 ,. -0.0547 -0.2611" -0.0933 0.1313
OWNLN -0.2821 1.0000 -0.1166 0.1166 -0.2671"- 0.0017
CONTRACT -0.0547 -0.1166 1.0000 -0.2501 0.0235 -0.0732
LIQUID -0.2611·· 0.1166 -0.2501 1.0000 0.4041 0.0020
PREVLN -0.0933 -0.2671 ,. 0.0235 0.4041··· 1.0000 -0.0583
GENDER 0.1313 0.0017 -0.0732 0.0020 -0.0583 1.0000
Note: and - indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively
The condition index is the square root of the ratio of the largest and smallest characteristic root.
Condition indices of between 10 and 30 indicate moderate to strong multicollinearity. The
highest condition index for the sample data was 11.927, which indicates moderate collinearity,
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with PRINC, OWN, LIVCON, and PREVLN contributing to the collinearity as reflected by the
relatively high variance proportions (Gujarati, 1995; Greene, 1990).
Table 6.16 Condition Indices for the Independent Variables in the MF02 Medium-term
Loan default Model
Eigenvalue Condition Variance Proportions
Index
Constant PRINC OWN LIVCON DEBTCOV PREVLN GENDER
4.830 1.000 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.006
0.963 2.241 0.001 0.022 0.008 0.004 0.156 0.280 0.004
0.543 2.983 0.000 0.080 0.105 0.006 0.253 0.268 0.000
0.3001 4.008 0.007 0.366 0.113 0.072 0.296 0.145 0.006
0.173 5.288 0.001 0.187 0.508 0.236 0.118 0.230 0.085
0.158 5.521 0.001 0.102 0.000 0.195 0.102 0.045 0.721
0.034 11.927 0.995 0.236 0.259 0.481 0.068 0.242 0.178
Since only mild collinearity is present no remedial measures were taken. Additional data were
not available, while ridge regression techniques make the interpretation of the results ambiguous
(Greene, 1990) and dropping an explanatory variable may cause specification bias.
6.6.1 Binomial Logit Model
For the binomial logit model, the current and arrears categories were combined to form a less
stringent category where borrowers are defined as current if all instalments due had been paid
within 90 days of the cut-off date. Given the variability of cash flows for contracting ventures,
MF02 borrowers often repaid large amounts when cash flows permitted. For the binomial logit
model estimated in Table 6.17 the residual deviance of 60.864 has a chi-squared distribution with
50 degrees of freedom and shows no significant lack of fit of the overall model. Collet (1991)
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and Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) show that the residual deviance is an unreliable estimator of
goodness of fit when the number of possible combinations in the independent variables
approximately equals the number of observations which occurs when continuous variables are
present in the model.
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) propose the use of the score statistic that follows a chi-squared
distribution which has an advantage over the residual deviance when there are continuous
variables in the model. The score statistic of 61.072 with 50 degrees of freedom also shows no
significant lack of fit. The overall model chi-square of 17.997 implies that the six variables in the
model contribute significantly toward predicting P(Y = 1) and the null hypotheses Ho : 131 = 132 =
13k = 0 is thus rejected, indicating that the variability observed in the data is not merely due to
sampling variation.
The statistical significance of individual parameters in the model is most accurately measured by
the likelihood ratio test which follows a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom
(Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Menard, 1995). According to Table
6.17, the parameter estimates for LSIZE, OWNLN, CONTRACT and LIQUID are statistically
significant at the five per cent level of probability. The variables PREVLN and GENDER
contribute little towards the explanatory power of the model. The Wald statistic which follows a
standard normal distribution may also be used to test the significance of individual parameter
estimates. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) recommend the use of the more conservative t-values to
measure statistical significance of the individual parameter estimates. The disadvantage of the
Wald statistic is that for large coefficients the standard error is inflated which may lead to false
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acceptance of the Ho: f3k = 0 (Menard, 1995). Again, the parameter estimates for LSIZE, OWLN,
CONTRACT and LIQUID are significant at the 1%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively.
Table 6.17 Parameter Estimates of the Binomial Logit Model
Variable Name In(pt/l - Pt) Likelihood Ratio Test













Overall model chi-square 17.997
Residual deviance - 60.864
Score statistic = 61.072
Overall correct classification = 75.44%
Correctly classified as current = 77.78%
Correctly classified as default = 73.33%
Note: " mdlcate sIgnIficance at the 10%, 5% and I% levels respectively
The model correctly classifies 75 per cent of the sample borrowers - 78 per cent of current and
73 per cent of default loans. The ability of the model to classify borrowers correctly may also be
used as a goodness of fit measure. The signs of the estimated coefficients mostly agree with a
priori expectations. For lending policy purposes, smaller loans and own equity contributions,
contracting and broiler production ventures, as well as, lower liquidity, are key factors associated
with borrowers being in default (instalments paid or unpaid 90 days after the cut-off date). The
negative sign for GENDER, indicating that female borrowers are more likely to default than
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male borrowers, is expected (female borrowers had repayment problems in the sample). This
may be a sample-specific result or may reflect the nature of the women borrowers' businesses,
with most going into broiler production or contract ploughing and cartage. Given that the
average loan size of loans used by women was substantially lower than that of men, women may
be operating smaller businesses or, in the case of contracting, buying cheaper second-hand
tractors which are less reliable and have greater down-time (and thus present greater cash flow
problems). In addition, the women may have less experience and less time to commit themselves
to their contracting businesses.
Borrowers with larger loan sizes have better repayment capacities with the log-odds in favour of
loan default being negative for LSIZE. Given that loan size proxies business size and borrower
wealth, borrowers with larger loans tended to have larger estimated gross incomes, better
liquidity and larger, possibly better diversified asset bases. This enables them to better withstand
negative income shocks and divert less business funds to personal consumption, thereby
improving loan repayment capacity (Barham et aI., 1996). Larger borrowers in the sample also
tended to have well-established markets for their products and services. In addition, their
relatively larger asset bases provided more verifiable collateral to lenders, better information on
potential investment returns, and reduced the cost per unit of credit lent. Ortmann and Lyne
(1995) also found that borrowers in rural KZN who generated cash from sales in excess of family
consumption needs had better loan repayment capacities.
Borrowers with higher own equity contributions had a lower probability of default relative to
borrowers with lower equity contributions. Greater own contributions increased the borrower's
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stake in the business, thus inducing more effort to ensure business success. In addition, higher
own equity contributions tended to be associated with lower loan approval times since the
information requirement by the lender was lower. Loans for contracting and broiler production
also significantly contributed to borrowers being in default. Contractors will be successful if
they have good management skills and are fmancially sound. This implies achieving some target
level of profit margin, affordable equipment, good cash flow, charging realistic tariffs and having
sufficient work (which requires good scheduling). In addition, the equipment must be
technically appropriate, non-productive hours in peak periods must be minimised and
maintenance of the equipment must be good (Crosby, 1995). Research on FSP contractors by
Crosby (1995) shows that individuals entering into contracting ventures often did not have farm
backgrounds and, therefore, often did not provide satisfactory work. They were also not well-
diversified, and focused only on one activity, mainly ploughing.
These factors together with the erratic demands of contract ploughing services peaking at
planting periods and down-time due to old, unreliable equipment, may induce cash flow
problems. Ortmann and Lyne (1995) found that contractors in KZN, specifically in the FSP
areas, had problems in accessing fuel with poor roads, lack of maintenance services, clients not
paying their debts and too little work contributing to poor cash flows. Given these problems,
Crosby (1995) estimates that individuals would experience loan repayment difficulty if loans for
equipment exceed of RIO 000. Poor working conditions and the relatively large loan sizes of the
sample borrowers, together with the inexperience of many MF02 borrowers returning from the
mines, may explain the poor performance of the MF02 sample contracting loans.
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Broiler production ventures also require skilled management and SUpervIsIon. Increased
competition due to the lowering of tariffs, and an outbreak of Newcastle disease at the time of
the survey, induced cash flow problems for these borrowers, reducing repayment capacities.
Borrowers with greater liquidity (ratio of all present income to annual debt obligations), had
higher odds of repaying their loans (negative LIQUID coefficient). Ensuring sufficient liquidity
is vital since the additional income of the loan may not necessarily be used for repaying the loan
but may be diverted to some other use more important at the time. While the contracting ventures
mostly had relatively high estimated gross incomes, most borrowers entering into these ventures
defaulted. Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega (1993) emphasised that loans repaid in arrears
can markedly affect MFI liquidity and viability. The binomial logit model was, therefore,
extended to include an arrears category, and replaced by a multiple category response logit
model described in section 6.6.2.
6.6.2 Unordered Multinomial Logit Model
The unordered multinomiallogit model estimated in Table 6.18 had a residual deviance of 83.17
and a chi-squared distribution with 43 degrees of freedom and shows a significant lack of fit.
This is substantiated by the score statistics ofthe two individual base category regressions (P2IPI)
and (P3IPI) which are 24.26 and 52.83 with 21 and 31 degrees of freedom respectively. The
overall likelihood ratio test is highly statistically significant indicating that the variables included
in the model have significant explanatory power with the variability observed not merely being
due to sampling variation (Menard, 1995). The lack of fit may be due to the small number of
observations in category two (arrears) and the definition ofthe three categories.
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Table 6.18 Parameter Estimates of the Unordered Multinomial Logit Model
Variable Name Ln(p2/Pd In(pJ!Pl) In(pJ!P2) Likelihood
Ratio Test
Constant -5.56479 3.79416 9.35895 (r: distribution)
(-1.29) (1.72) (2.61)
LSIZE 0.00009'- -0.00005':>% -0.00014"" 7.9134"
(1.81) (-1.53) (-2.83)
OWNLN -1.36906 -9.03642 -7.66736 3.8795'5%
(-0.23) (-1.93) (-1.21)
CONTRACT 4.28042'- 1.77329" -2.50713 5.7980"
(1.79) (1.72) (-0.99)
LIQUID 0.0940915% -0.02526 -0.11935 3.9638':>%
(1.54) (-0.50) (-2.07)
PREVLN -1.88467 -2.01593 -0.13126 4.0011 15%
(-1.31) (-1.92) (-0.1 0)
GENDER -1.56856 -1.53728 0.03128 1.5303
(-1.08) (-1.20) (0.02)
Overall "I: 31.2855
Residual deviance - 83.17
Score statistic PzIP, = 24.26 (df= 21)
Score statistic P3IP1 = 52.83 (df= 31)
Overall correct classification = 70.18%
Correctly classified current = 58.82%
Correctly classified in arrears = 30%
Correctly classified as defaulters = 90%
Note: " mdIcate SIgnIficance at the 100/0, 5% and I % levels respectively
Significance of the individual parameters as given by the likelihood ratio test, which now follows
a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom, showing that LSIZE and CONTRACT
contribute most to the explanatory power of the model. Parameter estimates for OWNLN,
LIQUID and PREVLN are statistically significant only at the 15 per cent level. The model
correctly classifies 70 per cent of the sample borrowers - 59 per cent of current, 30 per cent of
arrears, and 90 per cent of default borrowers. The poor classification results for the current and
arrears categories is due to the small size of these categories in relation to the default category.
Individuals falling in the border-line cases in the arrears and current categories will tend to be
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mis-classified, while the default category will tend to be classified relatively well. This is a
particular disadvantage of the mutlinomiallogit model which is sensitive to the size of individual
categories. The signs of the estimated coefficients mostly agree with a priori expectations. For
lending policy purposes, larger loans, contract ploughing and cartage businesses and borrower
liquidity are key factors associated with payment in arrears (In(PZ/P1)).
Although a priori expectations were that borrowers with larger loans would have fewer
repayment problems, the positive sign for the LSIZE coefficient is due to two borrowers
experiencing temporary repayment problems on large loans issued by the Pietermaritzburg
branch. These borrowers also had larger liquidity levels, resulting in a positive sign for the
LIQUID coefficient. The small number of observations in the arrears category may have also
contributed to the low significance levels of the estimated parameters. The fit for the model may
be improved by increasing the number of observations in the model, specifically for the arrears
category.
While the broiler production unit may have been affected by Newcastle disease or a reduction in
prices due to imports at the time of the study, the sugarcane contractor may not have received
payment from the mill or customers leading to a temporary liquidity problem. Given that larger
borrowers tended to have better liquidity, the sign of the LIQUID coefficient, although contrary
to expectations, is plausible. Borrowers with smaller loans, less liquidity, who enter into
contracting ploughing and broiler production ventures and who have had no previous loans from
MF02, have greater odds of defaulting on their loans than being current. These results are
li q : cs suz;a =£ caM; in 1:;;g;g .~ ItX1&&£J; go kG " EJZXUt
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similar to those of the binomial logit model. The only parameter that was not statistically
significant in the binomiallogit model was PREVLN.
Borrowers who had previous loans from MF02 possibly have better knowledge of its lending
procedures and late payment penalties imposed by the lender. The relatively strong correlation
between PREVLN and LIQUID may have affected the significance levels of these variables in
the regression. Variables increasing the odds of being in arrears relative being in default
(In(p31P2)) are larger loan size and high borrower liquidity. Again this is partially due to the large
loans disbursed by the Pietermaritzburg branch which were in arrears. The results, however, still
lend support to the argument that larger borrowers with better liquidity and well-diversified asset
bases have greater odds of repaying the loans than defaulting.
6.6.3 Application of the Binomial Logit Model Results for Credit Scoring
In practice, lenders may use various approaches to evaluating the credit-worthiness of loan
applicants. These may range from highly subjective approaches based on informal scoring
methods such as loan officer heuristics (rules-of-thumb that loan officers develop in evaluating
loan applications), to detailed statistical models. The major objectives of these approaches is to
determine the potential credit risk of borrowers (Barry et al., 1995:185 - 211). While the credit
scoring process cannot be reduced completely to an objective scoring procedure, credit scoring
models may assist lenders in risk-related loan pricing (interest rate decisions) and in improving
the quality of services through faster loan approval times (Turvey, 1991). Credit models should,
however, not be used in isolation, as they serve only as a tool in the credit evaluation process.
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Credit scoring has several basic steps, the first being to identify several key variables that best
distinguish between potential high- and low-credit risk clients. The second step involves
assigning appropriate weights to these variables, and the third step entails the computing of the
credit score. Finally, based on the credit score, loan applicants can be assigned to one of a few
discrete risk classes for the purposes ofloan pricing (Harry et al., 1995: 185 - 211). In this study,
logit analysis was used to identify the factors influencing default on MF02 to assign medium-
term loan weights to those factors. Given the good fit of the binomial logit model, its results are
used to demonstrate the practical application of the analyses for credit scoring processes. Credit
scores are determined by computing the log-odds ratio, which is the sum of the estimated
parameters multiplied by the vector of explanatory variables. Figure 6.1 plots the credit score
versus the cumulative probabilities of default for the sample data based on the binomial logit
model results in Table 6.17.
A credit score with the associated probability of default can be computed and matched with the
relevant risk class. Loan applicants with scores greater than 1.1 fall in the very high-risk
category, while clients with credit scores below -1.1 are in the low-risk category. This means that
an intuitive understanding of probabilities is not required by MF02 loan officers, improving the
ease of using of such a technique. While the above example has demonstrated a practical
application of the logit analysis for credit scoring purposes, this model serves an example only.
Several methodological factors affect the accuracy of credit scoring models and should be
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Figure 6.1 Plot of Probability of Default versus MF02 Client Credit Scores
The first issue is the effect that a non-random sample has on the estimated parameters. The credit
scoring decision involves having to discriminate between high- and low-risk loan applicants.
Where this decision involves the subjective assessments of loan officers, some rejected
individuals might become successful borrowers at other lending institutions, while some
accepted loan applicants may prove to be greater credit risks than previously expected (adverse
selection and moral hazard problems).
It is also clear that in order to develop an objective credit scoring model, information on both
accepted and rejected applicants is required. Data on rejected loan applicants were not available
for this study. Including only data on existing loan applicants may systematically bias the sample
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(Boyes et aI., 1989; Miller and LaDue, 1991). While Reichert et al (1983) show that the bias as a
result of excluding rejected loan applicants may be small, data on rejected loan applicants should
be included. The second issue concerns the estimation of the cut-offpoints which, for Figure 6.1,
have been set at the 25,50 and 75 per cent probabilities ofdefault. A more rigorous estimation of
the cut-off points is required, and can be based on both the prior probability of being in a class,
and the costs of correct and incorrect classification (Reichert et aI., 1983; Miller and LaDue,
1991; Mortensen et al., 1988). This is particularly important where the lender's revenues from,
and costs of, correct and incorrect classification are not equal. More information on these costs
and revenues of problem and successful loans is required. Such data were not available for this
study.
The last issue is the evaluation of the classification ability of the model. To correct for the
problem of over-fitting the data set, an independent hold-out sample should be used to validate
the results (Miller and LaDue, 1991; Reichert et al., 1983). The relatively small sample size
available in this study was not conducive to such a validation technique. Credit scoring models,
therefore, require relatively large sample sizes to improve on the accuracy of the scoring model
and to facilitate the use of validation techniques which require a hold-out sample. Classification
efficiency rates should also be tested to ensure that the estimated scoring model has a better
classification ability than the naive model (Miller and LaDue, 1991). The next section discusses
the policy implications and conclusions drawn from the evaluation of financial technologies used
by the four KZN MFOs, and from the empirical models of credit rationing and loan default for
MFO1 and MF02.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Financial technologies directly affect the level of outreach and fmancial self-sustainability achieved
over time by the four study MFOs. Key factors that influence the fmancial technologies are both
endogenous and exogenous to the financial institutions. Lenders MFOl and MF03 achieved
relatively high levels of outreach in terms of the number of clients serviced and the depth of outreach
(proxied by average loan size). Lender MF02 has changed the focus of its target market, while
MF04 has encountered severe fmancial difficulties. Each of the four MFOs focused on a unique
target market: MFOl and MF04 financed small loans to low-income households and business
groups, while MF02 and MF03 fmance agricultural loans.
The ability of these financial institutions to improve access to financial services was firstly affected
by the organizational mission statement and resolve to service a particular market niche and become
self-sustainable. The leaders of MFO1 were committed to providing credit to formally employed
low-income individuals on a profitable basis with the intention of also beginning to offer savings
facilities. The capacity to do this existed because of the fmancial backing from MFOl' s parent
company and the technical expertise within the organisation. Over time, MFO I staff has accumulated
the expertise to service its market and had developed a well-established branch infrastructure for
providing financial services. This infrastructure can be leveraged to provide additional services such
as savings. The lesson is that sound management and administrative processes, together with
technical expertise, require attention if policy mak~rs want to facilitate growth of the microfmance
sector in South Africa (SA).
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lender MF02's mission to improve its fmancial viability resulted in a shift towards providing larger,
more cost-effective loans. Small agricultural loans were costly to administer and exposed MF02 to
relatively high default rates. Since agricultural loans are relatively large by nature, it is not always
possible to charge interest rates that cover the costs of lending due to Usury Act restrictions. The
lesson is that for SMMEs and the small farming sector, policy makers need to focus on developing
the income-generating capacity of these sectors rather than solving liquidity constraints with
additional credit. Although MF04 wanted to be fmancially viable, funding and administrative
constraints severely limited this prospect.
Disorganised senior management and lack of clear direction and focus were part of the problem,
while an inadequate management information system (MIS) and lack of adherence to policy and
procedure caused the failure of MF04. The inability to leverage sufficient funds may also have
constrained MF04's expansion. This highlights the limitations of donor funds and the importance of
MFOs being able to leverage funds acquired in capital markets or through savings. In order to attract
private investment, there must be some evidence of profitability and clients must trust the
organisation.
Lender MFOl reached large numbers of low-income individuals because of the type of financial
products it offered and its administrative capacity within the branch network and between the
branches and head office. A well-established branch network reduced borrower transaction costs to
access credit. Decentralized decision-making allowed for fast loan approval times, as loans were
disbursed in cash within one to two hours of the application. Appropriate policies and procedures
were also in place to monitor the activities of the branches and cash handling facilities that are
administratively expensive and require an MIS that can track the flow of cash in branches. The lack
ofthis type oftechnology was one ofthe main constraints faced by both MF03 and MF04.
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In order to try and save costs and retain administrative control, MF04 branches did not keep cash.
This meant that loans could not be paid out immediately, and that borrowers had to cash cheques at a
commercial bank. This, together with a limited branch network, increased borrower transaction costs,
while the lack of cash handling at MF04 also meant that no payments could be received. Deposits
had to made at the commercial bank and the deposit slip taken to the branch. Lender MF03 also did
not have cash handling facilities and relied on the administrative capacity of staff at the sugar mills to
deal with loan disbursals and loan collections. While such technologies may be cost-saving to the
lender, they are necessarily cost increasing to the borrower. Donors may view this as a cost effective
option to provide fmancial services.
However, the MFO needs to offer quality service so that clients derive value from transacting with
the financial institution over time. Borrowers must be able to transact fairly easily at the branches to
reduce their transaction costs and to encourage repeat borrowing. Agency relationships such as those
used by MF03 with sugar mills can work, but as MF03 discovered, they can result in longer loan
approval times and reduced customer service. At MFOl, MF02 and MF04, the borrowers dealt with
lender staff in their home language. Borrowers were also not compelled to complete a loan
application form - this was done for them by a customer consultant at MFOl and MF03, and by loan
officers at MF04. This is important when dealing with individuals that have a high level of illiteracy.
Lenders MF02 and MF03 had relatively long loan approval times because of fairly centralized
decision-making processes, and MF03 also had to contend with administration by mill personnel.
Although the loans may be necessarily more complex, this is an aspect that both of these MFOs can
improve (MF03 has only recently started to place its own staff at the mills in order to reduce the loan
processing times).
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Lender MFO1 had a custom-built MIS that was optimized for transactional speed and day-to-day
management. Data on customers was stored but regularly over-written, while little historic loan
performance information was kept. This made it difficult to conduct performance and trend analysis,
and to develop a credit scoring system. The MIS, did, however, enable MFOl to fully transact at
branch level and to replicate this technology fairly easily so that rapid branch expansion was
possible. Such a system is vital to improve customer service and handle large volumes of cash at
branch level. MFO1 has now implemented a data "warehouse" to facilitate this process. Another key
issue for an MIS is the extent to which it can be adapted to accommodate savings information.
Lender MFOl has since conducted an expensive programming exercise to incorporate the ability to
take savings into the MIS. This meant a considerable time lag from when management took the
decision to experiment with savings mobilization and the point when this could be implemented. It
thus takes funds, experience and time to develop a well-functioning MIS - 12 years in the case of
MFOl.
The absence of a well-functioning, fully transactional MIS seemed to be a constraint for both MF03
and MF04. This prevented MF04 from managing cash at the branch level and also from effectively
monitoring its debtors' book. Administrative efficiency and debt management were compromised,
and key information about debtors that could be used to develop new products and adjust the loan
technology to better cope with adverse selection and moral hazard could not be processed. Similar
problems emerged on a less serious level at MF03. Investment in an effective MIS is costly as "off-
the-shelf' systems are often too rigid or do not suit a particular MFO. To strengthen organizational
capacity, policy makers need to recognize the importance of an appropriate MIS. Rather than directly
intervene in credit markets, they could help to build organizational capacity by channeling funds into
staff training, software development, and business management.
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Overcoming the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in fmancial contracts can promote
both outreach and financial viability. Lenders MFOl, MF02 and MF03 relied on screening and the
use of collateral or collateral substitutes, while MF04 used peer monitoring and joint liability to try
and reduce information asymmetries and incentive problems. By not requiring any formal collateral,
MFOl considerably reduced this barrier to accessing finance for low-income individuals. However,
its screening technology has not developed to sufficiently accurately evaluate the future income
streams of small businesses enterprises (SMMEs), and hence, loans were limited to formally
employed people. It will become more important for microlenders to expand their financial
technologies to provide fmancial services to SMMEs as the formally employed target market
becomes increasingly saturated with consumption loans. The screening technology used by MFOl
relied on both statistical scoring techniques and its branch managers' localized knowledge to reach
relatively poor clients. The role of the loan officer's localized knowledge should, therefore, also not
be underestimated. Micro-credit markets for SMMEs in SA have not yet developed to the stage
where statistical screening mechanisms can be used.
Information about the stability of expected future income streams and expenditure patterns is not
always readily available from SMMEs since the business and household income and expenditure are
not always kept separate. Infonnation obtained from the savings behaviour could be used by MFOs
to learn more about the typical cash flow patterns of SMMEs. The flow of funds into and out of the
savings account can be monitored to determine the stability of income streams. Savings can also be
used as collateral against which funds can be leant as MF02 has demonstrated. Where legislation
allows microlenders to offer savings services this may encourage private institutions such as MFOl
to expand financial services to SMMEs. This may avoid some of the problems experienced by MFOs
trying to mobilize savings with limited organizational capacity and experience.
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Savings behaviour can be built into credit scoring models like those that have been effectively used
by MFOl to reduce information aSYmmetries. While statistical scoring models will not replace the
knowledge base of loan officers in the microfmance sector, they are a useful tool that can enhance
and speed up credit decisions. Where possible, MFOs need to develop such tools to improve the
quality of the credit decisions. This is even more critical in SA where policy makers are concerned
about the relatively high interest rates charged by microlenders. Cost reduction via reducing bad
debts will thus become increasingly important in the SA microfmance sector. While credit scoring
tools can reduce information aSYmmetries, they are data intensive and many MFOs may not have the
necessary MIS to store the required data.
In the absence of formal collateral, MFOl relied on effective monitoring and borrower reputational
capital to create the necessary repaYment incentive mechanisms. A well-developed MIS facilitated
borrower monitoring, with credit controllers being notified within a day of an instalment being late
and immediate telephonic follow-up being actioned. The monitoring technology relied heavily on
telephonic contact, which limited MFOl's outreach to certain sectors of formally employed clients.
This lending technology may be less suited when lending to SMMEs and small-scale farmers,
although it could be implemented if individuals have access to cell phone technology.
The most important incentive mechanism for MFO1 was the threat of termination of the contract
upon default. This rule is rigorously applied by MFOl and can build reputational capital where
information sharing between lenders is effective and where all lenders consistently apply this rule.
The highly competitive market in which MFOl operates has made the application of this rule more
difficult since some lenders have less stringent debt forgiveness policies. The sequencing of loan
terms and conditions is also more difficult in a competitive market since borrowers have access to
alternative credit sources. In the SMME and emerging farmer sectors, reputational capital and the
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sequencing of loan terms and conditions may still have a powerful incentive effect since these
markets are not subject to the same level of competition as the consumer loans market in SA. In the
consumption loans sector, information sharing between lenders is likely to become more important.
Credit bureaus have performed this task in SA, and it is important that this information is correct and
fully reflects the credit behaviour of borrowers.
Policy makers need to ensure that lenders submit consistent and accurate information to credit
bureaus while not compromising the integrity of this information and the incentives that it creates to
encourage borrowers to align their behaviour with the lender's objectives. In addition, MFO staff that
use this information must be trained to interpret it correctly given that different MFOs may have
different aging processes and write-off rules. This is where lender organisations such as the
Consumer Credit Association (CCA) to which MFOl belongs provide lenders with guidelines on the
different debt aging practices used by MFOs. The new proposals to improve the quality of the bureau
data will help in this regard, while the NLR will also prove useful to microlending institutions if all
lenders submit correct information. The consistent application of the rule of no further access to
credit if a borrower defaults also needs to be applied rigorously by all lenders if reputational capital is
to be effective. To maintain the integrity of reputational capital, MFOs must not compromise their
credit granting rules in order to achieve sales targets as this could increase bad debts.
Lender MF02 has relied increasingly on formal types of collateral to secure loans and a formal
screening procedure to assess the risk of the loan applicant. This is lengthy, since detailed
information on the loan applicant's business venture of the loan applicant is required. Formal
collateral creates another entry barrier to fmancing for SMMEs and emerging farmers, allowing only
those with relatively large businesses and accumulated wealth to apply for loans. This technology
may not expand access to microfinance by SMMEs, as shown by MF02's marked increase in
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429
average loan size. While the access to funds is not restricted through collateral by MF03, the
delegated monitoring by the sugar mill staff has caused problems in loan collection. Although, funds
are deducted upon delivery of the sugarcane crop, borrowers can deliver on other individuals' grower
codes or simply decide not to produce sugarcane.
This again illustrates the trade-off between intensive client monitoring and the absence of collateral.
Monitoring is costly but essential where insufficient incentives are built into the contract to
encourage the borrower to repay. MF03 could consider improving its ability to monitor growers and
to better incentivise the delegated agents doing its monitoring to be more effective. The SA sugar
industry should also consider limiting the allocation of grower codes to households and not allocate
grower codes to individuals. Group lending, although successfully used by MFOs such as the
Grameen Bank and BancoSol, requires specific conditions to succeed. This technology may be less
effective in providing access to credit for farmer groups in rural KZN that were large, with members
that were spatially dispersed (individuals did not benefit from monitoring each other), not well
constituted (limited investment in group formation), and heterogeneous. In addition, loan repayment
was seasonal, and so frequent contact between staff and borrowers was not maintained to instill
borrower discipline and group cohesion. Constituting and maintaining farmer groups may also
impose high costs on both the borrowers and the lender (owing to substantial investments in group
formation) and may, therefore, be a less desirable form of collateral for fmancing emerging farmer
groups.
The group loan concept tended to be more applicable in urban areas of SA, where the groups were
small (4 - 6 members), homogenous and members made regular mbnthly repayments, bringing them
into contact with the lender who could then monitor group performance closely. However, high
administration costs of group lending programmes negatively impact on financial self-sustainability.
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Such costs may be reduced by introducing MISs at branch level, and achieving a scale of operations
that spreads costs over more loans. A focus on sales rather than viability, the lack of discipline to
follow-up on groups, and the scrapping of compulsory deposits negatively affected the functioning of
groups financed by MF04 and ultimately led to unacceptably high bad debts.
A compulsory savings account is necessary to limit the pressure on group solidarity. Where this is
absent, group members may not want to continue to pay outstanding debts for defaulters. Again,
loans have to be graduated to create the right incentives, while loan default must be penalized by
immediate default. While these procedures were applied by MF04 with varying degrees of success, a
problem within the groups was that the performance of the businesses within the group was not
uniform. This created tension as different members of the group had varying credit demands. Group
lending can overcome information asymmetries, but its application is more complicated. The lesson
is that thorough understanding of the target market is necessary before this technology can be
applied.
The four financial technologies used by the study MFOs differed markedly in their ability to reduce
information asymmetries. The need to develop suitable information processing capabilities and
collateral substitutes is critical. Reputational capital was used with reasonable success and its broader
application in financing SMMEs in SA is possible. The information processing capabilities of MFOs
need to be adapted either by using local agents or having an MIS system that can accumulate
information over time to improve decision making. Using formal collateral may be less desirable and
may increase the barriers to finance for SMMEs. The process of "learning by doing" and careful
experimentation should be encouraged when adapting MFO fmancial technologies to fmance
SMMEs and emerging farmers.
431
Policy makers may also consider reforming the process of borrowers applying to go under
administration as this presents a serious threat to the credibility of loan contracts in the South African
microfmance sector. A process of accrediting administrators may prevent unscrupulous individuals
or organisations presenting themselves as administrators and abusing the process by encouraging
borrowers to go under administration while charging a fee for the debt administration. The criteria
for going under administration could also be made very stringent such that the process is not a likely
option for the borrower. A complicated legal follow-up process also hampers the enforcement of debt
contracts. The time period from initiating legal action to the borrower's appearance in court is often
long and tedious. A simplification of the process that 'fast tracks' the borrower's appearance in court
may improve debt contract enforcement as lenders are able to act quicker to obtain a judgment
against a borrower which is listed on the credit bureau and adversely affects the borrower's ability to
apply for credit in the future.
A potential new business opportunity for SA MFOs lies in developing suitable loan products for
SMMEs that have a relatively quick turnover of stock. Here the study MFOs may want to explore
loan products that leverage savings information and provide for weekly or bi-monthly loan
repayments that meet the cash-flow needs of SMMEs. This requires that MFOs identify the sectors
that can be profitably serviced. Hawkers and small spaza shops may not require loans and would
prefer savings or transmission facilities, while medium-scale businesses such as taxi owners or small
contractors may require longer-term loan products. Policy makers and microfinance practitioners
need to establish what products low-income consumers want rather than following a ''top-down''
approach in product development. This is particularly the case for MF02 that has shifted away from
financing small agricultural loans that were relatively costly to administer. The lesson is that for
SMMEs and the small farming sector, policy makers need to promote the income-generating capacity
of these sectors rather than solving liquidity constraints with additional credit.
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The importance of savings mobilization should not be underestimated. Savings can be a substitute for
credit in liquidity management and provide collateral against which credit can be granted. In order to
offer savings facilities and use savings behaviour as a source of information, fmancial institutions
need to offer in-house savings facilities. This requires cash handling facilities, a MIS that can process
savings, and the appropriate administrative capacity to deal with savings. Typical NGOs do not meet
all of these requirements and, therefore, may not be in the best position to mobilize savings. Evidence
from MF02 suggests that rural, low-income individuals do save, but these savings have to accessible,
while the MFO must be trusted by clients to take deposits. Established MFOs such as MFOI and
MF02 have an advantage in developing this trust compared to the village banks that began
operations by mobilizing savings.
Financial sustainability promotes permanence which also has important incentive effects, especially
where reputational capital is being used as a collateral substitute. If MFOs are not perceived to be
permanent, borrowers will have less incentive to repay the credit. Only MFO1 in the study was
financially viable, while the other three MFOs were subsidy-dependent - this is not necessarily a
problem if access to donor support is not threatened (as shown by MF03). Sustainability, however,
requires profits for reinvestment, which are generated by a suitable interest rate spread and control of
administrative costs and arrears. Lender MFO1 charged high nominal interest rates while keeping
arrears under control.
The question remains whether borrowers can afford to pay such high nominal interest rates in the
long-term. Shareholder pressure has to some extent compelled MFOl to charge high interest rates to
maintain profit targets. Extending fmancial services to SMMEs and the emerging farm sector in SA
will require lower interest rates than MFO1 currently charges. The question remains whether
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shareholders will allow this. The agricultural MFOs had relatively high arrears which, together with
low interest rates, are not conducive to financial self-sustainability.
Operational efficiency and arrears control can be achieved by giving staff appropriate incentives for
loan sales and loan collections. Branch efficiency can be improved with well-defined policies and
procedures and a MIS to support these. Reaching economies of scale also promotes fmancial self-
sustainability, but requires that the fmancial technology must be replicable and that there is a demand
for the financial services. The MFO must also have access to capital that is necessary for the
expansion process.
An important challenge for microlenders in SA is the control of costs as loan portfolio expansion
slows down. Portfolio efficiency is a key indicator of cost efficiency and is a function of loan size
and transactional efficiency. Consumption loans are prone to reduce transactional efficiency since
borrowers need funds regularly while there are limits on the extent to which loan size per customer
can increase without increasing the loan term. The challenge for MFOs will be to manage this by
diversifying their portfolios across geographic regions and across different sectors in the economy
(e.g. not just financing individuals that are employed, but also financing SMMEs). In a competitive
market this will be more challenging and should increase the drive to develop suitable fmancial
technologies for SMMEs and emerging farmers.
Results show that the credit granting decision for MFOl staff was influenced by borrower credit-
worthiness, ability to repay, contactability and income stability at all three branches (Ladysmith,
Pretoria, and Pietermaritzburg). Credit bureau information was consistently a key source of
information used by branch managers in deciding to grant credit. This highlights the need, firstly, for
branch managers to be properly trained to interpret and use this information, and secondly, that the
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infonnation supplied to the credit bureau be accurate. If the ability of credit bureaus to keep this
infonnation is constrained, it will hamper MFO's efforts to address the problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard.
The focus should be on maintaining the quality of infonnation supplied to the credit bureau. Heavy
reliance on this infonnation by MFOl shows the role of reputational capital as collateral.
Competitive pressures in the SA microfmance market may diminish the effect of this collateral type
where borrowers use one credit source to repay the other. If this is not properly reflected in the
borrower's payment profile infonnation, it may lead to adverse selection problems.
Borrower affordability is also a key concern for MFOl branch managers, as borrowers with debt-to-
disposable income ratios over 25% were not granted credit. This is in line with the nonns
recommended by the MFRC. Such infonnation is also obtained from the credit bureau, again
highlighting the need for infonnation-sharing between lenders. Such sharing between microlenders in
SA is still problematic, but the NLR endeavours to overcome this problem. This must be done
speedily if the level of indebtedness amongst clients is to be effectively controlled. Credit rationing
by MFOI staffwas more severe where loan applicants were less contactable.
Loan applicants with less stable expected future income streams were less likely to be granted credit.
This highlights the effect that exogenous shocks can have on the portfolio quality ofMFOl. Changes
in the economic environment can rapidly affect the profitability of economic sectors and job stability
for borrowers. This implies that MFO1 staff must monitor its exposure to borrowers in different
economic sectors, and that portfolio diversification, both geographic and across economic sectors,
can reduce lending risks.
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The stringent credit rationing criteria used by MFOl's managers prevented payment profile data
supplied by the credit bureau from being used to assess loan default since most borrowers in arrears
were not granted credit. For the Ladysmith branch, loan repayment was affected by borrower age,
economic activity and borrower indebtedness. The impact of economic sector on loan repayment
performance highlights the need for a well-diversified portfolio across economic sectors to reduce
systemic credit risks. It also indicates that loan staff at MFOl are very aware of this factor. Previous
defaults and economic sector employed were directly linked to loan default for the Pretoria Branch.
Although most loan applicants with default information were credit-rationed, those that were granted
credit still proved to be repayment risks. Branch managers could thus consider stricter rationing
according to this variable. The role of default information also underlines the role of credit bureau
information in predicting loan default. This information needs to be shared between lenders to
improve the credibility of reputational capital as collateral. Credit bureaus need to be allowed to
retain this information, as it is a key predictor of future loan repayment performance. Better borrower
contactability reduced loan default, and branch managers at Pretoria should ensure that borrowers are
contactable at home. Borrowers who had been employed longer at their current employer and who
owned their home, were less likely to default (reflect expected income stability).
Higher previous bad debt, a higher debt-to-income ratio, economic sector employed in, and total
number of recent inquiries positively affected loan default at the Pietermaritzburg branch. Higher
indebtedness means that branch managers must accurately assess their clients' repayment capacity.
Branch managers should also focus on achieving a good portfolio mix to reduce exposure to systemic
credit risks. Model results testing the efficacy of the loan granting decision for MFO1 suggest that
branch managers have adequately identified key factors that affect loan repayment. Loan applicant
characteristics that lead to a greater likelihood of acceptance also decreased the probability of loan
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default. Borrower contactability, stability, debt commitments and previous credit history all
influenced both loan granting and loan repayment decisions.
An effective loan screening mechanism is critical for MFOl, since it relies on a screening intensive
loan technology to minimize the risk of loan default. The negative correlation between the error
terms of the equations in the bivariate probit model suggest that the unexplained variances in the
credit granting decision decrease the likelihood of loan default. Branch managers at MFO1 may thus
be somewhat conservative in their credit granting decisions, particularly for first-time loan
applicants. Given the trade-off between rationing credit and securing profits, these managers need to
find the correct balance between perceived credit risk and expected profitability. Finally, the need to
account for sample selection bias when estimating loan default equations is highlighted by different
prediction probabilities in the unconditional and conditional probit models. Conditioning for sample
selection bias is critical when developing credit scoring models that apply to ''through the door" loan
applicants. There is also a need for MFOs to store information on rejected loan applicants.
The estimated loan default model for MF02 highlighted some key characteristics which could
improve its screening procedures and help to develop a formal screening model for emerging
farmers, SMMEs and agribusinesses. Economic activity of the borrowers is a key factor for loan
officers to consider, as ploughing contractors and broiler producers tended to be in arrears and in
default. Ploughing contractors probably needed closer monitoring to ensure that equipment is
properly maintained and sufficient income can be obtained to repay loans. They could also be
encouraged to diversify into contract transport (e.g. sugar-cane, timber or inputs) to improve
liquidity. Given increased competition and the periodic outbreak of disease in the chicken industry,
caution should be exercised when financing broiler production ventures in KZN. Borrowers need to
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be made aware of the management requirements and should be encouraged to diversify to reduce
price risk.
Results also suggest that clients with larger loans are less likely to default. These loans tended to be
associated with more (verifiable) collateral, lower administration costs per unit of credit and,
probably, better quality information on potential investment returns. Larger borrowers also tended to
produce for sale and had well-diversified asset bases that enabled them to better manage negative
income shocks, and to avoid diverting funds for loan repayment to current consumption. Increasing
the owner's equity stake in the business increases the share of the risk borne by the client and gives
him/her more incentive to repay the loan. Although this measure is a second best option, it can be an
alternative when collateral is ineffective in enforcing loan contracts.
Borrowers having an established record with the lender tended to repay their loans, highlighting the
importance of reputation in a borrower-lender relationship. Borrower liquidity (expected total annual
income relative to annual debt obligations) also helped to distinguish between high- and low-risk
borrowers. This debt coverage measure focuses on total borrower income, rather than income
generated only by the project, given that borrowers may divert funds for loan repayment to other uses
such as funerals, weddings, food and clothing. Lenders, therefore, need to focus on total borrower
liquidity and not only on the income generated by the intended investment, as an indicator of loan
repayment capacity.
The results of the three analyses suggest that there is scope for lenders to adapt their financial
technologies to improve the provision of rural financial services in KZN and other parts of SA.
Agricultural lenders need to focus on improving service quality and loan contract enforcement. The
microlenders face the challenges of broadening their financial product range to accommodate the
RUg
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needs of low-income individuals. The importance of mobilizing savings requires that the savings and
credit functions be managed by the same financial institution. This will reduce borrower transaction
costs in accessing fmancial services, promote fmancial self-sustainability, and encourage the use of
savings as a source of collateral and information.
This study has highlighted three areas for future research. Firstly, there is a need to improve access to
borrower information in order to make recommendations for improving fmancial services. It is very
difficult to get access to information from MFOs, and this often requires considerable commitment
from MFOs, which is not always forthcoming. Researchers also need to understand the business
processes of the MFOs and the business rules that defme how they handle data storage. This is not an
easy process, particularly where the MFO derives no immediate direct benefit from the work being
undertaken. Private consultants, large credit bureaus and credit risk management companies mostly
undertake loan default studies.
Secondly, appropriate loan default models require very large sample sizes. Working with such large
datasets requires good database management skills, especially where information from credit bureaus
needs to be incorporated into the analyses. Future research should also focus on developing fmancial
technologies that can improve access to financial services by SMMEs. Thirdly, more research is
needed on the impact of interest rates on loan demand and the quality of loan applicants. High
interest rates charged by microlenders are of concern to SA policy makers. If lower interest rates
attract a better quality client in larger volumes, this will benefit microlenders.
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SUMMARY
Growing concerns about poverty stem from the need to achieve growth with equity through
policies that foster participation of the poor in the process of economic development. While
the linkages between economic growth and poverty reduction are not perfect, it is difficult to
imagine a significant decline in poverty in the absence of economic growth. Concerns about
access to credit were prompted by the absence of formal institutions, such as commercial
banks, in rural areas, assumptions that rural individuals were too poor to save, and to
encourage productive investment and technology adoption. Results of these programmes were
poor with lending institutions recording high default rates, having limited outreach and being
largely subsidy dependent.
Economic growth in developing regions may be improved through fostering well functioning
markets and improving institutions that facilitate the ownership and transfer of property rights
with a legal environment that adequately enforces contract law. Financial institutions, formal
and informal, represent part of the essential institutional infrastructure required for the
efficient functioning of markets. The most important contribution of financial intermediation
is its ability to induce larger size and foster a greater degree of integration of markets for
goods and services, factors of production and other assets. This promotes the division of
labour and increased specialisation, greater competition, use of modem technologies and
exploitation of economies of scale and scope. This is achieved through the provision of
monetization services, management of the payments system and intermediation between
surplus (savers) and deficit units (investor/borrower) which facilitates channelling of
resources from individuals, activities and regions with limited growth potential to those
where more rapid expansion is possible. Financial intermediaries also facilitate risk
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management and conswnption smoothing over time by allowing synchronisation between
income generating and conswnption activities.
The indirect role of fmance in economic development and the poor performance of directed
credit programmes, led to the emergence of a new institutional view of micro finance. This
'new view' promoted the development of financially viable lending institutions that provide a
wide range of demand driven financial services to a broad range of clients. High levels of
outreach and self-sustainability, however, require innovative and cost effective financial
technologies to overcome information asymmetries, the absence of formal collateral and the
lack of complementary institutions prevalent in rural financial markets.
Most challenges in rural financial intermediation arise from the promissory and intertemporal
nature of financial contracts. Asymmetric information between borrower and lender creates
problems for lenders in distinguishing between high and low risk borrowers and deciding
whether borrowers will adopt a riskier project during the term of the loan. Together with
difficulty in contract enforcement, this has led to the poor frequently being rationed out of
formal credit markets.
In addition, both borrowers and lenders incur transaction costs in accessing and providing
financial services. For the borrowers, these include out-of-pocket costs to access fmancial
services, legal fees and the opportunity costs of time. Lender transaction costs arise from
gathering information, collecting and disbursing funds, administering fmancial services and
loan contract enforcement. High transaction costs may also result in external credit rationing
by lenders or internal rationing by borrowers.
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Innovations in rural financial markets have focused on reducing transaction costs by
improving financial technologies and overcoming information and loan contract enforcement
constraints. 'Best practice' MFOs in Indonesia, Asia and Latin America have reduced
borrower transaction costs via establishing extensive branch networks and mobile banking
services which increase accessibility to clients. Customising loans and savings products
accommodates needs and preferences of clients. Short-term loans with flexible loan sizes and
repayment terms, have allowed a wider variety of activities to be financed while accounting
for seasonality of cash flows.
Loans have simple application forms and fast approval times (one to two weeks) facilitated by
decentralised decision making. Lenders have reduced transaction costs by using effective
management information systems (MISs) that can instantly track loan status, reducing paper
work, and motivating staff with financial and non-financial incentives linked to quantifiable
performance based indicators such as number of clients, portfolio growth, branch profits and
loan collections. In addition, branch structures have been kept lean while spreading costs over
a large number ofclients (achieving economies of scale).
Repeat loans to small borrower groups lower loan risk by providing initial small loans with
frequent repayments to instil financial discipline and facilitate monitoring. Joint liability
amongst borrowers is used as a collateral substitute with lenders requiring compulsory
savings as a contingency fund to fmance group members in arrears. Lenders with more
flexible loan terms have used character references to screen and monitor borrowers, and
interest rate rebates, reputational capital, loan guarantees and warehouse receipts as incentive
and contract enforcement mechanisms. Borrowers have been held strictly accountable with no
new loans granted without existing loans being repaid.
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The charging of positive real interest rates that provide a suitable spread to cover operational
costs and cost of funds, while protecting the MFO equity base, is also imperative for financial
self-sustainability. Best practice institutions with innovative financial technologies and
motivated management have achieved both scale (reaching large numbers of clients) and
depth (reaching relatively poor clients) of outreach with high levels of fmancial self-
sufficiency. Such MFOs have managed to perform in a variety of policy environments.
However, low levels of inflation, suitable economic growth, stable political environments,
and well established complementary institutions (credible legal systems, secure and
transferable property rights, well established infrastructure) have contributed to self-
sustainability and greater levels of outreach.
In South Africa, targeted credit programmes faced similar problems experienced in other
developing countries. Given the lack of formal financial services in developing areas in South
Africa, the government initiated targeted credit programmes to motivate productive
investment and technology adoption. A multitude of MFOs were created to act as
implementing agencies for the state. The institutions experienced high default rates with the
credit not always reaching the targeted population. A new policy direction emerged which
promoted more viable MFOs providing broad-based financial services including savings
facilities to the rural poor.
The Strauss Commission was also established to develop a formal rural fmance strategy for
South Africa. While some proposals of the Strauss Commission were positive, the thrust of
the proposals were in developing targeted, sector-specific credit programmes, which
international experience has shown not to be viable. Private commercial lenders such as
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ABSA Bank and NGOs such as the Financial Aid Fund of the South African Sugar
Association and the Ithala Finance and Investment Corporation have shown considerable
initiative in mobilising savings and providing credit to the rural poor using innovative
financial products. In an effort to promote capital flows into developing areas the Government
introduced an exemption to the Usury Act. The exemption resulted in the mushrooming ofthe
micro lending sector that mainly focused on providing financial to low-income, formally
employed individuals. Providing finance to SMMEs remained marginal. The challenge facing
South African MFOs is to develop financial technologies that can expand the frontier of
fmance to this sector.
Previous rural finance research in South Africa has focused mainly on the role of credit in the
production process, outreach and self-sustainability or on individual lenders. Given the new
focus on evaluating credit providers and the lack of attention given to financial technologies,
this study aims to assess fmancial technologies, outreach and fmancial viability of four
institutions providing loans to households in developing areas of KZN. Understanding the
limitations and advantages of current technologies and innovations, used by KZN lenders,
may facilitate institutional reform to improve access of rural people to formal financial
services. In addition data on borrower and loan characteristics were analysed using logistic
regression to identify characteristics of clients who are current and in arrears both at a micro
lending and agricultural MFO. The efficacy of the loan screening mechanism for one the
study MFOs was also evaluated using a bivariate probit model conditioned for sample
selection.
Data on fmancial delivery systems, contract enforcement and incentive mechanisms were
obtained from four fmancial institutions in KZN. The four institutions differed in their
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objectives and target clientele. MF02 and MF03 focused on providing agricultural input
loans to clients. These lenders were concerned mainly with promoting economic development
and social upliftment of small farmers in rural areas and thus provided loan products to suit
the needs of these development objectives. The loan products were mostly for income
generating purposes. MF02 had a range of short, medium and long-term loan products
(including a short-term non-asset backed group loan for agricultural inputs) with no fixed
limit on loan sizes. With increased focus on fmancial viability MF02 changed is focus on
fmancing larger commercially viable business ventures of emerging farmers and agribusiness.
MF02 stopped granting group credit to small, subsistence farmers as high default rates and
administration costs reduced the viability of these loans.
MF03 targeted specifically small farmers producing less than 450 tonnes of sucrose per year,
and provided a long-term crop establishment and a short-term working capital loan. Loan
terms were long which is characteristic of agricultural loans, while loan repayment schedules
were flexible to accommodate the seasonality of agricultural production. Concessionary
interest rates were charged on these loans although MF02 changed this policy in-line with it
drive to improve fmancial viability. In addition, compulsory own equity contributions were
required by MF02 to increase the incentives of the loan contract. More stringent collateral
requirements and own equity contributions made it more difficult for low-income small-scale
farmers to access finance from MF02. MF03 had relied on crop cessions as a contract
enforcement mechanism.
While loan terms were flexible, the loan applications tended to be tedious for the agricultural
lenders with loans being disbursed in-kind only. Long loan approval times, together with
complex disbursal procedures increased borrower transaction costs. Loan disbursal and
IQ,,",- 233.
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approval procedures were complicated for MF03 because of reliance on the sugar mill
administration process. This caused serious backlogs in loan application processing that
resulted in loan approval times of up to 6 months. Streamlining this process will improve the
quality of service that MF03 can deliver to borrowers. MF03 has already embarked on this
process by employing its own staff at the sugar mills to facilitate the administrative
procedure.
Micro-lenders extending credit for micro-business activities (MF04) and consumption
purposes (MFO1) had relatively smaller loans than the agricultural lenders with definite loan
maxima imposed on loan sizes to comply with the Usury Act exemptioIis. These loans had
more frequent and rigid repayment periods, partly to instil financial discipline amongst
borrowers, while interest rates that reflect the true cost of lending were charged. MFO1
disbursed loans in cash with few restrictions on use, which represented an improvement in the
quality of services to borrowers.
Loan applications procedures for the micro lenders varied. MFO1 had a well established and
extensive branch network throughout South Africa, improving access to financial services.
Loan approval times were relative quick (l - 2 hours) with loans being disbursed in cash. The
represented a substantial improvement in quality of service when compared to the agricultural
lender although MF02 and MF03 required more detailed processed because the nature of the
loan products. MFO1s greatest advantage was the strength of its administration system and
cash handling facility at the branches. The good administrative system was facilitated by good
governance principles and a MIS system that could track cash handling at branches.
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The group formation processes at MF04 did pose considerable transaction costs on borrowers
although the absence of formal collateral requirements allowed low-income SMMEs to access
the fmancial services. The absence of strong administrative processes and a well function
MIS system at branches resulted in MF04 having to rely on the transaction facilities of a
commercial bank. Group leaders had to cash a cheque at the commercial bank to obtain the
group's loan while payments also had be made at the bank and the deposit slip taken to
MF04. This process is likely to increase borrower transaction costs and detract from the
quality of service. MF04 also did not have a well established branch network. Hence it was
costly and time consuming to get to the branches for borrowers.
In the case of group loans, MF04 initially invested a considerable amount of time in group
formation while MF02 relied on the existing structures of local farmer associations. While
this reduced administration costs of MF02, in terms of extending a large number of small
loans to small farmers, the group structures were weak, which consequently resulted in loan
repayment problems. Group loans in themselves presented some inflexibility in terms of loan
sizes and loan use between members. While they allow access of the rural poor with no
suitable collateral to fmancial services, group loans become limiting where members require
larger loans to grow their businesses. This was a particular problem for MF04. With sales
pressure mounting, investment in group formation was compromised. The result was higher
bad debts that culminated in MF04 having to be liquidated and restructured.
A particular problem also arose with borrowers having difficulty in interacting with the
commercial bank. Processes were complicated while borrowers complained of poor customer
service at the bank and the impatience of staff in assisting them with the banking process.
These problems may make future interlinkages between commercial banks and less formal
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fmancial institutions difficult. Schoombe's (1999) approach of promoting interlinkages may
thus be less practical in reality and policy makers should focus on encouraging existing micro
lenders with a well developed infrastructure and technology to expand the scope of their
financial services.
Having a suitable credit delivery system that provides quality fmancial services is important
in terms of achieving good outreach. However, quality fmancial services need to be provided
on a continuous basis, which requires the institutions not only to charge interest rates that
reflect the true cost of lending, but to reduce loan default and achieve suitable loan collection
rates. This requires lenders reduce information asymmetries, loan repayment incentive and
contract enforcement problems. Few of the institutions had formal screening models, with
only MFO1 employing a computerised system to improve both the speed and the accuracy of
the loan approval process. However, the scoring models were used in conjunction with the
localised knowledge of branch managers. Use of a scoring system was facilitated by a well
functioning MIS system.
MF04 used local group structures to screen individuals, which reduced both the geographic
and ethnic distance between borrower and lender and thus improved the accuracy of the
screening procedure. MF03 made use ofa loan approval committee with representatives from
the local area. MF02 had a formal applicant screening methodology where this screening
methodology mainly focused on determining whether the investment project could carry the
additional debt burden. Only MFO1s screening technology focused on determining whether
borrower had the ability and willingness to repay.
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Loan monitoring was difficult and costly for the agricultural lenders given the geographic
dispersion of the clientele. The micro-lenders, given the use of financial technologies, which
promoted frequent contact between borrower and lender, could monitor clients more
regularly. In addition to initial borrower screening, lenders relied on collateral to enforce loan
contracts and reduce moral hazard. Both collateral and collateral substitutes were used by
lenders to enforce loan contracts. These included crop cessions, machinery and equipment,
permission to occupy certificates, mortgage bonds on land, joint liability groups, third party
guarantors and reputational capital. Crop cessions were less successful as collateral types
because of defective loan collection mechanisms. Machinery and equipment was subject to
high collateral specific risks due to poor maintenance and theft as well as high liquidation
costs, which reduced the efficacy of this collateral.
Permission to occupy certificates had no value as collateral since they were not secure and
tradable, giving them no market value. Mortgage land used by MF02 had secure and tradable
property rights, which gave it relatively high value as collateral. Joint liability mechanisms
had mixed results with this collateral substitute being relatively more effective for small,
homogeneous groups of micro-entrepreneurs having regular incomes to suit the frequent
repayment patterns required by this method to instil fmancial discipline amongst borrowers
and to promote frequent contact between borrower and lender.
Agricultural group loans consisted of large, heterogeneous groups with weak group cohesion
due to the geographic dispersion. The seasonality of agricultural production did not suit the
frequent loan repayment patterns while weak group cohesion and the limited contact between
borrower and lender made this collateral type less applicable for agricultural loans.
Reputational capital was used most successfully by MFOI and MF04. Given that MFOI
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required no formal collateral types, the threat of termination of the borrower lender
relationship was used to create the necessary incentive for borrowers not to voluntarily
default. Listing defaulting borrowers with the credit bureau reinforced the mechanism. The
mechanism of slowly improving the loan terms and conditions for borrowers who repay their
loans on time was absent. To some extent this was prompted by the highly competitive nature
of the market where severely credit rationed borrowers could easily source alternative credit.
The reputational capital to work effectively it is critical that new loans are not granted to
defaulting borrowers. Where this happens, the power of the incentive mechanism is
weakened. This is true to some extent for the South African micro lending market where the
level of competition is high but information sharing is imperfect, because not all lenders
submit information to the same credit bureau. The National Loans Register administered by
the MFRC is trying to overcome this problem but it will take time before the level of
information sharing is improved amongst the micro lenders. The joint liability groups of
MF04 worked less well as incentive mechanism. This was mainly as a result of the group
formation processes being relaxed and abandoning the compulsory savings account because
borrowers felt uncomfortable in transacting with the commercial bank.
Costly and ineffective legal procedures also contributed to the loan repayment problem. It is
important that borrowers are sanctioned for default to reduce the possibility of voluntary
default. This can be achieved by providing sufficient penalties that are enforceable by law.
This may also reduce the culture of non-payment, which exists amongst borrowers. Limited
savings mobilisation was undertaken by the MFOs, except for MF02, which had an extensive
savings mobilisation network. Savings have a far greater potential of reaching rural poor as
shown by the large number of savers relative to borrowers for MF02. In addition to savings
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providing an important substitute for credit, they can provide an important source collateral
and information on potential borrowers. Savings can also assist lenders in reducing
dependence on donor funds. It is, therefore, important that savings and loans be provided
together. This will also help in reducing transaction costs of borrowers in having to access
financial services at different financial institutions.
However, to offer saving facilities requires organisation competence, sound administration,
cash handling facilities, and a good MIS that can accommodate savings. MFO1 has all these
qualities and is in the position to expand the scope of its financial services. Offering savings
facilities will also help MFO1 acquire more knowledge about potential customers,
particularly SMMEs. Savings may thus enable MFO1 to broaden its financial technologies to
provide finance successfully to SMMEs. This will present an important expansion in the
frontier ofmicro finance in South Africa.
Self-sustainability indicators showed that the development orientated lenders were subsidy-
dependent although MF02 is working towards achieving a greater level of subsidy
independence. MF03 will continue to remain subsidy dependent as its focus is development
fmance. However, subsidy dependence has not detracted from MF03's focus of achieving
cost efficiencies through utilising the infrastructure of the sugar mills. This has, however,
impacted on its ability to deliver quality financial services. The continued reliance on donor
funds may also constrain MF03 from being able to improve the quality of service without
incurring additional costs.
MFOl was highly profitable as a result of achieving economies of scale while managing to
contain bad debt levels. Charging relatively high interest rates has also contributed to MFOl 's
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profitability. The ability of MFOl to continue to charge these high interest rates may be
constrained as the micro credit market matures and as borrowers become more aware of the
cost of credit. Hence MFO1 will have to focus on improving its cost efficiencies to maintain
its profitability levels.
Outreach of loans for MF02 poor and is a reflection of the limited accessibility of the loan
products while they were also aimed at larger, more wealthy rural borrowers. Low average
number of loans outstanding and high volume of loans disbursed for MF02 substantiates this.
Accessibility of financial products has been improved with the restructuring of MF02 such
that all agricultural loan products are available throughout its extensive branch network and
not only at selected branches. Arrears for the development lenders were relatively high, which
is a reflection of the poor loan collections achieved. This has resulted from difficulties with
collateral types while droughts and payment boycotts have also contributed to this. Poor loan
collection promotes continued subsidy dependence and should be kept to a minimum.
Accurate arrears and cost infonnation was not available for MF04. However, interviews with
staff suggested that MF04 had incurred high arrear rates because of poor administration and
control of borrower groups. MFOl and MF03 have been able to achieve a considerable depth
of and breadth of outreach while MF02 has shifted its focus to less expensive large loans.
MF04s outreach was relative limited. There are several reasons for this with the most
important being the inability to achieve economies of scale, possibly due to the lack of
funding. Its administrative capacity was also limited. In addition, it is not clear whether there
is a massive demand of fmancial services by SMMEs. The perfonnance of SMMEs is linked
to a well functioning and growing economy. Small business may more constrained by high
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transaction costs of doing business and access to markets rather than being liquidity
constrained.
Effective borrower screening does not only increase the ability of lenders to reduce the
problem of adverse selection but may also speed up loan approval times. Data on both
accepted and reject clients was collected from MFOI with the objective offrrstly determining
the factors that influence the credit rationing decision. Loan performance information was
also observed for those loan applicants who were granted credit to determine factors that
influence loan default. Finally, the efficacy of the credit granting system was evaluated using
a bivariate probit model conditioning for sample selection bias.
Key factors that emerged as important credit rationing criteria were loan applicant income
stability, contactability, ability to repay the debt and loan applicant credit history as provided
by the credit bureau. Importantly these results did not vary across the three study branches.
Loan officers were very aware of the economic sectors in which borrowers were employed as
the risk of retrenchment or short jeopardised the stability of the future income streams.
Although the nature of the employment sectors varied from branch to branch, borrowers who
were regarded as being employed in stable economic sectors were less likely to be rationed.
Contactability by telephone was a very important component of MFOls monitoring
technology. Hence the importance of this variable in the screening decision. Loan applicants
where were less contactable by telephone either at work or at home were more likely to be
credit rationed.
The reliance on telephonic contact also highlights the inability of this type of technology to
deal with SMMEs. Monitoring masses of borrowers is not possible for MFO I because it
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would too costly. Telephonic contact is thus a substitute, albeit imperfect, monitoring
mechanism. Also important is that the bigger the company and the higher the bad debt the
greater the monitoring cost is. It is also a cost that is difficult to control since the telephone
network is owned by a state monopoly in South Africa.
Loan applicants who had existing debt commitments that exceeded 25% of their net 'take-
home-pay' were also more likely to be rationed. Ability to pay is a critical component of
MFO Is rationing decision and is evaluated using the payslip information present on
application. Inherent in this is also a potential shortcoming of MFO1s financial technology
since the ability to assess affordability of business incomes is not possible. The most
important rationing criteria for MFO1 was the previous credit history information provided by
the credit bureau.
This highlights some important characteristics of MFOla credit technology. Firstly, it does
rely on the reputational capital of borrowers. Borrowers with worse credit histories as
manifested by payment profile arrears, defaults and judgements were not likely to be granted
credit. Secondly, it highlights the importance of accurate credit bureau information since a
large part of the rationing decision is based on this data. Improvements in the quality of
information may enhance the decision making capabilities based on bureau data. It is also
important that branch managers know how to interpret the data based as arrears reporting by
lenders vary.
Factors influencing loan repayment performance varied between the branches. However,
common factors that affect loan repayment performance were borrower ability to repay,
previous defaults, contactability and economic activity. In addition, older borrowers were less
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likely to default at the Ladysmith branch while borrowers who had been employed for a
longer at the current employer were less likely to default at the Pretoria branch. Borrowers
that were more contactable were less likely to default. This highlights the importance of loan
monitoring in a technology that is less collateral intensive. However, monitoring is costly and
needs and needs to be balanced against the returns achieved with that additional monitoring.
The importance of employment sector in the affecting the likelihood of repaying the loan
highlights the impact that economic shocks can have on MFO1. Secure employment is a pre-
requisite for a guaranteed future payment stream important to repay the loan.
However, economic instability that results in retrenchments or staff being put on short-time
may have adverse effects on borrowers ability to repay and thus expose MFO I to
considerable systemic risk. It is, therefore, important that MFO I ensures a reasonable level of
diversification of its loan portfolio across employment sectors at a branch level to eliminate
the adverse impacts of exogenous economic shocks. Branch staff are acutely aware of this
given that employment sector variable was also important in the credit rationing decision.
Ability of borrowers to repay the loan is also an important determinant of loan repayment. On
average, borrowers who had more that 18% of their monthly, disposable income committed to
repay debt with other lenders were less likely to repay the loan at MFOl. Low-income
borrowers have relatively lower levels of liquidity and are thus less able to carry high debt
loadings. This confmns the concerns raised in the study of borrower indebtedness
commissioned by the MFRC. It is thus important that MFO1 staff take cognisance of the
existing debt commitments of loan applicants and possible ration loan applicants with higher
debt commitments more. It is also important that MFOs are made aware of the borrowers'
existing debt commitments. This is something that the NLR aims to achieve. Greater
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awareness of borrower debt commitments will result in better loan granting decisions. This
does, however, depend on how consistent the rule is applied across lenders.
The importance of previous credit history in loan repayment performance emphasised the
value of this information in the loan granting decision. Borrowers with a higher number of
previous defaults were more likely to default again. By not granting loans to borrowers that
have previously defaulted, MFO1 can enhance the value of reputational capital. It is also
important that this rule is applied consistently across the lending industry. The value of this
information also highlights the importance that bureaus keep this information and make it
available to the credit industry.
The efficacy of the credit granting decision was evaluated using a bivariate probit model that
conditions for sample selection bias as repayment performance is only observed for those
borrowers that are granted credit. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient in the loan
granting equation, together with a negative (positive) and significant coefficient in the loan
repayment equation would suggest that MFO1 is using the information correctly to grant or
deny credit to loan applicants. The results of the bivariate probit model suggest that MFOl's
screening mechanism is effective in correctly identifying high and low risk borrowers. Loan
applicant contactability and stability have a positive and significant coefficient in the credit
granting equation and a negative and significant coefficient in the loan repayment equation.
The debt-income ratio, number of bad debt write-offs and payment profile arrears have
negative and significant coefficients on the loan granting equation and positive and significant
coefficients in the loan repayment equation. Only payment profile information has a non-
significant coefficient in the loan repayment equation. This is because most of the loan
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applicants who had payment profile arrears were fully rationed. The negative correlation
coefficient between the credit granting and loan repayment equations is negative, suggesting
that loan officers were somewhat conservative in their credit granting decisions. This is not
necessarily bad but there is a trade-off between risk and profits. The optimal point at which to
ration credit needs to be determined by MFO1. Evaluating the efficacy of the screening
mechanism is important for lenders since poor screening results in higher bad debts.
Data were collected on individual borrower characteristics of medium-term agricultural loans
extended during 1993 and 1994 by an MF02. A total of 59 observations were obtained.
Initial descriptive statistics show the majority of borrowers to be men with only 17 per cent
being women. Men, on average, received relatively larger loans than women, with companies
and partnerships receiving the largest loans. The activities financed were mainly livestock
production, timber and sugarcane contracting, maize milling and contract ploughing and
cartage. Livestock production loans included loans for the purchase of broiler equipment,
feed and day-old chickens. Loans for timber and sugarcane contracting ventures involved the
purchase of equipment while loans for maize milling were used to buy hammer mills. Loans
for contract ploughing and cartage involved the purchase of tractors, trailers and ploughs.
Most of the male borrowers invested in contract ploughing and cartage ventures with most of
the women being involved in broiler production. The largest number and volume of loans
were disbursed by the Port Shepstone branch with loans for contract ploughing and cartage
accounting for 78 per cent of the total value of loans disbursed. The Pietermaritzburg branch
tended to also focus on broiler production loans.
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Of the total of 59 loans disbursed, 17 were current, 10 were in arrears and 32 were in default.
Both binomial and multinomial logit models were estimated to determine characteristics of
borrowers that paid loans in arrears and in default. For the binomiallogit model the 'arrears'
and 'current' categories were combined to form a less stringent 'current' category. Borrowers
who had larger loans, higher own equity contributions, had maize milling and timber and
sugarcane contracting businesses and were relatively liquid were less likely to default on loan
repayments. Larger loans tended to be associated with more verifiable collateral, lower
administration costs per unit of credit and probably better quality information on potential
investment returns.
A higher owner's equity stake in the business increases the share of risk borne by the
borrower and provides more incentive to repay the loan. Ploughing and broiler contractors
need closer monitoring to ensure that equipment is properly maintained and that sufficient
income can be obtained for loan repayment. Contractors should be encouraged to diversify to
improve liquidity. Given the increased competition and periodic outbreak of disease in the
chicken industry, caution should be exercised when financing broiler production ventures.
The results for the multinomial logit model indicated that borrowers with larger loans and
who had contract ploughing and broiler production ventures are more likely to pay in arrears.
A few large loans were extended to borrowers entering into timber and sugarcane contracting
as well as broiler production. Given the drop in price of chicken meat due to imports in 1994
the broiler producers could have experienced temporary repayment problems. Borrowers
with smaller loans, lower own equity contributions, who entered into contract ploughing and
broiler production ventures and who did not have a previous loan history were more likely to
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default. Borrowers having an established record with the bank tend to repay their loans,
highlighting the importance of reputation in a borrower lender relationship.
Improved service quality together with more effective loan contract enforcement mechanisms
are important areas of improvement for local MFOs and need to be considered by both policy
makers and lenders when designing future rural finance policies. The loan default models also
highlight key variables which lenders should consider for future borrower screening to
promote viability and continued outreach.
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Appendix A
Loan and Financial Performance Evaluation Form for MFOs
Note: This form should be completed by the head office ofthe Savings and Loans Division. This questionnaire is based on survey instruments
developed by the Rural Finance Prowam at the Ohio State University, Columbus, United States ofAmerica.
Note :All information will be kept strictly confidential and will only be used to compute outreach andfinancial performance indicators. The
base information in this questionnaire will, under no circumstances, be published.
Note :Allfinancial information shouldpertain only to those operations directly concerned with financial intermediation. For example, ifa Micro
Finance Organisation (MFO) lends and owns industrial hives, the entries provided here should be derivedfrom accounts that pertain only
to lending and deposit mobilisation operations and not to the industrial hives. The same convention should be followed ifa MFO provides
training and/or counseling services, in addition to, financial intermediation. The non-financial intermediation activities should be
separatedfrom the accounts.
Note: Many of the ratios require the calculation of annual averages. For example, return on assets is calculated as net income divided by
average annual assets. Thus successive years of data are needed, at least for the stock figures. Unless otherwise stated assume that all
information is required as at the beginning and end ofthe 1996/1997, 1997/1998, 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 financial reporting periods.
The financial reporting periods should coincide with the financial year ofthe Savings and Loans Division. Income and Expenditure items
required are those incurred during the indicated financial periods. Certain loan and savings data will be for disbursements and
withdrawals during the financial periods. This will be clearly stated.
Note: Please enter N/A for "Not Available" for any requested data which the Savings and Loans Division is unable to provide.
Note: The reader is requested to read each question carefully.




1. Dates of BEGINNING and END of FINANCIAL reporting period
Date of beginning of financial period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Date of end of financial period
2. Balance Sheet Information
Please note that the balance sheets of the Savings and Loans Division may not be compiled in the same manner as described in this
questionnaire. Please complete the information required here as accurately as possible and clearly describe any differences.
2.1 Assets
F~xed Assets at Cost at beginning of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
FIxed Assets at Cost at end of period
Fixed assets should include all assets employed in financial intermediation, even ifthose assets were not paidfor, but rather received as in-kind
grants. For example, donated computer equipment may be a resource used by the Savings and Loans Division's operations and should be
accountedfor as such and depreciated over its useful life.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Accumulated Depreciation at beginning of period
Accumulated Depreciation at end of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Loan portfolio principal outstanding at beginning of period
Loan portfolio principal outstanding at end of period




1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
I Provision for Bad Debts at beginning of period
IProvision for Bad Debts at end of period
This is a contra asset account. Any balance in it is subtractedfrom the balance in the account for Loan Portfolio Principal Outstanding. Here,
the Performing Loan Portfolio is equal to the Loan Portfolio Principal Outstanding (an asset account) less any balance in the Provisionfor Bad
Debts account (a contra-asset account). Any Bad-debt Provision expense increases the balance in the Provision for Bad Debts contra-asset
account. When a loan is written off, the balance in the Provision For Bad Debts Account decreases. The idea is that some ofthe loans currently
being made and some ofthe debts currently outstanding will end up being irrecoverable. To accurately reflect current performance, the expense
caused by the writing offofthese bad debts should be incurred in the period in which the loans are disbursed, not when the loans are eventually
recognised as non-performing. Therefore, expenses for Bad debt Provision should be recorded more or less continuously as loans are made, but
actual write-offs (decreases in the Provision for Bad Debt contra-asset account) are made only when specific loans are recognised as
irrecoverable.
Other Assets at beginning of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Other Assets at end ofperiod
Include all other assets not recorded in the previous asset items.
Total Assets at beginning of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total Assets at end of period
The total asset figure derived from summing all the asset accounts in this questionnaire should equal the total assets that appear in the audited
financial statements unless some non-financial operations had to be separated out.
2.2 Liabilities
Depos~ts from Clients at beginning of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000




This should include any funds borrowedfrom commercial sources, that is, sources that do not charge a "special", "preferential" or lower than
market interest rate.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Borrowings from Banks or other commercial sources at beginning of period
Borrowi~gs from Banks or other commercial sources at end of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Borrowings from Donors at beginning of period
Borrowings from Donors at end ofperiod
This should include any funds borrowed from sources which: (a) charge a lower-than-market interest rate, or (b) are not in the business of
making a profit or which are not owned by individuals seeking to maximise their own welfare. For example, the World Bank is not owned by
profit maximising individuals. If the funds from a donor are lent at market rates, then classifying the funds as from a donor will not affect the
subsidy dependence.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Borrowings from Government at beginning of period
Borrowings from Government at end of period
This should include any funds borrowed from government at lower than market interest rates. E.g. Khula Enterprises, the National Housmg
Fund, the Development Bank ofSouthern Africa, the Land and Agricultural Bank or any government agency.
Other liabilities at beginnim! of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Other liabilities at end of period
This should include all liabilities that were not recorded in the above accounts.
Total Liabilities at beginning of period
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total Liabilities at end of period
The total liabilities figure derived from summing all liability accounts in this questionnaire should equal the total liabilities that appear in the





Total Equity at beginning ofoeriod
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total Equity at end ofoeriod
This is defined as the difference between Total Assets and Total Liabilities. Please also refer to section 5, which deals with the computation of
Retained Earnings.
4. Income Statement (or Statement of Profit or Loss) (record revenues and expenses incurred during the financial period)
4.1 Revenues
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Interest revenue from loans received in cash
Interest revenue from loans due but not yet received
Fee revenue from loans received as cash
Fee revenue from loans due but not yet received
I Other interest revenue
r 1996/1997 I 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
1 I
This includes interest revenue derivedfrom deposits in banks orfrom other investments.
Grants in cash 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Grants are extraordinary revenue because they do not reflect the operations of the intermediary in the period Grants must be included as
revenue because the net worth ofan entity increases when it receives a grant.
I Grants in-kind consumed
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 I 1999/2000
Some grants are in-kind, and some in-kind grants are immediately consumed by the entity. Examples include advisors whose salaries are not




controlled by the Savings and Loans Division and thus do not increase assets, but neither do they increase the obligations ofthe entity and thus
do not increase liabilities. In short, an expense is incurred, but no decrease to Net Income is experienced. Thus offsetting entries are made for
the value of the grant in-kind that was consumed. One entry on the revenue side and one entry on the expense side. Thus all expenses incurred
by the entity in its operations are recorded for use in productivity and efficiency measures, but the grants do not affect net income and thus do
not affect net worth.
1996/1997 I 1997/1998 I 1998/1999 I 1999/2000 I
IGrants in-kind that are not consumed I - I I I I
Some in-kind grants are not immediately consumed. Examples include computer equipment or vehicles. These grants increase the Savings and
Loans Division's assets because they increase the resources in the control ofthe Savings and Loans Division. For example, an in-kind grant ofa
truck with a cost ofRi0 000 would increase the fixed asset account on the balance sheet by Ri0 000. Depreciation would be expensed as usual
over the asset's life. Such unconsumed in-kind grants are recorded as extraordinary income but not as an expense. This increases the net income
and thus the net worth ofthe entity just enough to balance the increase in assets.
This includes revenue that is not the result ofnormal operations, such as gains on the sale offixed assets.
IExtraordinary revenue
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 -I
1
rOther revenue










I 1996/1997 I 1997/1998 I 1998/1999 1999/2000
I I I
Total revenue as computed here will differ from the auditedfinancial statementsby the amount ofaccrued interest revenue and by the amount of
in-kind grants (both consumed and not consumed, as noted).
4.2 Expenses
I Staff expenses
I 1996/1997 I 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
I I





1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
This includes payment for items such as paper, pens, consumables, telephones, cell phones, tea, and other assets which are consumed too
quickly to be consideredfixed assets.
Any other administration expenses not covered in materials and equipment.
I Other administrative expenses
1996/1997 1997/1998 1 1998/1999 1999/2000 1
I l
IBad debt provision expense
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 l
l
This is the amount that is added to the Provision for Bad Debt contra-asset account in the balance sheet in anticipation of irrecoverable debt.
Ordinary write-offs ofbad debt are subsequently charged to the Provision for Bad Debt contra-asset account. The level ofprovisioning should
reflect the anticipated level of risk of bad debt in the current portfolio. It differs from the expense for extraordinary charge-o.fJs in that
provisioning expenses are part ofthe normal operations ofa lender. All lenders have some bad debts as part ofnormal operations.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Depreciation expense
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
IExtra-ordinary charge-offs
1996/1997 1997/1998 I 1998/1999 1999/2000
I
This does not represent any ordinary loan-loss provision expense. It may be used, for example, when bad debts which have been accumulatmg





This should exactly equal Grants-in-kind consumed noted on the revenue side.
1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
l Extraordinary expense I
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
I
This includes any expenses that are not part ofnormal operations and that are not included in other expense accounts. An example would be
losses on the sales offixed assets.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Interest expense on borrowin_gs from banks
Interest expense on borrowings from donors
Interest expense on borrowin~s from government
Interest expense on borrowings from clients
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total expenses computed above will differ from total expenses in the auditedfinancial statements by the amount ofin-kind grants consumed. Net
income will differ only by the amount ofaccrued interest and in-kind grants.
5. Statement of Retained Earnings
1996/1997 1997/1998 I 1998/1999 1999/2000
INet income I




This is amount ofdividends paid to share holders.
l Dividends oaid out I
1996/1997 I 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
I I 1
rAccumulated profit at the beginning of the period 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
This is the sum ofcapitalised net income from all previous periods.
I Paid-in capital at the beginning of the oeriod 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
This is the sum ofall amounts receivedfrom all shareholders that have ever bought shares in the entity from the entity.
r Capital account at the beginning ofperiod
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 I
l
This should be equal to the sum ofaccumulated profit at the beginning ofthe period + paid-in capital at the beginning ofthe period. Even if the
accumulatedprofit at the beginning ofthe period andpaid-in capital are not readily available, the capital account at the beginning ofthe period
should be known.
ICapital paid-in during the period
I 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
I
This represents the amount receivedfrom shareholders buying newly issued shares directly from the entity.
LCapital account at the end of the period 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
This should equal the amount ofequity shown on the balance sheetfor the end ofthe period.
6. Individual Loan Data
I
lNumber of loans outstanding at beginning of period




1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Number of loans outstanding at end of period
Amount of~rincipaloutstanding at beginning of period
Amount of principal outstanding at end of period
Provision for Bad Debt at beginning of period
Provision for Bad Debt at end of period
Number of loans disbursed in the period
Amount of principal disbursed in the period
Number of loans disbursed to first time borrowers in the period
7. Group Loan Data
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Number of group loans outstanding at beginning ofperiod
Number of group loans outstanding at end ofperiod
Number of loans disbursed to groups in the period
Number of loans disbursed to first time groups in the period
8. Deposit Account Data
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Number of deposit accounts active at beginning of the period
Number of deposit accounts active at end of the period
Number ofdeposit accounts opened during the period
Amount of deposit balances at beginning of the period
Amount of deposit balances at end of period
Amount deposited in the period
Amount withdrawn in the period
Number of deposit transactions in the period
Number of Demand deposits at beginning of the period




1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Number of Demand deposits opened during period
Amount of Demand deposit balances at beginning of the period
Amount of Demand deposit balances at end of period
Amount deposited in Demand deposits in the period
Amount withdrawn from Demand deposits in the period
Number of Time deposits at beginning of the period
Number of Time deposits at end of the period
Number of Time deposits opened in the period
Amount of Time deposit balances at beginning of the period
Amount of Time deposit balances at end of the period
Amount deposited in Time deposits in the period
Amount withdrawn from Time deposits in the period
9. Loan Recovery Rate Information
The loan collection rate can be defined in a number ofways. The data requirements for each type ofcollection rate will be listed below. Please
fill in the information for the method used by the Savings and Loans Division. Ifthis data is available monthly then complete the information on
a monthly basis with month1 and month 12 coinciding with the beginning and end of the financial year. (Please note: AMOUNT DUE and
AMOUNT RECEIVED INCLUDE PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST)
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total amounts falling due for the first time during the period (this
excludes overdue payments)
Of the loan amounts falling due for the first time during the period,
how much has been paid on time (excludes pre-payments)
Total loan amounts due during the period (including overdue
payments)
Total loan amounts received during the period (including current





1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
All amounts due at the end of the period since the inception of the
program (cumulative amounts due)
All payments received at the end of the period since the inception
of the program (cumulative amounts received)
If the recovery rates are recorded on a monthly basis then the following tables should be completed.
Total amounts falling due for the first time during the period (this excludes overdue payments)













Of the loan amounts falling due for the first time during the period, how much has been paid on time (excludes pre-payments)









Ofthe loan amounts falling due for the first time during the period, how much has been paid on time(excludes pre-payments)








Total loan amounts due during the period (including overdue payments)













Total loan amounts received during the period (including current payments, overdue payments and pre-payments)








Total loan amounts received during the period (including current payrr ents, overdue payments and pre-payments)









All amounts due at the end of the month since the inception of the program (cumulative amounts due)













All payments received at the end of the month since the inception of the program (cumulative amounts received)







All payments received at the end of the month since the inception of the program (cumulative amounts received)










10. Loan Arrears Rate Information
The computation ofan arrears rate depends on how the Savings and Loans Division defines the arrears rate. A standard definition ofarrears
will be provided below. If the Savings and Loans Division computes arrears differently, please provide an accurate definition in the space
provided. Following the definition, please fill in the relevant amounts in the spaces provided.
These figures indicate the amount ofpayments that the Savings and Loans Division should have received as ofthe date ofthe balance sheet
but had not, relative to the total loan portfolio outstanding. Thus, if the loan portfolio consisted ofone loan for R1000 and that loan had one
payment ofRl0 overdue as ofthe date ofthe balance sheet, the arrears would be 10/1000 = 1%. Ifthe organuisation does not age arrears,
please not that andprovide the unagedfigure.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Amount of principal and interest overdue by 1 - 30 days
Amount ofprincipal and interest overdue by 31 - 60 days
Amount of principal and interest overdue by 61 - 90 days




1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments 1 - 30
days late
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments 31 -
60 days late
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments 61 -
90 days late
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments 90+
days late
These figures indicate the amount of the portfolio signaled to be at risk of becoming bad debt because one or more of the payments are
overdue. For example, ifone RIO payment on a RIOOO loan is overdue, the entire RIOOO is at risk and the entire RIOOO should be included in
the arrears figure presented here. Ifthe Savings and Loans Division does not age arrears, please note that andprovide the unagedfigure.
If the above categorisation of arrears is different to that of the Savings and Loans Division, please indicate how the Savings and Loans Division
defines arrears and then supply the relevant data in the spaces provided below.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Amount of principal and interest overdue ........ days
Amount of principal and interest overdue by ........ days
Amount ofprincipal and interest overdue by ...... days
Amount of principal and interest overdue by ...... days
These figures indicate the amount ofpayments that the Savings and Loans Division should have received as ofthe date ofthe balance sheet




payment ofR10 overdue as ofthe date ofthe balance sheet, the arrears would be 1011000 = l%. Ifthe organuisation does not age arrears,
please not that andprovide the unagedfigure.
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments ......
days late
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments ... ,
days late
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments ...... ,
days late
Total outstanding balance for loans with payments
......days late
These figures indicate the amount of the portfolio signaled to be at risk of becoming bad debt because one or more of the payments are
overdue. For example, ifone R10 payment on a RIOOO loan is overdue, the entire R1000 is at risk and the entire RIOOO should be included in
the arrears figure presented here. Ifthe Savings and Loans Division does not age arrears, please note that and provide the unagedfigure.
11. Branch Structure
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total number of branches at beginning of the period
Total number of branches at end of period
Total number of satellite branches/ agencies at beginning of the period
Total number of satellite branches/ agencies at end of period
12. Staff Structure (If the Savings and Loans Division has a different staff structure then please use the blank rows to describe the structures
filling in the relevant staff numbers in the blank columns)
12.1 Savings Mobilisation Staff
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total number of senior managers at head office at beginning of period
Total number of senior managers at head office at end of period
.j::o..
\0....
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total number of managers at head office at beginning of period
Total number of managers at head office at end of period
Total number of administrative staff at head office at beginning of period
Total number of administrative staff at head office at end of~eriod
Total number of cleaning staff at head office at beginning of~eriod
Total number of cleaning staff at head office at end of period
Total number of branch managers at beginning of period
Total number of branch managers at end ofperiod
Total number of senior loan officers at beginning of period
Total number of senior loan officers at end of period
Total number of loan officers at beginning of period
Total number of loan officers at end of period
Total number of administrative staff at branches at beginning of period
Total number ofadministrative staff at branches at end of period
Total number of cleaning staff at branches at beginning of~eriod




1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Total number of senior managers at head office at beginning of period
Total number of senior managers at head office at end of period
Total number ofmanagers at head office at beginning of period
Total number ofmanagers at head office at end of period
Total number of administrative staff at head office at beginning of period
Total number of administrative staff at head office at end of period
Total number of cleaning staff at head office at beginning ofperiod
Total number of cleaning staff at head office at end ofperiod
Total number ofbranch managers at beginning of period
Total number of branch managers at end of period
Total number of senior loan officers at beginning ofperiod
Total number of senior loan officers at end of period
Total number of loan officers at b~nning of period
Total number of loan officers at end of period
Total number of administrative staff at branches at beginnin& of period
Total number of administrative staff at branches at end of~eriod
Total number of cleaning staff at branches at beginning of~eriod




1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000




APPENDIX B - Lender Questionnaire
MONITORING AND EVALUATION FORM FOR NON-GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENl FINANCE INSTITUfIONS
This questionnaire is aimed at assimilating information for the monitoring and evaluation component of the Commission ofInquiry into the Provision
Rural Financial Services. All information will be kept strictly confidential.
Address
NameofInstitution _
I. KEY INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
l.l Legal status oforganisation _ 1.2 Years branch has been in operation _
1.3 Date ofthe most recent balance sheet (DDIM.M!YY), _ 1.4 Date ofbalance sheet previous to the most recent balance sheet _
1.5 Overall size parameters oforganisation as the date ofthe most recent balance sheet:
DESCRIPTION RANDS DESCRIPTION RANDS
End of previous End of most End ofprevious reporting End of recent reporting
reporting period recent reporting period period
period
TOTAL ASSETS TOTAL LIABILITIES
Loan Assets (principal outstanding) Deposits from clients
Accounts receivable Borrowings from banks
Fixed Assets (at cost) Borrowings from other commercial sources
Accumulated depreciation Borrowings from government
Provision for bad debts Borrowings from donors
Cash on hand Accounts payable
Deposits in other institutions Other liabilities (please specifY)
Investments in private securities TOTAL EQUITY
Equity investments in other entities Accumulated earnings




1.6 Income and expenditure for the most recent accounting reporting period:
DESCRIPTION End ofmost recent DESCRIPTION End ofmost recent
reoortiOlZ oeriod reoorting oeriod
REVENUE EXPENSES
Interest revenue from loans received in cash Personnel expenses: Salary expense
Interest revenue from loans due but not yet received, i.e. accrued interest Fringe benefits expense
Fee revenue from loans received as cash Bonus expense
Fee revenue from loans due but not yet received Other personnel expense
Interest revenue on deposits in banks Purchase ofconsumables
Interest revenue from investments in securities Other administration expenses
Grants in cash Extraordinary expense
Grants in-kind consumed Depreciation expense
Grants in-kind that are not consumed Grants in-kind consumed
Extraordinary revenue Bad debt provision expense
Other revenue (please specify) Extraordinary write-offs
Interest expense on borrowing from commercial banks
Interest expense on borrowings from other commercial sources
Interest expense on borrowings from government
Interest expense on borrowings from donors






1.7 How is the level of provision for bad debts detennined? For example, is provision made for the entire amount ofthe ofprincipal outstanding on loans with some principal and interest payments more than 90 days overdue?
Is provisioning set at some fixed proportion for loans that are in arrears? Does the level of provisioning differ between secured and unsecured loans?
1.8 Staffcomposition
DESCRIPTION NUMBER
End ofprevious reporting period End of most recent reporting period













2.1 The following table refers to number ofclients :
CLIENT NUMBERS Previous reporting period Most recent reporting period
Total number ofclients at the end ofthe period ,
Total number ofboTrowers at end ofperiod
Total number ofsavers at the end ofperiod
2.2 What are the most common types ofclients that you have? (farmer, hawkers, micro-business)
2.3 What numbers ofthe rural (farm and non-farm) loans are:
FEMALE MALE





2.4 What numbers ofthe rural deposits (farm and non-farm) are:
FEMALE MALE
Individual deposits MALE AND FEMALE (MIXED)
Group deposits
2.5 Ifyou lend to groups, why is this and what criteria must borrowers wanting to establish a group meet? Explain
2.6 Ifyou lend to individuals and groups, or only individuals, why do you prefer this rather than lending just to groups?





3.1 List the loan products your organisation has to offer (ifonly a graduated loan scheme is offered, please list the loan graduations)
3.2 The following tables concern general aspects ofyour loan portfolio:
3.2.1 Total Portfolio
Total amount ofprincipal and interest due in the most recent reporting period
Total amount ofprincipal and interest received in the most recent reporting period
3.2.2 Loan disbursement figures for all loans
Number ofloans outstanding at the start of the period (beginning ofthe most recent reporting period)
Number ofloans outstanding at the end ofthe period (end ofthe most recent reporting period)
Amount of principal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number of loans disbursed during the period
Number ofloans disbursed to first time borrowers




3.2.3 Loan disbursement figures for all Agricultural Loans
Number ofagricultural loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number ofagricultural loans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount of principal outstanding at the start ofthe period
Amount of principal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number ofagricultural loans disbursed during the period
Number of agricultural loans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount of principal disbursed in the period
3.2.4 Loan disbursement figures for Seasonal Agricultural Loans
Number ofseasonal agricultural loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number of seasonal agricultural loans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount of principal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the end of the period
Number ofseasonal agricultural loans disbursed during the period
Number ofseasonal agricultural loans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount of principal disbursed in the period
3.2.5 Loan disbursement figures for Medium-Term Agricultural Loans
Number ofmedium-term agricultural loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number ofmedium term agricultural loans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount of principal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number ofloans disbursed in the period
Number of loans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount ofprincipal disbursed in the period
VI
o......
3.2.6 Loan disbursement figures for Agricultural Land Purchases
Number ofland purchase loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number ofland purchase loans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the start ofthe period
Amount of principal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number ofloans disbursed in the period
Number ofloans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount ofprincipal disbursed during the period
3.2.7 Loan disbursement figures for Non-Agricultural Land Purchases
Number ofland purchase loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number of land purchase loans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount of principal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number ofloans disbursed in the period
Number ofloans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount ofprincipal disbursed during the period
3.2.8 Loan disbursement figures for Loans to Women
Number of loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number ofloans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number of loans disbursed in the period
Number of loans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount ofprincipal disbursed during the period
VI
~
3.2.9 Loan disbursement figures for Loans to Groups
Number ofloans outstanding at the start of the period
Number of loans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number ofborrowers in groups at the start of the period
Number ofborrowers in groups at the end of the period
Amount.ofprincipal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number ofloans disbursed in the period
Number of loans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount of principal disbursed during the period
3.2.10 Loan disbursement figures for Housing Loans
Number of loans outstanding at the start of the period
Number ofloans outstanding at the end ofthe period
Amount ofprincipal outstanding at the start of the period
Amount of principal outstanding at the end ofthe period
Number of loans disbursed in the period
Number of loans disbursed to first time borrowers
Amount of principal disbursed during the period
VI
ow
3.3 The following tables refer to loan conditions and terms for loan products as listed in question 3.1 for the most recent reporting period:
LOAN PRODUCT LOAN CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BORROWERS FIRST TIME BORROWERS
Maximum loan value (Rand)
Minimum loan value (Rand)
Maximum loan term (months)
Minimum loan term (months)
Average monthly payment
Typical time taken to repay loan
DIRECT COSTS:
Most common interest rate charged (nominal)
Fee charges (as a % ofthe loan amount)
INDIRECT COSTS:
Obligatory deposit as a % ofloan size
Collateral as a % of loan amount
Typical number ofvisits by clients to lender's office




LOAN PRODUCT LOAN CONDmONS ESTABLISHED BORROWERS FIRST TIME BORROWERS
Maximum loan value (Rand)
Minimum loan value (Rand)
Maximum loan term (months)
Minimum loan term (months)
Average monthly payment
Typical time taken to repay loan
DIRECT COSTS:
Most common interest rate charged (nominal)
Fee charges (as a %ofthe loan amount)
INDIRECT COSTS:
Obligatory deposit as a % ofloan size
Collateral as a % ofloan amount
Typical number ofvisits by clients to lender's office





LOAN PRODUCT LOAN CONDmONS ESTABLISHED BORROWERS FIRST TIME BORROWERS
Maximum loan value (Rand)
Minimum loan value (Rand)
Maximum loan tenn (months)
Minimum loan tenn (months)
Average monthly payment
Typical time taken to repay loan
DIRECT COSTS:
Most common interest rate charged (nominal)
Fee charges (as a % ofthe loan amount)
INDIRECT COSTS:
Obligatory deposit as a % ofloan size
Collateral as a % ofloan amount
Typical number ofvisits by clients to lender's office





LOAN PRODUCT LOAN CONDmONS ESTABLISHED BORROWERS FIRST TIME BORROWERS
Maximum loan value (Rand)
Minimum loan value (Rand)
Maximum loan tenn (months)
Minimum loan tenn (months)
Average monthly payment
Typical time taken to repay loan
DIRECT COSTS:
Most common interest rate charged (nominal)
Fee charges (as a % ofthe loan amount)
INDIRECT COSTS:
Obligatory deposit as a % ofloan size
Collateral as a % ofloan amount
Typical number ofvisits by clients to lender's office




3.4 Where does the client apply for a loan? Does the loan officer visit the client, does the client come to the main office? Explain
3.5 Where is the loan processed and approved?
3.6 To what degree is the responsibility ofloan approval assigned to the local branch manager or loan officer? Is there a loan limit from where it has to be passed to a higher authority ?




3.8 Select the type(s) ofcollateral / collateral substitutes by loan product and difficulties in securing these (fill in the numbers corresponding to the appropriate statement, listed below the table, in the appropriate column.
Should you have any difficulties in using the specified type ofcollateral in the event of foreclosure or for any other reason, please state what these difficulties are.)
LOAN PRODUCT COLLATERAL / SUBSTII1JTES Most common problem you encounter
First time borrowers Established borrowers











Key to filling in above table:
I =Saleable product quota; 2 = Saleable crops and livestock; 3 = Accounts receivable; 4 = Term deposits and savings; 5 = Salary stop orders; 6 = Personal, physical and financial assets - 6.1 = Jewellery, 6.2 = Insurance policies,
6.3 = Shares, 6.4 = House; 7 = Third Party Guarantor -7.1 = Relative, 7.2 = Business partner, 7.3 = Government guarantee, 7.4 = group guarantee; 8 = Credit track record; 9 = Long term business or family relationship;
10 = Threat of loss of future loans; 11 = Permission to occupy certificates; 12 =Land mortgage bonds; 13 =Provident fund; 14 = Employer guarantee; 15 = Crop cession; 16 = Character reference by village chiefor




3.9 Does your institution apply a standard and rigid structure for loan repayments or are the repayment terms flexible in terms ofamount repaid, duration of repayments etc. Is the repayment structure client or loan specific?
Explain
3.10 Does a borrower qualify for a higher loan amount if the previous loan is repaid on time?
3.11 Is there a maximum loan size which eventually forces successful clients to seek loans elsewhere? Explain
3.12 Ifyou lend to groups, are people in the groups allowed to borrow different amounts? Explain
3.13 Other Services offered either by the branch or institution (please tick (J'> the appropriate box(es»:





Mobile banking services Vl-o
3.14 Do you charge individuals a partial or complete fee for any ofthe services offered in 3.13 ? Explain
4. LOAN COLLECTION AND ARREARS









4.2 Penalties for non-repayment ofloans or incentives to encourage loan repayment
























4.3 What criteria does the institution use, by loan product type, to define when a loan is in arrears ?
LOAN PRODUCTS
4.4 Loan portfolio repayment status (amount ofprincipal and interest overdue)
DEFINITION OF ARREARS
AMOUNT OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST OVERDUE NUMBER OF LOANS VOLUME (RANDS)
BY:




61 - 90 Days
+ 90 Days
VI-w
4.5 Loan portfolio repayment status (amount ofprincipal outstanding for loans with some principal and interest overdue)
AMOUNT OF PRINCIPAL OUTSTANDING FOR LOANS WITH SOME NUMBER OF LOANS VOLUME (RANDS)
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST OVERDUE BY:






4.6 What portion ofthe amount ofthe loan portfolio outstanding represents loans that have been rescheduled? In general, a rescheduled loan may be defined as a loan for which the borrower missed one or more
repayments but is not currently considered to be in arrears even though the borrower has yet to catch up on hislher repayments.
4.7 What criteria does the institution use to determine when a loan in arrears will be written off?
Vl.....
.j::>.
4.8 Loans written offduring the past two lending periods
Loan product Number ofloans written off Amount written off(Rands)
5. FUND DEPOSITS - VALUES AND TRENDS
5.1 Deposit portfolio at end of last two accounting periods
'eriod End ofmost recent reDorting Deriod End of 'eriod End of most recent reDorting Deriod
TYPE Number ofactive deposits Total value
(Rands)













5.2 Characteristics ofdeposits for the most recent reporting period:
TYPE Range in size ofdeposits Most Common Amount deposited Amount withdrawn Number of deposit















5.3 Please list any fees charged and rules which apply to savings instruments:




SAVINGS DEPOSITS (no notice







6. CLIENT INFORMAnON SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES/sCORlNG MODELS
6.1 Are there any loans for which no physical/tangible collateral is required? Explain
6.2 Does your institution employ a systematic loan tracing / monitoring system on a weekly or monthly basis for a selected clientele?
6.3 Does the institution use separate formal credit scoring techniques to analyse borrower financial data for any ofthe loan types ? Identify which loan type(s) and briefly explain the technique
VI--...,J
6.4 What three elements are weighted most heavily in your credit scoring for the loan types indicated in the table below?
LOAN PRODUCTS THREE ELEMENTS WEIGHTED MOST HEAVILY
Key to element codes:
I = Character; 2 = Education, skills and/or training; 3 = Credit history; 4 = Collateral--property; 5 = Collateral--moveable assets; 6 = Repayment capacity; 7 = Profitability; 8 = Tenure status; 9 = Part-time/Full-time farmer
status; 10 = Steady job; 11 = Pensions; 12 = Other non-farm income.
VI.....
00
6.5 How does the institution verify credit worthiness data in Table 6.4 ? (please place a tick (J) next to the relevant statement(s»
Reliable, credible references
Shared info with other creditors / credit institutions
Relevant documents, deeds etc. brought to branch by client
Credit-rating agencies
Statfvisits to potential clients
Shared information with loan guarantors
Other _
7. INSTITUTION OPERATIONAL pmLOSOPHY, PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION/CONTROL SYSTEMS
7.1 What are your client target market(s) ?
7.2 Does the institution have a specific mission statement? _




7.4.1 How is the branch manager evaluated / promoted within the organisation (If there are multiple criteria, how are they weighted)? Explain.
7.4.2 Are there any branch manager performance incentive schemes? Ifyes, please state and explain the criteria used.
7.5.1 What criteria does the branch manager use to evaluate his principal loan officers ?
7.5.2 Are there any explicit bonus schemes to reward principal loan officers? Ifyes, please state and explain the criteria used.
7.6 Are there any loan and deposit staffperformance incentive schemes? Explain.
VI
IVo
7.7 Define the composition ofthe Board of Directors and briefly specify their backgrounds (speciality, profession, qualifications, experience etc.)
8. FUTURE FINANCIAL INNOVATION FOR RURAL CLIENTELE
8.1 What major factors (e.g. legal, information, cultural, infrastructure etc.) does this institution perceive as constraints to the provision of financial services to rural clients (by client type if possible) ? Explain
8.2 What are the major financial service needs by type of rural clientele (e.g. emergent farmers, former homeland rural households and micro-small and medium sized enterprises) that this institution perceives lenders
most need to address in the next five years? Explain
8.3 Which ofthese financial service needs does this institution have the capability to address in the next five years (e.g. savings mobilisation etc.)? How would this be done (i.e. what legal, information,
infrastructure, education etc. constraints can this institution overcome or expects can be overcome) ?




Guidelines to Loan Data Requirements of the Score Card Development for MF01
1. Introduction
This document describes in detail the data requirements for the development and validation of
MFO1' s scoring model. This document is to be used in conjunction with the electronic data
sheet where the data will be recorded. A hard copy of the data sheet is provided in chapter
two. The column names of the variables outlined in the Tables coincide with the column
headings in the data sheet. It is recommended that the recording method of each variable is
studied rigorously to avoid inconsistencies in the data as some ofthe data only applies to loans
from MFOl while some of the data is to be captured for all loans (this includes those loans
which rejected MFO1 clients have obtained at other lenders). In addition, some of the data
may be downloadable from the MFO1 data base while some data may have to be obtained
from the loan application forms, MFO1 transaction view reports and the ITC client query
reports. In all instances the recording method will clearly state where the data for the variable
is obtained. Manual input of some data on loan histories and loans that MFO1 applicants have
with other lenders may be beneficial and is deemed important in determining scoring variables
concerned with the credit worthiness of the loan applicant and to verify the information on
which the Empirica score is based. The following section briefly outlines the objectives of the
study. This is followed by a definition of the inclusion and exclusion criteria of the sampling
units, definitions of terminology and finally a detailed outline of the data to be captured in the
electronic data sheet.
2. Objectives tbe Analysis
The objective of capturing the data are as follows:
1. To determine the factors influencing the credit granting decision ofMF01.
2. To determine factors influencing loan default amongst MFOl clients.
3. To determine the effectiveness of the current in-house scoring system used by MFOl to
potentially improve the scoring system.
3. Applicant Account Selection Criteria
This section refers to the sampling criteria for MFO1 loans. The sample population consists of
all loans applied for from 1 January 1999 to 20 November 1999. The sampling units are the
individual loan applications ofMFO1 and accepted loans of rejected MFO1 applicants at other
lenders after the date ofrejection at MFO1.
3.1 Inclusions
1. ALL FIRST TIME LOAN APPLICATIONS (both accepted and rejected) at MFOl for the
period 1 January 1999 to 20 November 1999 (this time period will be known as the
window period). Clients with a pending, waiting and closed status on their accounts will
considered provided they had been accepted on first-time application in the window period.
2. For REJECTED MFO1 loan applicants, all loans from other lenders which became active
after the date of rejection at MFO1 will be included. This includes instalment accounts
which were ~ppli~ for and opened or opened after the date of rejection but before 30 May
1999. It applies to Instalment accounts which were applied for and opened prior to the date
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of rejection but which only became active after the date of rejection. It also applies to
revolving accounts which were applied for and opened after the date of rejection but prior
to 30 May 1999, and to revolving accounts which may have been opened prior to the date
of rejection but which became active after the date of rejection but before 30 May 1999. To
establish whether loans from other lenders meet these criteria it is necessary to identify all
loans which became active in month after the MFO1 applicant was rejected.
3.2 Exclusions
1. All MFOl applications prior to 1 January 1999 and after 20 November 1999.
2. For rejected MFOl applicants, all loans from other lenders which had active payment
profiles at the date of loan rejection at MFO1. All loans from other lenders with completed
loan maturities prior to the date ofrejection from MFO1.
3. For accepted MFOl applicants, loans from other lenders.
4 Definitions
The tables identifying the variables and outlining the recording method will have four
headings. These are variable name, variable description, column name and recording method.
Please read items carefully before entering data into the data sheet. Where the recording
method specifies a system entry, DO NOT record anything in the block for that particular








Refers to the loan which is entered as an observation on an
individual row in the data sheet.
Identifies the variable to be measured.
Refers to the name of the column in the data sheet.
Refers to the recording of the borrowers monthly repayment on
the ITC client enquiry report.
Refers to the documented number of enquiries an individual
made at various lenders on the ITC client enquiry report.
Refers the timeliness of the borrowers loan repayment
Refers to the loan applicants loan account or loan.
5. Data Recording Method
The columns will each have a name. Where applicable enter the data in the correct block for
that column.
Each account which is included under the inclusion criteria in section 3 is entered on a
separate row in the data sheet. However all loans for a particular MFO1 client must be
retained under one account number. This also applies for loans from other lenders which are
recorded for rejected MFO1 applicants. Table 1 provides an example (note: the codes for
Table 1 are found in section 6).







Loan Identification Accept or Reject
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100704576 45879 1 1 1
56790 1 1 1
100689273 1 2 2
2 2 1 (note this
individual was
rejected by MFO1)
100367099 78905 1 3 1
6. Account and Loan Identification Data
This section records the variables which will be used to identify accounts and loans for sorting
purposes in the data sheet.











MFO1 account number ofclient
Account number
1. This may be a system entry but can also be obtained from the
MFO1 transaction view report.
2. Record the account number of the sample client for each of the
accepted and rejected loans in the sample.
Loan number
This variable records the MFO1 loan number. This is not applicable
to rejected applicants and sample loans from other lenders.
Loannumb~
1. May be a system entry but can be obtained from the transaction
view report.
2. Record the loan number for all loans disbursed by MFO1. Where
the loan number is not applicable leave the block blank.
Variable Name Lender identification
Variable Description Records whether the loan is from MFO1 or another lender.
iCQj~lfill;;~~;! \J~ ....> ....•••
Recording Method Enter 1 if sample loan is from MFO1.




This variable records a code that links all loans granted to a particular
sample client.
·C·•.•.•..// ·;···.Ni~~~;···· .'y\ .> .••..\.; > "L.. . '.../ > •.
o~~9.>.~...>/ .......' / •....• ..•....• •..•....•..
Recording Method 1. Each sample loan, whether accepted or rejected, will be assigned a
code linking it to a particular client. This code starts from o. Thus
all applications (both accepted and rejected) from MFO1 and other
lenders belonging to the same individual will be assigned the same
code. For example, the first individual has three loans from MFO1
and 2 other loans which are classified as sampling units. All will be
assigned the code O.
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Variable Name Accept or Reject
Variable Description This variable indicates the loan status.
Col~mn NaJi!~:> <'ACcept~r;R~Ject .... .'
Recording Method Enter the following codes to describe the variable:
1 if loan application was accepted.
2 ifloan application was rejected.
3 ifloan application was cancelled.
4 ifthe loan application is pending.
5 if the loan application is waiting.
(Just insert a number which applies in the column)
7. Loan Description Variables
This section records the information of the loan characteristics
Table 3 Loan Cbaracteristics
Variable Name Date application
Variable Description This records the date when the loan application was made.
.. C,ol~,t.iliN ~ifi! ..... .,H~; Pat~of~#quitjr .... . .~ ...... t ';.
~'
Recording Method 1. MFOI - For MFOI loans refer to the enquiries section of the ITC
client query report or from the application form. Identify the
sample loans and record the dates that the loan enquiry was made.
For repeat loans no enquiry may be lodged in which case the date
of enquiry is the same as the date on which the loan was paid out.
2. Sample loans from OTHER LENDERS - refer to the enqumes
section of the ITC client query report. For the sample loan under
consideration identify and record the date on which the enqUIry
was made. If no enquiry date is given, leave this block blank.
Variable Name Date ofloan disbursement
Variable Description For loans which were accepted, this records the date on which the
loans were paid out. For rejected applicants, this records the date the
loan was rejected (Date of rejection IS only applicable to MFOl
clients).
Coltimn NaIlM .. ;" ·.Dtit~:()flq~di$~tir~SeII!~t .. .....-. _ .""_~_ 0:; - -" ,.~ ~ ._0"_ --- -. ,_.' ..' .", .. ,
Recording Method 1. MFOl - the date of loan disbursement is the date when the loan
was actually paid out. This information IS obtained from the
MFO1 transaction view report.
2. Loans from OTHER LENDERS - the date ofloan disbursement is
the date when the account was opened. This information IS
available from the payment profiles of the ITC client query report.
Variable Name Date offirst instalment
Variable Description Records the date on which the first instalment is due.
C""fi' '···'·'N ·',·f7c',.''''' ',' ". 'l,/·i,,".'.··,··,·.·..·••'•••.••.•&,:'tt,·, ,·.r.;,,/.,,'C. ,................. ', ',. .','OUIDD:.alD' ".; .. '.'
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Recording Method 1. For MF01 enter the date that the first instalment of the sample
loan is due. This information is available from the transaction view
report (could also be a system entry). The format should be
dd/mm/yy.
2. For sample loans from other lenders, enter the due date of the first
instalment as the first day of which ever month the loan
repayments start on the payment profile (It is assumed here that
instalments are due on the first day of every month although this
may not be the case).
Variable Name Loan principal amount
Variable Description Records the loan amount before finance charges (interest) that is paid
out to the sample loan applicants if the loan is approved. For rejected
MF01 sample applicants this variable records the loan amount
requested. For loans from other lender, for rejected applicants, this
records the principal loan amount paid out.
ColunlllNaDie. ". \llOanpWtcipaliai~i~u~~,
'. ~ .. '.'
. .... .
. - -_. - ~
Recording Method 1. From the transaction view report for MFO1 clients record the loan
amount paid out.
2. From the enquiry from record the loan amount requested by
rejected MF01 applicants.
3. For sample loans from other lenders enter the loan principal
amount which IS recorded as the opening balance III payment
profile section of the ITC report.
Variable Name Interest charges
Variable Description Records the interest charges on the loan. Interest charged IS not
available for sample loans from other lenders. This variable is also not
applicable to rejected loan apolicants.
Column Nime; Interestcha,rges
• - ".,": ',,,§.,~:. .', .'
Recording Method 1. From the MF01 transaction VIew report record the amount of
interest raised for all accepted sample loans from MFO1.
Variable Name Total principal and interest
Variable Description Is a summation of the principal and interest due on the MFO1 loan.
Coluin""·~~,i~< '... To(al:pfiricipata.n~ .interest
Recording Method System entry
Variable Name Club fee
Variable Description Records the additional club fee charges (if any) that are paid by
MFOl borrowers. This is not applicable to sample loans from other
lenders and is also not aoplicable to rejected applicants.
ColulIlltNam'e CluQlee ....... ..... ·········S . .
,·!.C~·'l::":··'-·- .;, -- ' .. '. ..•. ... ;;; . ......
Recording Method 1. The information is available from the transaction view report.
2. Record the total club fee charges for the sample loan.
Variable Name Totalloan amount due
Variable Description Records the total amount payable to MFO1 by the sample applicant.
This only applies to approved MFO1 loans
ColumnNifue·/\··): Tota.l-l()arl ., ,,' .. -....., ".". .'
Recording Method System entry
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Variable Name Loan term
Variable Description Enter the repayment term, i.e. how many months the sample applicant




Recording Method 1. For MFOI sample loans the number of months the borrower has
to repay the loan can be obtained from the transaction view report.
It may also be available on the data base. Enter the loan term as
the number of months the borrower has to repay the loan. For
example, if the borrower has 4 months to repay the loan, then
record 4 months.
2. For sample loans from other lenders the loan term is obtained from
the payment profile information of the ITC report under the
heading 'terms'. Record the number that is specified in the 'terms'
field. Where this information is not given, the data field should be
left blank.
Variable Name Monthly instalments due for MFO1 loans
Variable Description This variable records the monthly instalments due for MFOI loans
only. Each instalment is due on the first day of a calendar month. No
penalty interest IS charged for instalments paid on any day from the




Recording Method System calculation
Variable Name Monthly instalments of loans from other lenders
Variable Description Records the monthly instalments payable by rejected applicants on
loans obtained from other lenders after the date of rejection. Not
aoolicable to rejected MFO1 loan.
Column Na,QJe M()h~hlfiDstaIri:ienfofothetJ()aIi .. '.'
Recording Method 1. Enter the monthly instalment amount which IS obtained from the
payment profile ofthe ITC client query report.
Variable Name Monthly loan instalment
Variable Description Records the monthly instalment of the sample loans
.·.···~()I....~ ••~am~·,;,e;·.· i.MontH1~I()~'iAst8Iment·\. .'
..'
:Rrecording Method System calculation
Variable Name Loan type
Variable Description This column identifies whether it IS an instalment or revolving type
loan. Not apolicable to rejected applicants.
c'olum!'~aJi~',<'; <~:F ,l:.9an~.~it/\i:;Z\C< '; ,\,tt., .::".J
Recording Method Enter 1 ifthe loan is an instalment type loan.
Enter 2 if the loan is a revolving type loan.
Variable Name Lender type
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Variable description Records the lender type from which the loan was taken. There are
several lender types and this will be divided into the broad categories
of furniture, building, clothing, retail, banking, MFO1, Other Micro-
lenders, Jewellers, Other (if additional categories need to be specified
then the necessary columns should be added and labelled
appropriately). A classification of the different retailers given below.
Not applicable to rejected loan applicants.
The grouping of the lenders is as follows (please note that some ofthese lenders may belong
to a holding company. Hence the enquiry may be listed under the holding company while the
payment profile may be listed under one of the holding company's subsidiaries. A list of the
group structures will accompany this document - see Appendix A). The abbreviations of the
lender types indicated in )arentheses will be used in the data sheet:
Furniture (FUR) OK Bazars, Geen and Richards, Savells, Tiptop furniture's, Bears,
Joshua Doore
Clotbing (CL) Woolworths, Edgars, Foshini's, Milady's, Bee Gees, Smart Center
Building (BU)
Retail (RE) HUB, Game
Banking (BK) Merchantile Bank, ABSA, Standard Bank, Wesbank, Stannic,
Bankfin
MFOl (MFOl) MFOl
Micro-lenders (MI) Consumer credit corporation
Consumber Credit Consumber credit corporation
Corporation (CC)
Jewellers Galaxy, Sterns
Otber lender types Provides a column for an additional lender category not mentioned.
(Otbl) Please name the column appropriately and specify the new lender
type)
This list is not conclusive.
Column Nalrie . .. >Len.dertype
Recording Method This variable is a coded variable with the codes being as follows:
Enter 1 if the sample loan is from MFO1 loan
Enter 2 if the sample loan is a furniture loan
Enter 3 ifthe sample loan is a building loan
Enter 4 if the sample loan is a clothing loan
Enter 5 if the sample loan is a general retail loan
Enter 6 if the sample loan is a banking loan
Enter 7 if the sample loan is from other micro-lenders
Enter 8 if the sample loan is from jewellers
Enter 9 if (for additional category add column and specify)
Enter 10 if(for additional cate~orv add column and specify)
Variable Name First time application or repeat loan
Variable Description Records whether the sample loan application IS a first time
application at the respective lender or whether the account has
already been established/opened
Column Name First time application or repeat loan
Recording Method Enter 1 for a first time application.
Enter 2 for a re eat loan/established account.
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8. Loan Repayment Performance Measures
Table 4 describes the variables used to determine loan repayment performance. Please note
that some of this data will only be available for MFO1 clients who have a loan (This will be
clearly indicated in the variable description column). Where MF01 clients have loans with
other lenders or where one is dealing with rejected or pending applicants some of this
information required for this section is not applicable and hence the entries should be left
BLANK. Please take note that the cur-off period (i.e. the time period at which the repayment
status of all loans will be assessed) is 30 May 1999. The method of assessing loan repayment
status will be as follows: The repayment status ofall loans applied for and disbursed during the
window period will be assessed as at this cut-off date.
This section records data on repayment performance.
Table 4 Loan Repayment Performance
Variable Name Number of instalments actually made
Variable Description This variable records the number of instalments the borrower actually
made to repay the loan. Not applicable to loans from other lenders
and rejected loan applicants.
Column Name 'c,." :Nulllberof mstBJnients·aCtually made
,-
Recording Method 1. For MF01 record the number of instalments actually made by the
borrower to repay the loan. Where the loan was refinanced by
DLP only count the instalments paid by the borrower. Do not
count the DLP instalment.
Variable Name Total amount paid at due date of each month (MONlNl...MONlN8)
(MONIA1 ....MONIA8).
Variable Description This variable records the monthly instalments actually paid by MFO1
sample clients only.
.Column Name , . M()nthlYmstaln1entsp~d l;>yMFOI clients ,-o __ , _ .,_. _ ••_.
Recording Method 1. The MFO1 data base will compute the total amounts paid by the
sample client at two different cut-off dates. This first will be set to
the financial month end which is the 20 ofeach month. The second
will be set to the calendar month. Thus all payments made by the
sample applicant as at the end of each financial month and
calendar month will be recorded. This information will be used in
an age analysis of the loan repayments to compute a payment
profile of sample client and then classify the client in the various
repayment categories.
2. TOINS1 (total instalments pd 1) and TOINS2 (total instalments
pd 2) will record the total amount the borrower repaid for each of
the monthly instalment computations.
Variable Name Total loan repaid for instalments payable by 20th
Variable Description Records the total amount of the loan repaid by the client for








Total loan repaid for instalments payable by 30th
Records the total amount of the loan repaid by the client for
instalments payable by the 30 ofeach month
Column Na '. . Total loan repaid for instalments payable by 30th
Recording Method System calculation
Variable Name Date loan was paid up
Variable Description Records the date when the loan was completely paid-up.
GOIUDl~~~~<J?~:A<.~' ''C'i ....i\ > .•..
Recording Method 1. For approved MFOl loans enter the date on which the loan was
finally paid up in the format dd/mm/yy. If the loan was not paid-up
by the cut-off date enter the cut-off date of 30 May 1999 as the
date when the loan was paid-up. If the loan has been classified as










Date loan was handed over to bad debt
Records the date on which MFO I classified the loan as bad debt.
Date loan was,handed over to bad debt
1. If in the transaction view report, the loan was classified as bad,
then record the date at which this was done in the format
dd/mm/yy.
Aunountrefinanced
Records the DLP instalment amount paid by MFO1 to clear the
borrower's current loan outstanding. This variable is only applicable
to sample clients from MFO1 who have loans.
AunQunt refinanced
1. Enter the Rand amount of the instalment denoted "payment
received DLP". This applies to every sample loan refinanced by
DLP. If the loan was not refinanced by DLP, then record a 0 in the
space provided.
2. For loans where this is not applicable leave the data block blank.
Variable Name Early settlement discount
Column Name .', '
Recording Method
Variable Name
., ..../ .... .. ....
1. Record the Rand amount of the early settlement discount received
as indicated in the MFO1 transaction view report.
Interest on overdue account
Only applicable to MFO 1 clients. Records the total amount of interest
paid on overdue instalments.
Variable Description
Column Nafue .' Interest on Overdue'. ...
Recording Method
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I. Interest on overdue is obtained from the transaction view report.
For each sample MFOI loan record the total interest paid on
overdue instalments.
Variable Name Net interest payable
Variable Description Records the net interest payable on the loan
.
Recording Method System calculation
Variable Name Total loan amount due adjusted for interest
Variable Description The total loan amount due for MFOI clients adjusted for interest.
Recording Method System calculation
Variable Name Repayment ratio
Variable Description Records the loan repayment ratio for the MFO1 client
Recording Method System calculation
Variable Name Interest overdue ratio
Variable Description Ratio of interest on overdue to total interest due
Recording Method System calculation
Variable Name Loan repayment status for MFOl clients
Variable Description This variable will record the loan repayment status of all MFO1 loans
only as at the financial month end ofMFOl
Column.Name L()an. repayment status






Each repayment category will occupy a column. In each column
record the following:
1. Enter 1 under CURRENT if all instalments of the sample loan
were repaid within 20 days of the due date. Enter 0 for the rest,
except if the loan was refinanced or rescheduled. If the loan was
refinanced by DLP then enter 1 under DLP. If the loan was
rescheduled enter 1 under rescheduled.
2. Enter 1 under ARREARS if, for loans with completed maturity,
any instalment was paid within 21 and 65 days after its due date.
Enter 0 in the other columns except where the loan was refinanced
by DLP or rescheduled. Enter 1 under refinanced if a DLP. If the
loan was rescheduled enter 1 under rescheduled.
3. Enter 1 under DEFAULT if for loans with completed maturity any
instalment was repaid after 65 days of its due date. Enter 0 in the
other columns except where the loan was refinanced by DLP or
rescheduled. Enter 1 under refinanced if a DLP. If the loan was
rescheduled enter 1 under rescheduled.
4. Enter 1 under BAD if no instalments had been paid on the loan or
if it has been written off as bad by MFO1. Enter 0 under all the
other columns.
5. The data entry for this section may be automated and no manual
entry may be necessary except for the cases where the loan was
refinanced by DLP or rescheduled.
Loan repayment status ofall sample loans (MFO1 and Other lenders)
Records repayment status of all loans (both MFO1 and sample loans
from other lenders). Loan repayment information will also be
obtained in this section on the loans which rejected MFO1 clients
subsequently took with other lenders. The repayment categories are
grouped into not due, current, arrears, default and bad. Refinanced
and rescheduled loans are ignored since this information is not
available for loans with other lenders. Some loans from other lenders
may not have reached loan maturity. The repayment status will be
taken up the cut-off date of30 June 1999. This will result in an upper
bound on the repayment status being set (i.e. the loan repayment
status can only get worse with this information not being available to
for the analysis).
.Loanrepayment status.ofall samplelOanS
Not due Current Arrears Default .Bad
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Recording Method The repayment information for loans with other lenders is obtained
from the payment profile on the ITC client query report. For MF01
loans the entry into this section will be a system entry.
1. Enter 1 under not due if the loan repayments on other loans were
not due as at 30 May 1999 and o in the other repayment
categories.
2. Enter 1 under CURRENT for all loans with a 0 or 1 in their
payment profiles and 0 in the other repayment categories.
3. Enter 1 under ARREARS for all loans with at least a 2 but not
higher in the payment profile and 0 in the other repayment
categories.
4. Enter 1 under BAD for all loans with at least a 3 in the payment
profile but not higher and 0 in the other repayment categories.
5. Enter 1 under DEFAULT for all loans with 4 or higher in the
payment profile and 0 in the other repayment categories.
Variable Name Method ofpayment
Variable Description Applies to MFO1 clients only and records the method in which loans
are repaid at MFO1. On the current system they are either recorded
as cash or other.
Column Nall1~ > Method ofpaynient . ..
Recording Method The information can be obtained from the MF01 transaction view
report.
Enter 1 if cash.
Enter 2 if other method of payment was used (even if the borrower
only used other methods for part of the loan repayments).
Variable Name Previous loan ofMF01 refinanced
Variable Description Records whether the preVIOUS MF01 loan of the client was
refinanced
Column·Na:lli~ .... Pr~vious10atlfrQm MFOlrefinanced?
Recording Method Enter 1 if the previous loan from MFO1 was not refinanced
Enter 2 if the previous loan from MFO1 was refinanced
9 Borrower Personal Characteristics
This section deals with the personal characteristics of the borrower with the column names and
descriptions being outlined in Table 4. The variables in this section should be available for both
accepted and rejected applicants.
Table 4 Borrower Personal Characteristics
Description
Variable Name Gender of sample client
Variable Description Records gender ofsample client
ColumnJ),#cilptioD 'Gehdet<>fsample;appii&ilif·..·.•·
Recording Method Enter 1 if sample client is male
Enter 2 if sample client is female
534
Variable Name Date ofbirth of client
Variable Description Records the date ofbirth of the client
Recording Method Enter the date ofbirth of the client in the fonnat dd/mm/yy
Variable Name Race ofapplicant
Variable Description Records the race of the sample applicants
Recording Method Enter 1 in the column ifthe applicant is Black
Enter 2 in the column if the applicant is Indian/Coloured
Enter 3 in the column if the applicant is White
Variable Name Language preference of sample client
Variable description Records the language preference of the sample clients
Col~II1JfN . ..•.•.. ... ·Lcinguclg~!pre[et;~q~~()~~lea.ppllcaQt·~,\" "•., i .' .
Recording Method Enter 1 if language preference is zulu
Enter 2 if language preference is English
Enter 3 if language preference is other (specify the language)










Records the martial status of loan applicant at the time of
application
.
Enter 1 if sample applicant was married
Enter 2 if sample applicant was single
Enter 3 if sample applicant was divorced
Enter 4 if sample applicant was widowed
Enter 5 of other (specify the marital status)
Exact location of residence
Records whether the loan applicant has provided an exact location
of the residence in the physical address. An exact location is
defined as a home unit number or a street address.
Enter 1 if the sample loan applicant has provided a unit number,
street number or employers physical address if he/she lives on the
employer's property.
Enter 2 if the sample loan applicant has stated that he/she lives
near to a particular place or has only given a Post Office box
address.
Enter 3 ifno address particulars are provided by sample applicant.
Home address of sample applicant
Records first line of the sample loan applicant's address such as
street name, unit number, place where residence is near to.
Recording Method Enter first line of the sample applicant's address specifying the

























Area/suburb where the sample loan applicant lives
Records Area/ Suburb where the sample loan applicant lives
Aref!/suburb where sample'applicant lives
Enter the section/suburb where the loan applicant lives (e.g.
Scottsville, Plessislaer, Willowton, KwaMashu, Azalea Location,
Pietermaritzburg Central). For small towns where there are no
suburbs enter the town name (e.g. Wartburg, New Hanover).
Town where applicant lives
Records Town / District where the loan applicant lives
~. . .' ....., .
...~....,.....,.'
Enter the town or district where the loan applicant's residence is
situated (e.g. Edendale, Pietermaritzburg, New Hanover, Cato
Ridge).
Length of residence at current address
Records the length of time that the applicant has been living at
his/her curr.ntlace ofresidence..... ·T....,· ; .
'< •..••••...• .•
Enter the number ofyears the applicant has lived at his/her current
residence.
Length ofresidence at previous address
Records the length of time the applicant has been living at his/her
previous place of residence.
•••~l1gth.()ff~§\~~n~atpr~Vi()\.l$a4dre$s ..
Enter the number of years the applicant has lived at his/her
previous residence/address.
Ownership status of residence
Records the home ownership status of the loan applicant.
.' Ownership' statU~,of residence .
Enter I if sample client owns the residence
Enter 2 if sample client lives on employer's property.
Enter 3 if sample client lives with parents.
Enter 4 if sample client rents the premises.
Enter 5 if sample client lives in location (MFO I do not distinguish
between a hostel and a location. It is thus imperative that the
address of the applicant is carefully noted to be able to classify this
category).
Enter 6 ifsample client lives in hostel.
Monthly rental payments
Records the monthly rental payments if the applicant rents his/her
residential premises.
~'... :.... ~ .. . .
Monthly bond repayments
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Variable description Records the monthly bond repayments if the applicant owns a
house and has a monthly bond repayment
Column Name Monthlyborid repa,yments
Recording Method Enter the monthly bond repayment in Rands if the applicant owns
a house and has a monthly bond repayment, otherwise enter a O.
Variable Name Does the applicant have a home telephone
Variable description Records whether the loan applicant has a home telephone
Columd·Naffi~'-/ - Hpme t~lephone
." -.,:~.:., .---'c'" ';
Recording Method Enter 1 if the applicant has provided a home telephone number.
Enter 2 if the applicant has NOT provided a home telephone
number.
Variable Name Does the applicant have a contact telephone number
Variable description Records whether the loan applicant has a contact telephone
number
ColulDnN=tm~, __ Conta:ct,nurnber - -.-
Recording Method Enter 1 if the loan applicant has provided a contact telephone
number.
Enter 0 if the loan applicant has not provided a contact telephone
number.
Variable Name Post destination
Variable description Records where the applicant has specified that the post is sent to
ColumnN~ij[~- Post destination
Recording Method Enter 1 if the post is sent to the residential/physical address.
Enter 2 if post is sent personal PO Box address.
Enter 3 ifpost is sent to the "care of' (c/o) another individual.
Enter 4 ifpost is sent to the applicant's employer.
Enter 5 (for additional options add columns and specify).
10. Employment Details ofApplicant
The employment details of the individual are captured by the variables outline in Table 5
below. Again take note that several variables are coded.






Records whether the client has provided the employment details
upon application with MFO1 or not.
EIllPloYtn_-.--ent-a~lai~_0fscln1Ple'__,apP_1ican_.---••-- _·-l
• . - .-- _ -':.- ,", J"-. , ....
Enter 1 if the applicant has provided details of employment on the
application form.
























Records the whether the loan applicant was employed full-time or
part-time or on contract at the current employer.
Employment statUs.Qfsample.applicant
Enter I if the loan applicant is employed part time.
Enter 2 if the loan applicant is employed full time.
Enter 3 if the loan applicant is employed on contract.
Enter 4 other (add an additional column and specify the
employment status).
Enter 5 other (add an additional column and specify the
employment status).
Contract termination date
If the applicant IS employed on a contract basis then, In this
column, record the termination date ofthe contract
Contta~ ietJIDnatiortd~te .... ....
Enter date of contract termination in the format dd/mm/yy. Where
a contract termination date is not applicable, leave the space blank.
Employer name
Records the name ofthe employer with the purpose ofestablishing
whether the employer is involved in manufacturing, government,
car service, hospital, etc.
Employer riarn~i:-' ..••.....
Enter the name of the employer on single line (e.g. University of
Natal, City Royal Hotel etc).
Section/Suburb where workplace is situated
Records the section/suburb where the employer is situated.
Suburb whereeri)ployer issitiIated
Enter the suburb where workplace is situated on a single row e.g.
Scottsville, Willowton, Plessilaer, Dalton. The suburb where the
employer is situated may not always be provided in the address,
especially if a postal address is given. In this case the employer
should be located In the telephone directory, where a street
address can normally be obtained. This can be used to locate the
suburb on a map.
Town where workplace is situated
Records town! district where workplace is situated
Townldistrjcfw~~fielIlplo}'erissituated··' ........•........
Enter the name of the town or district in which the employer is
situated on a single row (e.g. Pietermaritzburg, Edendale, Cato
Ridge, Richmond).
Department where applicant is employed




ColumnN~Qit OepartIri~htwhere sampleapplic8nt emplQYecl .'.
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Recording Method Enter the department or division m which the applicant IS
employed in a single block.
Variable Name Work description
Variable description Records the type ofwork the applicant is involved in.
ColulDoNa,J#ey, Work.de$C;fipti()Il ',.
Recording Method Enter the work description of the applicant on a single block in the
data sheet.
Variable Name Te1ephone contact
Variable description Records whether the applicant can be contacted by telephone at
the workplace.
ColumllNam~> ",' , ,,' , Te1ephon~ '~ntaciatw~tk. .', ' . "-.' - ~ ',' -, " "
Recording Method Enter 1 if no telephonic contact can be made with the loan
applicant at work (has provided no telephone number or indicated
that no telephonic contact can be made).
Enter 2 if telephonic contact can be made but his contact is not
immediate (a work telephone number is provided but the contact is
not immediate).
Enter 3 if telephonic contact at the work place is by message only.
Enter 4 iftelephonic contact at the work place is immediate.
Variable Name Length of time employed at the current work place
Variable description Records the length of time that the applicant has been employed at
the current employer.
Column Name LerigtllofemplQyment at currentemployet
Recording Method Enter number that the applicant has been employed at the current
employer. If the number of months is computationally difficult to
enter, then enter the length of employment as number ofyears and
months (yy/mm).
Variable Name Length of time employed at the previous employer
Variable description Records the length of time the applicant was employed at the
previous employer.
Column Name- Lengtho(theelllployment atprevio:us eIIlployer
'. --'" F_~._ -.
Recording Method Enter number that the applicant has been employed at the previous
employer. If the number of months is computationally difficult to
enter, then enter the length of employment as number ofyears and
months (yy/mm).
Variable Name Net salary





Recording Method Enter the net monthly salary in Rand.
Variable Name Basic salary





Recording Method Enter the basic monthly salary in Rand.
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11. Details of Spouse/Closest RelativelFriend
Table 6 outlines the variables recording details of the spouse, closest relative or friend and
fonns part of the loan security provided by the applicant to MFOl. For rejected applicants
some of this infonnation is missing may influence the extent to which loan applicants are
granted loans or are rationed by MFO1.
Table 6 Details of loan applicant's spouse, relative or friend
Variable Description
Variable Name Details present
Variable description Records whether the loan applicant has provided the required
details on the spouse, relative or friend.
'Column Namt: •.... ······ISp()usedetmlsp.,~Seilt
.
Recording Method Enter 1 if the loan applicant has not provided details of the
souse, relative or friend (if these were simply not recorded by
MFOl for any reason other than the applicant not having
provided the details leave this space blank).
Enter 2 if the applicant has provided details of a spouse, relative
or friend.
Variable Name Relationship of the spouse, relative or friend to the loan applicant
Variable description Records the relationship of the individual whose details are being
recorded in this section to the client.
Column Name .. Relationshipto;client··· .
Recording Method Enter 1 if the relationship to the applicant is specified as none.
Enter 2 if a relative/aunt/uncle.
Enter 3 ifa sisterlbrother.
Enter 4 ifa parent.
Enter 5 if a wifelhusband.
Variable Name Gender of spouse, relative or friend




Recording Method Enter 1 if the spouse, relative or friend is a female.
Enter 2 ifthe spouse, relative or friend is a male.
Variable Name Employment status of spouse, relative or friend
Variable description Records whether the spouse, relative or friend IS employed or
unemployed
C()lumnName' .i. ." ..~ijipt9Yiti~~~'~~~W~~of:~p~~,Je1~~iYe·grm#n<l; .. ....""",,:.;":c.,/·"'.':?('-'·", ·,"C'· ,.:,.••.:,,;':.:.::.:..,'.:.:;.'
Recording Method Enter 1 if the spouse, relative or friend is unemployed (also enter
1 if spouse, relative or friend is a house wife).
Enter 2 if the spouse, relative or friend is employed.
Enter 3 if the spouse, relative or friend is self-emplOYed.
Variable Name Name of employer
Variable description Records place of employment of spouse/relative/friend
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Column Name Employe~name
Recording Method Enter the name of the employer m a single block in the data
sheet. Some confusion may arise if the spouse if self-employed. If
the applicant is self-employed then write the name of the
business. Where this is not given leave the block blank. If spouse,
relative or friend is a housewife, then leave this column blank. If
domestic worker, then leave column blank unless name of
employer is given.
Variable Name Address details ofemployer
Variable description Records whether a physical or postal address has been provided
for the spouse's, relative or friend's work place.
Column Nam~. Adqtess>det8.iJ.s·qfelllploYer
Recording Method Enter 1 if the spouse, relative or friend's employer address is
given as a post office box.
Enter 2 if the spouse, relative or friend's employer's address is
given as a physical address.
Enter 3 ifboth are provided.
Enter 4 ifnone are provided.
Variable Name Section/Suburb where employer is situated
Variable description Records the suburb m which the workplace of the spouse,
relative or friend is situated.
Column.Name Section/sulJfirlf~liereworkpl~ceis situat~
Recording Method Enter suburb name m a single block m the data sheet (e.g.
Scottsville, PMB Central, Dalton). Note: for rural towns there
may be no suburbs in which case enter the town name in this
block. In some instances the section/suburb may not be given as
a postal address is given. If this is the case, the address of the
employer may be found in the telephone directory and suburb
located on a map.
Variable Name Town/district where employer is situated
Variable description Records the town where the workplace of the spouse, relative or
friend is situated.
Column NaD:!e Town/district wher.e employefis situated
Recording Method Enter the town name where the applicant's spouse, relative or
friend IS employed m a single block m the data sheet (e.g.
Pietermaritzburg, Edendale, Dalton, Wartbur~).
Variable Name Department where applicant's spouse, relative or friend IS
employed.
Variable description Records the division/department in which the applicant's spouse,
relative or friend is employed.
ColuIfiIl Na'm~i' .... '. nepartmen~',wh~resP()uSe,re1a.t!ve or frje~d·is.c~~ploye(l
Recording Method Enter the division/department name in a single block in the data
sheet (e.g. hospital ward, kitchen, teaching). For self-employed
individuals record the type ofwork done or else leave blank.
Variable Name Employment category
Variable description Records category of employment of spouse, relative or friend
ha & & a
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ColumnNanu~ ... Employment category ofspouse; relative or friend
Recording Method Enter 0 if the spouse, relative or friend IS employed as an
unskilled worker.
Enter 1 if the spouse, relative or friend is employed as a skilled
worker, or is self-employed.
Variable Name Home telephone
Variable description Records whether the spouse, relative or friend has provided a
home telephone number
ColullinName -Home teleph6ne-()t;~pouse,relative.orfriend ....
",_"c'""
Recording Method Enter 1 ifNO home telephone number has been provided.
Enter 2 if spouse, relative or friend HAS provided a home
telephone number.
Variable Name Work telephone
Variable description Records whether the spouse, relative or friend has a work
telephone number.
.Column Na"me .. Work tele'phOn~ofspouse;•. relative or friend···.·
.. .;- •.-,.......... ,._. ,",_ • ...• ..., .•. '.:';0 •.•··;
Recording Method Enter 1 IS spouse, relative or friend has no work telephone
number.
Enter 2 if spouse, relative or friend has a work telephone
number.
12. Details of Co-signer
Table 7 outlines the information recorded on the loan applicants co-signer. It follows a very
similar format to the previous section and should be completed in exactly the same manner.










Has the applicant provided the details ofa co-signer
•••. Details()fco-si~er / ..••••. . .
Enter 1 if the applicant has NOT provided details of the co-
signer (if the details have been omitted for any reason other than
the applicant not providing the details of the co-signer to MFO1,
leave this column blank).
Enter 2 if the applicant has provided details of the co-signer.
Gender ofco-signer
Records the gender of the co-signer
Enter 1 if co-signer is a female
Enter 2 if co-signer is a male.
Exact location of residence
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Variable description Records whether the loan applicant has provided an exact
location of the residence in the physical address of the co-signer.
An exact location is defined as a home unit number or a street
address.
Column NalJ)e . .Exact loeation ofco-signer .
Recording Method Enter 1 if the sample loan applicant has provided a unit number,
street number or employers physical address if co-signer lives on
the employer's property.
Enter 2 if the sample loan applicant has stated that the co-signer
lives near to a particular place or has only given a Post Office
box address.
Enter 3 if no address details are given.
Variable Name Home address of co-signer
Recording Method
Variable description Records first line of the co-signer's address such as street name,
unit number, lace where residence is near to.
ItQr~"~~~f====l~TiT~~~~".;j"~"'~' .. "'.'
Enter the street name, Unit number, near school etc. in a single
block in the data sheet.
Variable Name Section/suburb of co-signer
le
Variable description Records the section or suburb where the co-signer lives
~~~;;".-.. ---+-S-e-ct-io-n/-..-su-o..,.)u....,,·t,....--Ov·-.·,~--,--:.~-~...:..,.::.,...._.-._-'~"""-.-11n-\T-p.~---. -"-----------i!
Recording Method Enter the section/suburb where the loan applicant lives (e.g.
Scottsville, Plessislaer, Willowton, KwaMashu, Azalea Location,
Pietermaritzburg Central). For small towns where there are no
suburbs enter the town name (e.g. Wartburg, New Hanover).
Variable Name Town/district where co-signer lives
Variable description
Column NaDlf .
Record the town where the co-signer is situated
Town/district·ofwhere co-signeT lives
Recording Method Enter the town name in a single block in the data sheet
(pietermaritzburg, Edendale, KwaMashu, Cato Ridge).
Variable Name Employment status of co-signer
",c<' .• '
Recording Method Enter 1 if the co-signer is unemployed (also enter one if co-
signer is a house-wife).
Enter 2 if the co-signer is employed by somebody.
Enter 3 if the co-signer is self-employed.
Variable description Records whether the co-signer is employed or unemployed
.( ~",:;-_...-.:-----t-:.~=--::_::-:-.:--'.,...----.:--, .........:;:-."._---.,;:-:-.-,....---=---.:....--,....-----.:...--=:.----8
Variable Name Employer name ofco-signer
Variable description Records the name ofthe employer of the co-signer.
C~I"Jij1i;;·. Z=«='=A<='<,=.... J";~~~,·~<··~--<·~2. ·"":.f;;';i»--xi··»'i _/, .•... ~
Recording Method Enter the employer name in a single block in the data sheet. For
domestic workers where no employer name may be given, enter
domestic worker in this block. For house-wife leave this column
blank. For self-employed individuals, enter a the business name
otherwise leave this block blank.
£$2 bC, & 22&.,& ZlJaAiA
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Variable Name Home telephone ofco-signer
Variable description Records whether the co-signer has a home telephone number
Column Naqt$} HQinetelephoneofco-:-signer '_
Recording Method Enter 1 ifco-signer has NO home telephone number.
Enter 2 ifco-signer DOES have a home telephone number.
Variable Name Work telephone ofco-signer
Variable description Records whether the co-signer has a work telephone number
. ',. ,,;,~ ...... :.,.,./., .: Wotk·telepllQne6fco.;signer
. '.'Co'umnNami' . '.
Recording Method Enter 1 ifthe co-signer has NO work telephone number.
Enter 2 if the co-signer DOES have a work telephone number.
13. Banking Details of Client
The banking details of the client can be obtained from the original application from which is














Banking details of sample applicant specified
Records whether the loan applicant has a any form of bank
account or not
Bank account specified .
Enter 1 if the applicant has no bank account
Enter 2 if the applicant does have some type ofbank account
Bank account type
Records the type ofbank account the loan applicant has
·.13~aCC()~!1ttyIie ' :......•.•.•...•.:.. •••.......:•...... \.....•.••.•..••
". . '. SaVings, Chequ~, Ttari~IIli~sion,CreditCard
Enter a 1 in the column block of the types of banking accounts
that the loan applicant has and 0 in those columns that are not
applicable.
Bank Name
Records the name of the bank at which the accounts are held
Barik'Name '.' .
Enter the name of the bank in one block provided on the data
sheet.
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14. Enquiry History of Applicant
Where as the information on applicant personal details is recorded only for the initial
application at MFO1, the variables for the following sections must be recorded for each
individual loan application. As time passes on, information on the enquiry history and loans
with other lenders may change and it is imperative that this information documented as
accurately as possible. Table 8 outlines information to be recorded in this section. The enquiry
and previous loan history may require considerable work as this section can only be entered
manually. All of the information in this section is obtained from the ITC records. Please note,
if additional columns have to be added to accommodate a category of lender or any other
specification that is not currently listed in the data sheet, add additional columns as required in
the data sheet and name them accordingly.
Table 8 Variables outlining the enquiry history of the loan applicant at the time
of loan application
Column Name Description





Records the total number of enquiries prior to the sample loan
enquiry date as listed by ITC client query report.
."....•.'. ' T(;)taI"Ilu~her,ofeIlquiti~~~atappI1((ati()q,#~t~:lurtPture, building,
clothing, &tail;baIik, IDicr(};.lender,iewell~rs;8iher. '.' .. ' .
Recording Method 1. Enter the total number enquiries the sample applicant made
before the date of enquiry of the sample loan by lender type.
For established MFO1 and other instalment accounts (re-
applications) and revolving loan accounts this may be more
difficult since such accounts may have no new enquiries listed
or may have been applied for a long time ago. In this case all
enquiries prior to the date at which the account was opened
(for repeat MFOl and other instalment accounts) and the date
at which the account became active (for active revolving
loans) are to be listed.
Variable Name Recent enquiry history
Records the total number of enquiries within 12 months of the
sample loan application as listed by the ITC client query report
by lender type.
." .N'l.l~beE.Qf~~~1.!ifi~s .. ~ad~"'1t!lltt12'1ll?~!~s.·()r~h~.,applicidiori
.' "date:·furrtit#re,;huildirig, clotfijt}g, ret8il;.·Q~g'¥p01, other
,....nP.~r()len9~rsje\v~llers,otper (addandnam~'additionalCoiumns
". .'. ..........> ',.. . '. > asnecess~);'>i'> •..•.. ">.r.~".<i:'" .'
Variable Description
I Column' Name
Recording Method 1. Enter the number of enquiries recorded on the ITC report that
were made within 12 months of the sample loan enquiry date.
This effectively means going back 12 months from 1 day prior
to the sample loan enquiry date and counting all the enquiries
made within this time period. For established MFOl and other
instalment accounts (re-applications) and revolving loan
accounts this may be more difficult since such accounts may














long time ago. In this case all enquiries 12 months prior to the
date at which the account was opened (for repeat MF01 and
other instalment accounts) and the date at which the account
became active (for active revolving loans) are to be listed.
Date ofmost recent enquiry
Records the date of the most recent enqutry prior to the sample
loan enquiry date.
1. Identify the most recent and second most recent enquiry date
prior to the sample loan enquiry date and enter the date in the
format dd/mm/yy. For established MF01 and other instalment
accounts (re-applications) and revolving loan accounts this
may be more difficult since such accounts may have no new
enquiries listed or may have been applied for a long time ago.
In this case the dates of the most recent and second most
recent enquIry pnor to the date at which the account was
opened (for repeat MFO1 and other instalment accounts) and
the date at which the account became active (for active
revolving loans) are to be listed.
Date ofoldest enquiry
Records the date of the oldest loan enquIry prior to the sample
loan enquiry documented on the ITC report.
I. Identify the oldest enqmry date pnor to the sample loan
application/enquiry and enter the date in the format dd/mm/yy.
For established MF01 and other instalment accounts (re-
applications) and revolving loan accounts the enquIry date IS
the date at which the account was opened (for repeat MF01
and other instalment accounts) and the date at which the
account became active (for active revolving loans).
Number of default judgements at application
Records the number of derogatory public records Gudgements)
against the applicant at the time of enauirv of the sample loan.
1. Enter the number derogatory public records at the sample
loan enquiry date. For established MF01 and other instalment
accounts (re-applications) and revolving loan accounts the
enquiry date is the date at which the account was opened (for
repeat MFO1 and other instalment accounts) and the date at
which the account became active (for active revolving loans).
Date ofjudgement
Records the date of the most recent default judgement.
Recording Method 1. Enter the date of the most recent default judgement against
the applicant at the sample loan enquIry date m the format
dd/mm/yy. For established instalment accounts (re-
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applications) and revolving loan accounts this may be more
difficult since such accounts may have been applied for a long
time ago. In this case the date at which the account was
opened (for instalment accounts) and the date at which the
account became active (for revolving loans) is to be used. If
there has been no judgement then leave this block blank.
Variable Name Enquiry conversions
Variable Description
Number· of enquiry conversions prior to the sample. loan
.application. date: Furniture, Building, Clothing, Retail, Bank,
Micro-lender, Jewellers, Other· (add additional column and
specify).·. . . .
Recording Method
Variable Name
Recording this variable requires that the enquiry record be
matched with the payment profiles:
1. Match the names of the lenders which appear in the enquiry
record with those which appear in the payment profile. (Note:
some lenders belong to different parent companies. Please
consult the accompanying companies list in appendix B to
make sure that the lenders given in enquiries belong to the
same holding company).
2. Look at the date of the enquiry and the date on which the
account was opened. If they are within reasonable proximity
(up to 1 month - this can sometimes be longer) then the
enquiry has been converted into a loan. However, both dates
must be before enquiry date of the sample loan.
3. Record the number of enquiries per lender group which have
been converted to loans. For established MF01 and
instalment accounts (re-applications) and revolving loan
accounts this may be more difficult since no new enquiries
may be registered or such accounts may have been applied for
a long time ago. In this case the date at which the account
was opened (for MF01 and instalment accounts) and the date
at which the account became active (for revolving loans) is
taken as the date for assessing prior enquiries.
Recent enquiry conversions
Recording this variable requires that the enquiry record be
matched with the payment profiles (recent enquiries refer to




Records the number of recent enquiries prior to the sample loan
enquiry that were converted into loans by lender type (i.e. which
lenders granted applicants loans subsequent to the enquiry prior
11--(",-.-:-;.-Tla-me~----l~~~~,¥~~~~~~jitf!1!ift~~~;~Nh~f,!""
.• .. .... application date:. furniture, bu.iJding~ clothing, retail,· bank; micrb~











1. Match the names of the lenders which appear in the enquiry
record with those which appear in the payment profile. (Note:
some lenders belong to different parent companies. Please
consult the accompanying companies list in appendix B to
make sure that the lenders given in enquiries belong to the
same holding company).
2. Look at the date of the enquiry and the date on which the
account was opened. If they are within reasonable proximity
(up to 1 month - this can sometimes be longer) then the
enquiry has been converted into a loan. However, both dates
must be before the date of enquiry of the sample loan.
3. Record the number of enquiries per lender group which have
been converted to loans. For established MF01 and other
instalment accounts (re-applications) and revolving loan
accounts this may be more difficult since no new enquiries
may be registered or these accounts may have been applied
for a long time ago. In this case the date at which the account
was opened (for MF01 and other instalment accounts) and
the date at which the account became active (for revolving
loans) is to be used as the date from which one assess the
enquiries.
Loan principal amounts of converted loans




1. For those enquiries converted into loans record the lender
type which approved the loan and loan principal amount
which the lender approved. This information is available from
the ITC sheet as the opening balance.
2. The lender types will be entered in the following code form:
Enter 1 ifloan from furniture lender
Enter 2 if loan from building supplies retailer
Enter 3 if loan from clothing retailer
Enter 4 ifloan from general retailer
Enter 5 if loan from bank
Enter 6 if loan from MFO1
Enter 7 ifloan from other micro-lender
Enter 8 if loan from jeweller
Enter 9 ifother (specify)
Enquiries ofrejected applicants
Records the number of enquiries made by rejected MFO1
applicants at other lenders after the date ofrejection
1. Record the number of enquiries made by the rejected MFO1
loan applicant at other lenders after the date of rejection. This
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is divided into the different lender types.
Variable Name Loans approved after rejection
Variable Description
.- . ~T~~":.1 ......,.,
Records the number of loans approved after the date of rejection
by lender type.
Number, oferiquires at other lenders converted after the date of
rejection atMF()l :fumiture, building, clothing, retail, banking,
micro~lender;jew~ner, (other) .
Recording Methods 1. Of those enquiries made by the rejected MFO1 client after the
date ofrejection, count the number which were converted into
loans. This is achieved by matching the accounts opened in
the ITC payment profile to the enquiries.
15. Repayment performance of ACTIVE Loans at the time of Loan Application
This section essentially looks at the loan repayment performance of other active loans that
were disbursed prior to the specified period of time but which were still being repaid during
the specified period of 1 February 1998 to 31 January 1999. All the variables come from the
perspective of what were the number and status of other active loans at the time of loan
application. Table 9 describes the variables and the recording method.




Repayment Status ofActive Accounts
Records the repayment status ofactive instalment and revolving loans
the sample applicant had at other lender at the time of application for
the sample loan. Active accounts are defined as all those accounts
which were actively being repaid at the time of application of the
sample loan. Note for established MF01 and other instalment loans
as well as revolving loans the application date is taken to be the date
the account was opened (for instalment loans) or the date the account
became active (for revolving sample loans). It also includes those
loan accounts which have been opened but where loan repayments
only commenced after the sample loan enquiry date. For example a
loan may have been opened at Edgars on the 14 January 1998 but the
repayments are only due on the 1 April 1998. On the 4 February 1998
the sample applicant applied at MFO1. Hence the loan at Edgars
would fall under the not et due cate 0 .
i~tb t iwa !§;;i;U;¥' g
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D~!~ ofmost recentdefinqlJellCY .'
Recording Method 1. From the ITC client query report look at the payment profiles and
establish whether loans that were disbursed prior to the sample
loan enquiry date have reached maturity (were paid-up) or were
closed for some other reason or not. Accounts that have been
closed or stopped as indicated by the payment profile status codes
(see appendix A) are to be ignored.
2. Establish which loan accounts are still being paid off at the sample
loan enquiry date and which loan accounts at other lenders were
opened prior to the sample loan enquiry date but where
repayments only commenced after the sample loan enquiry date.
Revolving accounts which have no active repayment are still
classified as active since they can become active at any time.
3. Once the active accounts have been identified, the number of loans
falling into the various repayment categories must be entered by
lender type.
4. Repayment performance is assessed ONE month prior to the
month in which the application of the sample loan was made. At
the time count the number of loans that were not yet due, which
were current (showed only 0 in the payment profile), which were 1
- 2 months in arrears (showed no greater than a 2 in the payment
profile one month prior to month in which sample loan application
was made), and greater or equal to 3 months in arrears (as for 2
months but the payment profile showed a 3 or greater). Loans are
classified as NOT DUE if they were opened prior to the sample
loan enquiry date but loan repayments commenced after the
sample loan enquiry date.
5. Of all the revolving credit loans and all the instalment loans
establish the most recent and most serious delinquency level from
the payment profiles (record the number given in the payment
profile). For example if a payment profile showed a maximum of 4
months in arrears one month prior the month in which the sample
loan application was made, then enter a 4. Ifthere are no counts in
a particular category, then enter a O. Enter the dates of the most
recent and most serious delinquency levels of the revolving and
instalment type loans in the format (mm/yy). If none of the active
loans showed delin uenc then leave this block blank.
Variable Name Instalment values of active loans at the time ofloan application
Variable Description Records the lender type to which the instalment is due and the
instalment amounts of the active loans that the applicant was repaying
at the date of sample loan enquiry, as well as, the instalments of those
loans which were not active at the time of loan application but which
become a able durin the re a ent eriod of the sam le loan..• i·"·~~:~~~:rzI~~~erl~~Wilie simple
h1stihrt~rtt:~ou .Y:()f~pened accimnts but ;which are ~(}tactive at
sam~le lbailac:.ciic~lI(jiraat~ .C • •• ..",". • ,," .
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V~ilue.ofinstalment . Lender type




1. Enter the code (see preVIous section) for the lender type of the
various instalment amounts the sample applicant was repaying and
for those loans not yet due.
2. Enter the instalment amounts from the ITC client query reports for
all the loans that the borrower was actively repaying at the time of
the loan application where the instalment amount for instalment 1
must correspond with the lender type under instalment 1.
3. Enter the lender type per instalment for loans not yet due
4. Determine the instalment amounts of those loans not yet due but
where the instalments become payable during the repayment term
of the sample loan. For this identify those loans from the payment
profile where the account was opened prior the date of the sample
loan enquIry and where instalments on such accounts became
payable during the repayment term of the current loan. This
implies that the payment profile becomes active during the
repayment period of the sample loan.
Loan principal amounts of active loans at the time ofapplication
Records the loan principal amounts of the active loans and loans not
yet due.
Column NaDlt .'. ....~aJ1.;(p~?ip~~ouJl~S of a;ctive loans ,by lender we at sample, loan
appucatic>upate:i '. " . , '
Vll1~~o(1(ian.: _Lender type
'Lpan'pnncipalawounts .of opened ··.accounts but which are not active
atsatllp.~?l()~~pplication date:
J+la:n~9~~t.·.···"'··«:i;.··.....• Lendertype. .
(For 'arldltionalinstalments addcoJurnns' and S~tNity j,.
Recording Method 1. Record the loan principal amounts of the loans for which the
instalments were recorded in the previous variable
16. Loans with COMPLETED Loan Maturity
This section records data on all those loans which were closed! paid up at the time when the
application was made for the sample loan. Table 3.10 describes the variables and recording
method ofthe data for this section.
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Table 3.10 Data (or COMPLETED loans (loans which have been paid-up)
Description
Variable Account status on loans closed/paid-up within the last 12 months of
the sample application
Variable Description Records the number ofclosed accounts for a given status category
Column Nam'E ~. TotalnumJ)er;Jbaii§c}()sed within. 12 morit~'pfiorto th~'saniple loan'
I··appiis~tiR#7;~~t~~t~;tB~••f()l.Io~~~tatus: •.at5SCQn~~d.(A),. c,10se<J' (C),
.,. i<iisPllted·..(Q);::r~PO·~~fSS.~(J),han?ed~over(L),'pm(FuPi(P)'· returned
mau(Rj,wntteti~otihv),' < ....., _ .....: .....
Recording Method 1. From the ITC payment profile, identify all accounts which have
been closed or stopped within a 12 month period prior to the date
of enquiry, starting one prior to sample loan application date and
going back 12 months. For repeat MFOl loans and repeat
instalment loans at other lenders the date of enquiry is taken as the
date at which the loan account was opened. For active revolving
accounts the application date is taken as the date at which the
account became active. The status on the closed loans may vary
and is given in code form by ITC (see Appendix A).
2. Enter the number of accounts which fall into the specified account
status category. Where a particular lender category has no counts
for a specified loan status, then record a 0 in that data block.
Variable Account status on all loans closed/paid-up prior to the sample loan
application date.
Variable Description Records the number of closed accounts for a given status category
1. From the ITC payment profile, identify all accounts which have
been closed or stopped prior to the date of enquiry of the sample
loan, starting one month prior to the sample loan application date
and going back as far as the ITC report will permit. For repeat
MFO 1 loans and repeat instalment loans at other lenders the date
of application is taken as the date at which the loan account was
opened. For active revolving accounts the application date is taken
as the date at which the account became active. The status on the
closed loans may vary and are given in code form by ITC (see
Appendix A).
2. Enter the number of accounts which fall into the specified account
status category. Where a particular lender category has no counts
for a specified loan status, then record a 0 in that data block.
Total number of loans closed within the last 12 months with the
status J, L, W
.
CollllllnNlirrttTotalnurnbe~·t()a1lsicIosed priOr tothes~ple1d3,.h;a.ppli~ti()n date
.Withthefol1o~gstatus: abs<x>nded .(A)~ .dlbsedtC)~disp\.lted (D),
T~possessed (i)u:handed-over (L), paid-up,(p)' returnoo' mail (R),
... ······.writteti~off (W),:: . ..', .
Recording Method
Variable
Variable Description Records the specified status for all accounts closed within 12 months
of the sample loan application date by lender type
Column Name !~taFpumb~J"gtlo~'SIQ.S,edt'Yithiit·:q~§'9tlispl}P.rt.to.the sample
loan application'dateWitlltheSiatus J, L,Wby lenoer tyJ,e:fuiniture,
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.buil?ing,(;lothit)g,i~etmIers, .banking, .¥FO1,' ,other micro':lenders,
consumerdedit -:ew~llers, other.' '
Recording Method 1. From the ITC payment profile, for all loans identified as closed
within a 12 months prior to the sample loan enquiry date, starting
one month prior to the sample loan application date and going
back 12 months, record the number of loans with the status J, L,
or W for the various lender types. Where a particular lender
category has no counts for a specified loan status, then record a 0




Total number ofloans closed with the status J, L, W
Records the s ecified status for all closed accounts blender e
1. From the ITC payment profile, for all loans identified as closed
prior to the sample loan enquiry date, starting one month prior to
the sample loan application date, and going back as far as the ITC
report will permit, record the number ofloans with the status J, L,
or W for the various lender types. Where a particular lender
category has no counts for a specified loan status, then record a 0
in that data block.
Total number ofloans closed/paid-up withinthe last 12 months prior
to the a lication date with the status A, R
1. From the ITC payment profile, for all loans identified as closed
within a 12 month period prior to the sample loan application date,
starting one month prior to the sample loan application date and
going back 12 months, record the number of loans with the status
A or R for the various lender types. Where a particular lender
category has no counts for a specified loan status, then record a 0
in that data block.
Records the s ecified status for all closed accounts blender t e
T{)ta!npi!Ioei'~(l~~c'I~s~withfn 12tPo~i~\'pfi~r J<>the sample'
l{)an., ~pplifCltl{)ni~4~i~;~tll th~status A~.,~' 12y.le!ld~r type:, furnitllre,
·'.building;,cl9th1Pg,)r?4Iil~rs, banking, MFOl,.~otner micro-lenders,






Total number of loans closed/paid-up prior to the application date
with the status A, R
Records the s ecified status for all closed accounts blender t e
1. From the ITC payment profile, for all loans identified as closed
prior to the sample loan enquiry date, starting one month prior to
the sample loan application date and going back as far as the ITC
report permits, record the number of loans with the status A or R








Recording Method 1. Identify the payment profiles of all loans that were paid-up or
closed at the date of enquiry of the sample loan. These should
already have been identified following the data requirements above
(except the time span is different for the two sections of this
variable). Note: this variable has two sections. The first records
the repayment profiles of all loans closed or paid-up within a 24
month period of the sample enquiry date and the second records
the repayment profiles of all the loans, going back as far as the
ITC report will permit, closed/paid-up at the sample loan enquiry
date.
2. Examine the payment profiles of these loans and count the number
of loans per lender category that fall into the different repayment
performance categories and insert this number into the respective
columns.
3. Repayment performance is assessed on the basis where payment
profiles of completed loans which show no worse than a 0 on the
payment profile fall into the (0) category, loans which show no
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worse than a 2 fall into the 1 to 2 category, loans which show a 3
or worse fall into the ~3 category.
4. Of all closed/ paid-up loans establish the most recent and most
serious delinquency level from the payment profiles (record the
number given in the payment profile). If the loan had no
delinquency then record a zero. Enter the dates of the most recent
and most serious delinquency levels in the format (mm/yy). Ifthere
are no delinquency levels, leave this column blank.
Variable Name
Variable Description
Loan principal amounts of all closed/paid-up loans
Records the value of the loan principal of the closed/paid-up loans by
lender type
.. ' ,..... ..~.,.
····/·:I.1~·;/~~~~p~(m1.8~Pts>~f••alll()~s·.whidh··httve ... ibeeD .••.clOsed/paid-up
;~'/~~f;lg~l\~ate: .. te~der TYJ)e:" .... .... . .
Recording Method 1. Of all the loans which have closed/paid-up as identified in this
section, record the loan principal amount and the lender type to
which this loan principal amount applies.
17. Repayment Status of active OTHER loans at SAMPLE LOAN MATURITY
This section records the repayment status of other loans which the loan applicant (and now
borrower) was actively repaying at the time of loan maturity of the sample loan. This section is
important in tracking the financial management of the various loan accounts which the sample
borrower may have during the sample loan repayment period. The layout is similar to the
previous section except that time period at which the loan repayment performance of other
loans is reviewed changes. Table 3.11 provides an outline of the data required and the
recording method.




Repayment status of active loans from other lenders prior to the due
ofthe first instalment of the sam le MFO1 loan
These variables record the repayment status of all active loans at the
due date of the first instalment of the sample MFO1 loan. Active
loans are defined here has those loan accounts which are open
and which have an active payment profile. This includes all loans
that began their repayment schedule prior to the sample loan enquiry
date and which are not paid up by sample loan maturity date. It
includes all loans which were active at the sample loan enquiry date







1. Loans falling into this section must comply with the definition as
stated in the variable description section. The repayment status of
active loans from other lenders is assessed at one month prior to
the due date of the first instalment. This information is provided by
the payment profile of the ITC report.
2. Enter the number of loans falling into the specified repayment
categories.
3. The specification is as follows: If the payment profile of the active
loans from other lenders have no more than a 0 in the entire
payment profile one month prior to the instalment due date of the
first instalment of the sample MFO1 loan, then the loan IS
classified as a O. If the payment profile has no more than a 2 one
month prior to the due date of the first instalment of the sample
MFOl loan, the loan IS counted in the 1 - 2 category. If the
payment profile has a 3 or greater in the payment profile one
month prior to the date of the first instalment, the loan is counted
in the ~ 3 category. Where there are no counts for a particular
category, enter 0 in the data block.
Repayment status of active loans from other lenders during the loan
repayment period ofthe samole MFO1 loan
These variables record the repayment status of all active loans during
loan repayment period of the sample MFO1 loan. Active loans are
defined here has those loan accounts which are open and which
have an active payment profile. This includes all loans that began
their repayment schedule prior to the sample loan enquiry date and
which are not paid up by sample loan maturity date. It includes all
loans which were active at the sample loan enquiry date and which
became paid-up prior to the sample loan maturity date.
~~paYIP.ent ...•. peff?rmflfl~of activ~l?ans fj-~Pl.oth~rl~p.4ers in the
...Inonth ofthe final'contrabted instalment ofth~ san1pl~MFOlloan:
furnitUre; "buildiIlg,"c'othIDg, retaiL ,bankiAg""'"MF01;'other micro-
J~nders, consu~er crefiit, je'\Vellers(for addit~onal'lend~r types add
~lumns and soeclrvillelender type) ....., '.. .
1. Loans falling into this section must comply with the definition as
stated in the variable description section. The repayment status of
active loans from other lenders is assessed during the repayment
period of the sample MFO1 loan. This information is provided by
the payment profile ofthe ITC report.
2. The repayment performance is assessed from the month of the first
instalment of the sample MFO1 loan to the month of the last
contracted instalment of the sample MFO1 loan. Count and enter
the number of loans falling into the specified repayment categories
in this time period.
3. The specification is as follows: If the payment profile of the other
active loans have no more than a 0 in their payment profile during
the loan repayment period of the sample MFO1 loan, then the loan














during the repayment period of the sample MFO1 loan, the loan is
counted in the 1 - 2 category. If the payment profile has a 3 or
greater in the payment profile during the repayment period of the
sample MFOl loan, the loan is counted in the ~ 3 category. Where
there are no counts for a particular category, enter 0 in the data
block.
Instalment amount ofactive loans at first instalment ofMFOI .
Records the instalment amounts of the active loans from other
lenders the sample borrower was repaying at the first instalment of
the MFO1 loan.
Instalment amounts of active loans from other lenders at first
instalment ofthe sample MFOI.loan:
Instalment amount.· . Lender Type
1. For each active loan identified in the previous variable, record the
instalment amount and the lender type to which that instalment
belongs in the data block.
Number of loans from other lenders opened prior to the first
instalment of the MFO1 loan and which became active in the month
ofthe first instalment.
Records the number of loans from other lenders that were opened
prior to the date of the first instalment but which commenced
repayment during or after the repayment period of the sample MFO1
loan.
Number of loans from other lenders opened prior to the first
instalment ofthe MFO1 loan, but which only became active during or
after the repayment term of the MFO1 loan by lender type: furniture,
building, clothing, retail, banking, micro-lenders, consumer credit,
jewellers, other
1. Count the number of loans from other lenders which were opened
prior to the due date of the first instalment of the sample MFO1
loan, which have not been closed off for any reason, and which
either start their repayments during or after the repayment term of
the sample MFOl loan. For lender types which score no counts,
enter a 0 in that data block.
Number of loans from other lenders opened during the loan
repayment period ofthe MFO1 sample loan
Records the number of loans from other lenders that are opened
during the loan repayment period of the sample MFOl loan. These
accounts may become active during the repayment period of the
sample MFO1 loan or they may only become active after the
repayment period ofthe sample MFO1 loan.
Number of loarisfr()mother lend~rs opened during the repayment
period of the sampleMFO1loan by lender type: furniture, building,
clothing, retail, banking, micro-lender, jeweller, conSumer credit,
other. .
1. Count the number of loans from other lenders which are opened






either start their repayments during or after the repayment term of
sample MFO1 loan (starting from the month of the first instalment
through the to the month of the last contracted instalment with
MFOI). For lender types which score no counts, enter a 0 in that
data block.
Loan repayment performance of loans from other lenders opened
prior to or during the repayment period of the sample MFO1 loan
(and which became active during or after the repayment period of the
sample MFOlloan) in the month of the final contracted instalment of
the MFOlloan blender e:
Records the repayment status of loans from other lenders which were
opened during the repayment period of the sample MFO1 loan in the
month of the last contracted instalment of the MFO1 sample loan.
This means that the sample applicants began repaying these loans
DURING or AFTER the repayment period of the sample loans. This
would be indicated by a payment profile becoming active during or
after the re a ent term of sam le MFO1 loans in the ITC re ort.
."';fUrruffire,~uiiditlg;'ltcf6tllliig~> reUU1,hailldn~Mf'0tother micro-
.J~nders, je'Well~rs'::({<>r~ddition31"lender iyp~s~ddcolurnns and
s'ec· the·l~mde{.'"e' .,
1 -2'~j(n:Qtdue .
1. Loans falling into this section must comply with the definition as
stated in the variable description section. The repayment status of
the opened accounts is assessed in the month if the final contracted
instalment of the sample MFO1 loan. This information is provided
by the payment profile of the ITC report.
2. For those loans which have become active, assess the repayment
performance and count the number of loans by lender types which
fall into the specified repayment categories and insert this number
in the block provided. Count the number of loans which are open
but which have not become active and insert this number in the not
due column.
3. The repayment specification is as follows: If the payment profile of
the active loans have no more than a 0 in the entire payment
profile one month prior to the instalment due date, then the loan is
classified as a o. If the payment profile has no more than a 2 one
month prior to the due date of the first instalment, the loan is
counted in the 1 - 2 category. If the payment profile has a 3 or
greater in the payment profile one month prior to the date of the
first instalment, the loan is counted in the ~ 3 category. If the loan
repayments of loans from other lenders had not commenced
during the repayment term of the sample MFO1 loan, the loan is


















cate 0 ,enter 0 in the data block.
Loan principal and instalment amounts of loans which were opened
prior the due date of the sample MFO1 loans which became active
durin or after the re a ent tenn ofthe sam le MFO1 loan
Records the principal and instalment amount of loans from other
lenders which have been opened before loan repayment tenn of the
sample MFO1, loan but which were not due prior to the first
instalment of the sam le MFO1 loan.
111r~I~fJ~l~l~I!PE
Under ""1~>~ ", "Princi 'alAmount Instahtient,amoupf
1. Record the lender type and the corresponding loan and instalment
amounts of loans as identified in the variable descri tion section.
Loan principal and instalment amounts of loans which were opened
durin the re a ent eriod of the sam le MFO1 loan.
Records the principal loan and instalment amounts of loans from
other lenders which have been opened during the loan repayment
tenn ofthe sam le MFO1 loan.
tOan~Rfi9ciIi~f~d ·,!tl~~ent.~~unts:ofloans<opened· during' the'
rffj~Ilt!~~~~;t~~~l~~i:,,:I§~;'.~;tmlllent,'aniount
1. Record the lender type and the corresponding loan and instalment
amounts of loans as identified in the variable descri tion section.
Number of loans from other lenders which were active in the month
of the last contracted instalment of the sam le MFO1 loan.
Records the total number of active loans at the maturity date of the
sam le loan from MFO1.
NUfuberof;ld¥sfr0in(),ther'lend~rs aCtiveinfhemonth6f the last
c~~tr~eted ~s~~f':ofthesample MFOl loan' by lender type:
fUmiwi~, .~uil~Wg,' c~ot!iing, reblij,' banklng, -micro~lender~ jeweller,ronsurtlercredlt;<>ther:"'" -'",' "... - ,', '
1. Record the number of loans with active (repaying the loan) loan
repayment profiles in the month of the last contracted instalment
of the sam le MFO1 loan.
Instalment amounts of all loans from other lenders which were active
in the month of the last contracted instalment of the sample MFO1
loan.
Records the instalment amounts ofall active loans from other lenders
in the month in which the sam le loan from MFO1 became mature.
1. Record the instalment amounts for loans identified in the previous
variable.
New loan en uiries





during the repayment period of the sample loan.
Number of new loan enquiries during the repayment period of the
sampleMFOlloanby lender type: .
fuI11iture,buildmg,clothil1g, retail, banking, .MFO1, other micro-
lenders, jewellers, other (add columns and specify).
1. Identify all new applications/enquiries with other lenders during
the repayment period of sample loans where the repayment period
is taken from the date of enquiry up to and including the month of
the last contracted instalment with MFO1.
2. Count the number of new enquiries during this period and record
the number applications by lender type under the respective




Variables to be included in the Analysis of Loan Data
1. General Notes
• The period for analysis is defined as 1 January 1998 to 30 June 1999 (to coincide with the
financial month of MFO1. All loans disbursed to clients during this period at the
Pietermaritzburg branch are to be included in the analysis.
1.1 Has the loan application been accepted or rejected _
(ifthe loan has been rejected, then go to section 3)
1.2 Client number _
2. Loan Repayment Status of Accepted Clients
This section will have to be repeated for each loan disbursed to the client. Hence it is
important to document the loan number for each client.
• Transaction view reports generated on the 3 June 1999 are required for each client.
2.1 Date ofloan disbursement
2.2 Date offirst instalment
2.3 Number ofcontracted instalments
2.4 Number ofactual instalments made
2.5 Total principal paid (Rand)
2.6 Total interest paid (Rand)
2.7 Early settlement discount (Rand)
2.8 Interest on overdue account paid (Rand)
2.9 The following classification applies to each loan in the clients
portfolio for the period under consideration:
The client may fall into one ofthe following repayment categories:
2.9.1 Loans that are up to date:
(includes all loans which are not yet fully due but for which
instalments due- or at least principal portion of instalments due- have
been paid on time) - loans falling into this category will probably occur
towards the end ofthe cut-off period
2.9.2 Loans without repayment problems
(includes all loans with completed maturities where instalments have
been repaid on time without being refinanced by DLP)
2.9.3 Loans which have been refinanced by DLP
Loans refinanced where instalments were paid:
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Current
2 - 14 days in arrears
15 - 60 days in arrears
Greater than 60 days in arrears
2.9.4 Loans not fully due repaid with arrears
Loans not fully due, but where instalments (any) have been paid:
2 - 14 days after due date
15 - 60 days after due date
2.9.5 Loans with completed maturity repaid with arrears
Includes all loans that have been fully repaid where instalments were
paid:
2 - 14 days after due date
15 - 60 days after due date
2.9.6 Loans which are in default
Includes all loans where instalments have been:
Paid more than 60 days after the due date
No payment has been received
The following includes documentation of the principal, interest and date of repayment which is
supplementary to the above data (This may require manual data capture)
Value ofPrincipal Payment







Value of Interest Payment
















3. Borrower Personal Characteristics
3.1 Gender (MIF)
3.2 Date ofbirth/ID number (to get age)
3.3 Language of preference ofclient





3.5 Length ofresidence at above address (years, months)






3.8 If client owns or rents house:
What are monthly rent! bond repayments
With which bank is bond held
3.9 Does client have own telephone (yes/no)
3.10 Does client have a contact telephone number (yes/no)
3.11 Where is post sent to (home, work, postal)
4. Employment Details
4.1 Employment status (full-time, part-time, casual, contract)
4.2 Ifon contract, list contract termination date (dd-mm-yy)
4.2 Details ofcurrent employer:
Company name
Employer address
4.3 Occupation of client
4.4 Category ofemployment (e.g. unskilled)
4.5 Department
4.7 Can client be contacted by telephone (yes/ no)
4.8 If yes, is contact immediate (yes, no, message only)
4.9 Length ofemployment at current employer (years/months)
4. 10 Length ofemployment at previous employer (years/months)
4.11 Monthly income details:
Net salary (Rand)
Basic salary (Rand)
4.12 Gross monthly income (Rand)
4.13 Date when salary is paid
5. Details of SpouselParent/Closest Relative
5. 1 Relationship to client (husband, wife, cousin etc.)
5.2 Home contact telephone number (yes/no)
5.3 Gender




5.8 Department in which employed
5.9 Can spouse be contacted at work by telephone (yes/no)
5. 10 Income details of relative:
Net monthly salary (Rand)
Basic monthly salary (Rand)
6. Banking Details of Client
6.1 Does the client have a credit card or not (yes/no)
6.2 Ifyes to 6.1, what is the card type
6.3 Ifyes to 6.1 what is the expiry date
6.4 Does the client have other banking accounts (yes/no)






6.5 Name ofbanking institution(s)
6.6 Branch(es) where account(s) is held
7. Loan Details of Client
7.1 Loan number
7.2 Date ofloan application (dd-mm-yy)
7.3 Date ofloan rejection (dd-mm-yy)
7.4 Date ofloan approval (dd-mm-yy)
7.5 Loan amount requested (Rand)
7.6 Loan amount granted (Rand)
7.7 Interest rate charged (% per month)
7.8 Monthly instalment (Rand)
7.9 Date ofloan disbursement (dd-mm-yy)
7.10 Total amount disbursed to borrower (Rand)
(This is amount is net of settlement ofexisting loans)
7.11 Method of payment (e.g. cash, cheque, money order,
debit order, Post Office)
7.12 Loan approved by (e.g. senior assistant, branch manger etc)
7.13 Loan term (4 months or 6 months)
8. Details of Personal Reference
8.1 Gender
8.2 Home telephone (yes/no)
8.3 Address of reference:
8.4 Employer details
8.5 Work telephone (yes/no)
9. Previous Loan History of Client with Credit Indemnity
9.1 Is this a first time or repeat client
9.2 Has client made previous enquiries at MF01 (yes/no)
9.3 Ifyes, then:










9.4 Ifrepeat borrower, then:
Please note the definitions of repayment status:
Current: ifloans were settled with all instalments being paid on time
Refinanced: Ifloan was refinanced by DLP
Arrears: Ifloans were settled with instalments being paid 30 - 60 days or more after due date
Default: Ifloans were settled with instalments being paid 61 days or more after their due date
Previous loan Date loan was taken Loan amount Repayment Status ofLoan
no. (current, refinanced arrears,
default)·
•
9.5 At the time ofthe current loan application, was borrower
in repayment cycle ofany other loan (yes/no)
Ifyes,
9.6 What is the amount outstanding on this loan (Rand)
9.7 What are the monthly instalments on this loan (Rand)
9.8 Is the loan repayment current/in arrears! in default
(according to definitions in section 2)
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10. Loan History with Other Lending Institutions
• It would be useful to obtain an ITC printout which provides infonnation on client loan
history
• The list below, details infonnation required on previous loan history of clients
10.1 Dat~ ofITC Enquiry
10.2 Enquiry history of applicant









10.3 Payment Profile on Loans:
(this will have to be repeated for every loan taken out)
10.4 Supplier ofcredit
10.5 Date account opened (dd-mm-yy)
10.6 Opening balance (Rand)
10.7 Instalment (Rand)
10.8 Current balance (Rand)
10.9 Repayment regime (e.g. montWy)
10.10 Date offirst instalment (mm-yy)
10.11 Date ofmost recent instalment (mm-yy)
10.12 Number of instalments due so far
10.13 Number ofinstalments current
10.14 Number ofinstalments 1 month in arrears
10.15 Number of instalments 2 months in arrears
10.16 Number of instalments 3 months in arrears
10.17 Were the two most recent instalments in arrears
10.18 Empirica score (ifany)
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APPENDIXE
Data sheet for Borrower Case Files
Please complete the questions below as accurately as possible. Should you have any queries,
please contact me at tel: (0331)-2605493.
1.1 Borrower Account Number:
1.2 Area Code:
1.3 Closest Town to Borrower:
2. Loan Characteristics
2.1 Date of loan application:
2.2 Date ofloan approval:
2.3 Date of draw-down:




2.8 Total loan amount:




2.12 Total instalment amount:
2.13 Administration fee:
2.14 Frequency of repayments:
2.15 Loan term:
2.14 Date offirst instalment:
2.15 Date ofloan maturity:
2.16 Collateral required for loan:
(tick relevant block)
2.17 Loan purpose:
(tick the relevant block)
3. Business Characteristics
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Unsecured (Life-a; Admission ofDebt)
Crop cession
Permission to Occupy Certificate
Asset: machinery
Asset : building







Machinery and Equipment Purchases












3.3 Years ofexperience in more than five years
running operation being two to five years
financed less than two years
(tick relevant block)
3.4 Size ofland holding: Ha
3.5 Area planted to crop: Ha
I I3.6 Is the crop irrigated ? Yes No
I I3.7 Extension services: Adequate Inadequate
3.8 Land tenure arrangements:
(Explain)







Large organisations (Wholesalers, factories, etc)
3.10 Total value ofassets at date ofapplication R
3.11 Total value of liabilities at date of loan application R
3.12 Estimated income generated from operations:
(per annum) R
3.13 Total cost ofoperations
(excluding AS instalment) R
(per annum)
3.14 A5 instalment including
interest (per annum) R
3.15 Net income: R
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4. Personal Characteristics
4.1 Borrower Age years
~4.2 Gender I Male Female
4.3 Number ofDependants
4.4 Level ofEducation
4.5 Has the borrower done any
additional courses which
could assist him in running
his business ?
4.6 If yes, please list these
courses?
4.7 Present occupation ?
4.8 Present income
!6====Y=e=s====d=====N=O=_===-





4.9 Is the borrower employed
full or part-time in
operations requiring finance? I Full Time Part Time ~
4.10 Does the borrower employ
someone else to manage hisI Yes No Ioperations requiring finance:
I !4.11 Ifyes, is it family : Yes No
4.12 Where does the borrower
make payments?
4.13 Approximate distance from
borrower to where payments
are made?
4.14 Nearest branch to borrower?
4.15 Credit rating from credit
bureau: '====G=O=Od======:!.====B=a=d=====!l~
4.16
Has the borrower previously Ib==o====Y=e=s=====,======N=O=====!had loans from AS ? ~ ,
(Loans prior to the current
loan)
4.17 Ifyes, were the loans repaid
(cross relevant box)
Repaid, no problems
Repaid after maturity date
Loan written off
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4.18 Has the borrower any other
current loans with AS? ~ Yes No ~
(loans that matured during
or after the year this loan
was approved)
4.19 Ifyes, what amount is
outstanding? R
4.20 Has the borrower any
current loans with other
institutions ? I Yes No
. (Loans that matured during
or after the year this loan
was approved)
4.21 Ifyes, what is the amount
outstanding? R
4.22 Number ofvisits ofloan
officer with client during
duration of the loan :
